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Abstract 
The determinants of audit fees and report lag: A comparative study of Egypt and 
the UK 
Despite the occurrence of recent economic and political events such as the global 
financial crisis and Arab spring in the Middle East, researchers have not addressed the 
effects of such events on the auditing profession. That is has given a motive to this study 
to explore this point of research. This study has three main objectives. The first objective 
is to investigate the determinants of audit fees and audit report timeliness in the Egyptian 
and UK contexts. The second objective is to point out how the economic and political 
events could affect these determinants. The third objective is to make a comparison 
between the response of auditors towards economic and political instability in both 
countries. These objectives are set to solve the research problem of this study which is to 
investigate how the price behaviour of audit fees and report timeliness can vary in two 
different contexts: Egypt and the UK, and to highlight how auditors respond to such 
economic (Global Financial Crisis) and political events (Egyptian Revolution).  A special 
attention has been addressed to tourism industry while investigat ing audit pricing and 
timeliness decisions throughout this study for two reasons. First, tourism industry play a 
critical role for the economy of many developing and developed countries. Second, 
tourism industry is highly affected by any economic and polit ical events. For these 
reasons, tourism industry is surrounded by high risk during the economic or political 
instability, and thus this might result in special procedures and decisions taken by the 
auditors regarding tourism industry clients during instable periods. 
To take into account the most recent economic and political events, the study sample 
covers the period of six financial years from 2008 to 2013. This sample period has been 
chosen to capture the global financial crisis that has taken place during 2008-2009 and 
also to investigate the effects of the Egyptian revolution that has taken place on January 
25, 2011, and subsequent political events. The study sample includes 212 Egyptian 
companies listed in the Egyptian stock market and the top 350 companies (FTSE 350) 
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listed in the London Stock Exchange. For guaranteeing the preciseness of the findings, 
advanced panel data Prais-Winsten statistical analysis technique has been used throughout 
this study. 
Results of this study reveal consistency between Egypt and UK in most signs of 
coefficients of audit fees determinants. However, a lot of differences exist between the 
audit report lag determinants in the Egyptian and UK context that suggest that a one-
size-fits-all approach cannot be generalized in audit report lag determinants for various 
countries. Despite that tourism is a very risky industry that is easily affected by economic 
and political instability, results reported in Egypt and UK reveal that audit fees charged 
and audit delay reported for tourism did not differ from other industries in both contexts. 
Results also reveal that Big N auditing firms in the UK have competitive advantages of 
not charging an audit fee premium and offering a more timely audit report than non-big 
N. These advantages increase the demand of Big N in the UK and increase their 
dominance. On the other side, in Egypt, Big N auditing firms do not offer such advantage 
of timely audit reports than non-big N, besides, they charge their clients with audit fee 
premium. That enabled medium sized and small auditing firms to penetrate the Egyptian 
auditing market and increase their market share, and thus, Big N dominance is not high 
in the Egyptian audit market as that in the UK. 
Different auditor responses to global financial crisis (GFC) have been documented in 
both countries. As auditors in Egypt decreased their audit fees and offered more timely 
audit report to face the economic recession and the anxiety of investors accompanied 
with the GFC. However, neither the pricing of auditing services nor the audit report lag 
have been affected during the GFC in the UK audit market. 
According to the results of this study, during the Egyptian Revolution, auditors tended 
to charge audit fees premium without increasing/decreasing audit delay. This implies that 
the increase in audit fees during revolution was a risk premium due to the instability in 
economic and political conditions and was not accompanied by any increase in audit 
effort and delay.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
In recent years, dispersion in the ownership of companies highly raised agency problems 
related to conflict of interest and information asymmetry. Management usually has an 
information advantage because of its involvement in day-to-day operations, on the other 
side, shareholders do not have much information about the company they own its stocks. 
This information advantage can be used by management in increasing their own personal 
gains at the expense of shareholders. As management can manipulate the financial 
information to receive any bonuses tied to the company's earnings.  Therefore, managers 
cannot be fully trusted, and need to be monitored by an independent party to protect the 
shareholders’ rights. Hereby, the importance of auditing raised. 
Auditing is the monitoring activity performed by an independent source to mitigate the 
agency problems. Dispersion of ownership increased the demand on auditing services 
for monitoring of management, protecting shareholders’ rights and verification of 
reported financial information to interested parties. As illustrated in Figure 1-1, the 
objective of the auditing process and procedures performed by the audit firm is to issue 
an audit report. The audit report is issued with the financial statements to provide an 
assurance and opinion for different users about the reliability of the financial statements. 
The audit report had to be timely to provide the required assurance to users in the right 
time. In exchange of providing auditing services, audit fees are charged to the company. 
Pricing of audit services and timeliness of audit delay decisions depend on different 
variables, some of them are related to client attributes, other are related to auditing and 
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engagements attributes, moreover, surrounding and economic events could have an 
effect too. 
Figure 1-1 The Auditing Process 
 
Source: The author 
 
The recent accounting scandals occurred at the beginning of the twenty-first century, and 
the collapse of giant companies, like Enron and WorldCom in the US, have highlighted 
the audit failure in uncovering fraud and threatened public trust in the auditing 
profession. To restore public confidence, regulators issued more rules to govern the 
auditing profession and increase auditing requirements. Researchers began to pay more 
attention to investigate the demand and supply sides challenged the auditing profession 
and auditing research has become more widespread in recent years. Many researchers 
have been interested in how auditing services are priced and the importance of audit 
report timeliness on influencing decision making of investors.  
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But despite the extensive literature on audit fees and audit report lag, still prior studies 
present mixed results and gap in literature exist in several aspects which need to be 
furtherly explored. Audit fees and delay literature reveals a scarcity of research relating 
to the determinants of audit fees and delay in the Middle East especially in Egypt, and 
non-recent data has been used in studies of the UK audit market. Moreover, the 
occurrence of recent economic and political events such as the global financial crisis and 
Arab spring in the Middle East have not been addressed by researchers to explore the 
effects of such events on the auditing profession.  
That is why the research problem is to investigate the price behaviour of audit fees and 
report timeliness in two different contexts: Egypt and the UK, and to highlight how auditors 
respond to economic (Global Financial Crisis) and political events (Egyptian Revolution). 
For guaranteeing the preciseness of the findings, panel data advanced econometric statistical 
analysis techniques are used throughout this study which have not been used by most prior 
literature which used only pure cross-sectional or time series techniques. 
1.2 Study motivations and gaps in literature 
The main motivation for this study is to address the gaps in the prior research and 
contribute to the literature, motivations of the study problems can be summarized as 
follows: 
• Despite the extensive literature on determinants of audit fees and audit report lag, 
much is still unknown about whether is it applicable to generalize the results on 
developing countries or not. As most of the prior studies are conducted in more 
developed countries. A review of the audit fees and delay literature reveals a 
scarcity of research relating to the determinants of audit fees and delay in the 
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Middle East especially in Egypt. That is why this was a motive for the study to 
explore determinants of audit fees and report lag in a developing country like 
Egypt. 
• Moreover, few studies have investigated UK audit market. Also, the existing 
studies on the UK audit market suffered from using non-recent data. Therefore, 
there is a strong incentive to update audit fees and report lag research in the UK.  
• Despite the advantages of the panel data methodology, this approach has not been 
used by most prior literature that used pure cross-sectional or time series 
techniques. A strong incentive for this study is to provide more accurate estimates 
by using advanced econometric techniques in analysing data.  
• According to (Taylor and Simon, 1999), the majority of studies of audit fees are 
conducted in a single country and this is considered a significant gap in the 
literature at which most studies are conducted in isolation within the borders of a 
single country. Understanding the differences in auditors’ behaviour in pricing 
audit services and timely reporting across countries will add to the literature. 
Therefore, it is a good motive to contribute to the literature by analysing 
differences between countries, such as Egypt and the UK, in the pricing of audit 
services and timeliness of audit report. 
• An important difference exists between the Egyptian and UK audit markets. The 
Egyptian audit market is much competitive, at which small and medium sized 
auditing firms have a greater market share than Big N auditing firms. On the other 
side, the UK audit market is dominated by Big N auditing firms that audit more 
than 95% of companies in the stock market. There has been a motive by the 
current study to analyse if the pricing decisions and timeliness of auditors in both 
markets have any effect on increasing/decreasing Big N dominance. 
• A review of audit fees and delay literature also reveals a scarcity of research 
relating to the effect of global financial crisis on them either in developed or 
developing countries. So, there is a strong incentive to make a comparison 
between auditors’ response to global financial crisis in a developing country (e.g. 
Egypt) and a developed country (e.g. UK) that can update the literature and 
contribute to it. 
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• The occurrence of Arab spring with the recent political events and changes in the 
Middle East creates a strong incentive to investigate how political changes could 
have effect on the assessment of the business risk of the companies in the stock 
market and the related response by auditors towards these risks. 
 
1.3 Research objectives and questions 
Based on prior literature, agency, signalling, political and client size theories, this study 
first objective is to investigate the determinants of audit fees and audit report timeliness 
in the Egyptian and UK contexts. Political and economic events may increase business 
risk and recession in the economy, and thus auditors' pricing decisions and report delay 
could be affected. So, the second objective of this study is to point out how the economic 
and political events could affect these determinants. The third objective of this study is 
to make a comparison between the response of auditors towards economic and political 
instability in both countries.  
Main research questions of this study are:  
• Do audit fees and report lag decisions differ:   
i. from one client to another depending on client specific attributes? 
ii. for each auditing process according to auditor and engagement attributes? 
iii. across different countries e.g. Egypt and the UK? 
• During periods of economic and political changes, 
i. Does the auditing profession is affected and auditors modify their pricing 
and timeliness decisions?  
ii. Does client industry risk assessment increase for certain industries (such 
as tourism industry) and therefore pricing and timeliness of audit services 
are affected?  
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• How do auditors take a combination of choices regarding audit pricing and 
timeliness decisions in response to various attributes and events surrounding the 
audit engagement? 
• How Big N dominance in the audit market is related to pricing and timeliness 
decisions taken by the auditors? 
1.4 Scope of the study 
The occurrence of Arab spring and the recent political events in the Middle East have 
not been explored by prior literature of auditing. Egypt, as one of the Arab countries at 
which several revolutions and political events have occurred, is considered a proper 
context to explore how the auditing profession is affected during political events. 
Moreover, after reviewing audit fees and delay literature, the researcher found a scarcity 
of research relating to the effect of global financial crisis on them either in developed or 
developing countries. This constitutes another gap in auditing literature, and a motive for 
this study to explore how one of the most important economic events can impact auditing 
profession in a developed and stable country like the UK, in comparison with, a less 
developed non-stable country like Egypt. Another interesting difference exists between 
Egyptian and the UK audit markets in that the Egyptian audit market is considered much 
competitive, at which small and medium sized auditing firms have a greater market share 
than Big N auditing firms. On the other side, the UK audit market is dominated by Big 
N auditing firms that audit more than 95% of companies in the stock market. That has 
created a motive for the current study to find out whether the pricing decisions and 
timeliness of auditors in both markets have any relation with the increase/decrease of Big 
N dominance. 
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To take into account the above economic and political events the study sample covers 
the period of six financial years from 2008 to 2013. This sample period has been chosen 
to capture the global financial crisis that has taken place during 2008-2009 and also to 
investigate the effects of the Egyptian revolution that has taken place on January 25, 
2011, and subsequent political events. The study sample includes 212 Egyptian 
companies listed in the Egyptian stock market and the top 350 companies (FTSE 350) 
listed in the London Stock Exchange. Following prior studies, the financial sector has 
been excluded from the sample because of the nature of their operations that set them 
completely apart from non-financial sector during performing the auditing procedures. 
A special interest has been addressed to tourism industry throughout this study for 
several reasons. First, tourism industry play a critical role for the economy of many 
countries and constitutes 40% of the income of the world’s countries, and therefore it is 
a very important sector in many developing and developed countries. Second, tourism 
industry is highly affected by any economic and political events. As in time of economic 
crisis, people will tend to cover essentials of life, and therefore recreational activities will 
decline, and thus tourism sector worldwide has been highly affected during the global 
financial crisis, and according to United Nations World Tourism Organization 
(UNWTO), the growth of tourism industry declined by 5% during year 2008 with a high 
deterioration of the demand of international tourists. Also, for tourism industry to bloom, 
it requires stable political conditions at which tourists feel safe and out of harm. That is 
why, political instability would highly affect the tourism industry and threaten tourism 
investments. As after the Egyptian revolution, the ministry of tourism in Egypt reported 
a decline in tourism revenues by 17.75 % in 2011 and 45% decline by 2013 compared to 
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tourism revenues in year 2010. For these reasons, tourism industry is surrounded by high 
risk during the economic or political instability, and thus this might result in special 
procedures and decisions taken by the auditors regarding tourism industry clients during 
instable periods. That is why it has been a motive for our study to give special attention 
for tourism sector while investigating audit pricing and timeliness decisions. 
 
1.5 Contribution of the study to Literature gap 
This study contributes to the auditing literature in a number of ways:  
• This research explores the determinants of audit fees and audit delay in Egypt in 
a period of six years (2008-2013). No previous study has tried to examine the 
determinants of audit fees and audit delay in Egypt during that period.  This study 
contributes to the literature by investigating auditors’ reaction in the Middle East 
context where very little literature has explored. 
• This study is the first to apply political theory besides the agency, signalling and 
client size theories to examine the effect of unstable political and economic 
conditions on the auditing profession. Consistent with these theories, this study 
offers evidence that auditors tend to increase their fees in periods of severe 
political instability, as what occurred after the revolution, which is another 
contribution for this study. This can be interpreted by the more professional 
scepticism acted by the auditors in the form of higher assessed litigation risk 
which auditors try to mitigate -in such instable conditions- by increasing their 
fees. 
• To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no study published has investigated 
the effect of global financial crisis (GFC) on the pricing of audit services and the 
audit report timeliness in Egypt or in the UK. Therefore, this study is considered 
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the first study to capture GFC effects on determinants of audit fees and audit delay 
in both contexts. 
• This study also contributes to the literature by presenting a comparison between 
determinants of audit fees and audit delay in Egypt and the UK. To argue that 
one-size-fits-all approach used by researchers in generalizing determinants of 
auditing pricing and delay is considered inappropriate.  
• The study presents a comparison between two different markets. A competitive 
market at which medium and small sized auditing firms have large market share 
as in the case of Egypt. On the other side, the UK market is less competitive at 
which the Big 4 dominant more than 95% of the audit market. This comparison 
highlights how Big 4 dominance could affect some determinants of audit fees and 
audit report timeliness. 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This chapter presented an overview of the importance of auditing research, the research 
problem, scope, objectives and questions addressed. Motives of the study, gaps in 
literature and contributions to the literature have also been briefly discussed. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter two gives an overview of 
the economic development of the Egyptian economy, political changes and the auditing 
profession. Then the UK context is addressed with a highlight of the effect of global 
financial crisis on the British economy and the audit regulations applied. Then a brief 
discussion is presented of the importance of tourism industry globally and in the 
Egyptian and UK contexts with an overview of how tourism industry is affected by 
political and economic instability. 
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Chapter three illustrates the related theoretical frameworks inspired from prior seminal 
studies of audit fees and delay, agency theory, signalling, political and client size 
theories. These theories are employed during this study to analyse determinants of audit 
fees and audit delay.  
Then chapter four presents a review of literature on determinants of audit fees and audit 
report lag. During the review of each determinant, literature gap is identified with 
suggestions to bridge this gap. A conceptual framework is then outlined. 
Chapter five presents the methodology adopted in this study. First a discussion of 
research philosophies, paradigms and approaches commonly used by researchers are 
highlighted. Then the appropriate methodology chosen by the researcher in the current 
study is then discussed. Then data sources, sample characteristics and selection has been 
illustrated. After that, choices of analytical techniques (OLS, random-effects, fixed-
effects, Prais-Winsten) are justified. Measures of dependent and independent variables 
are illustrated for each model. Then related hypotheses for each model has been 
demonstrated. 
Chapter six presents and discusses the descriptive statistics of the Egyptian context. 
Followed by a presentation of correlation analysis. Results of audit fees and delay models 
in the Egyptian context are then discussed with inferences drawn from tests of the 
hypotheses. Analysis and discussion of auditor choices concerning mixing decisions of 
audit pricing and timeliness are then presented. Further analysis concerning the effect of 
audit firm size and client size have been also illustrated. 
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Chapter seven presents and discuss the descriptive statistics of the UK context. Followed 
by the presentation of correlation analysis. Results of audit fees and delay models in the 
UK context are then discussed with inferences drawn from tests of the hypotheses. 
Analysis and discussion of auditor choices concerning mixing decisions of audit pricing 
and timeliness are then presented. Further analysis concerning the effect client size has 
been also illustrated. 
Chapter eight presents and discuss a comparison of audit fees and delay results between 
Egypt and the UK contexts. Also, a comparison of auditor decisions and choices in the 
two contexts are analysed. 
Chapter nine presents a summary of this study. It summarizes the findings and 
conclusions of this study. Significance, conclusions and implications are drawn. 
Potential limitations and recommendations for future research are then presented. 
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Chapter 2 An overview of Egyptian and UK contexts and 
Tourism Industry 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief summary of the economic environment 
in the Egyptian and UK contexts, highlighting recent economic and political events 
affecting those contexts during the sample period of this study. The chapter also 
discussed the regulatory structure of auditing profession in Egypt and the UK to 
show the similarity between the audit regulations applied in both contexts. Finally, 
an overview of the global importance of tourism industry is presented with an outline 
of how tourism industry is affected by economic and political stability. 
2.2 Egyptian Context 
The Egyptian economy has different phases of bloom and recession. Events related to 
Egypt in the last three decades can be classified into three phases; the first phase is during 
the application of the economic reform program (from 1990 to 2007), the second phase 
is during the global financial crisis (2008-2009) and the third phase which is affected by 
political instability connected with the Egyptian Revolution (2011-2013). These phases 
will be briefly summarized in the following sections to highlight the important events 
affected the Egyptian context during the period of study of this research.  
Auditing profession development in any country is associated with the bloom of the 
economy, investments, stock market performance and shareholders increase. A brief 
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discussion of the audit profession structure, development and regulations in the Egyptian 
environment will be highlighted afterwards in this chapter.  
2.2.1 Economic and political events affecting Egyptian economy 
2.2.1.1 Economic reform program (1990-2007) 
By May 1991, Egypt began an economic reform program by the help of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), at which the economy began to bloom in number of ways (Rubin, 
2015): 
• Budget deficit decreasing from 15% in 1991 to 6% in 1992 to only 1% in 1995 
• Job opportunities increased to 460000 opportunity a year, for period 1992-2000, 
compared to 250000 during 1976 to 1992.  
• Tourism industry increased sharply realizing $4.3 billion in 2000 versus $1.1 
billion in 1990.  
• Value of stocks increased from representing only 5% of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in 1994 to 20% in 2000. 
However, the economic reform fade out by the beginning of 2000s with budget deficit 
jumping back to 9% of GDP due to several reasons such as; liquidity shortage, negative 
performance of stock market, September events in USA, terrorism attacks in Luxor 
(Bekheit, 2008). By 2004, a new cabinet has been appointed by Mubarak (the president 
of Egypt at that time) and the economic reform was accelerated again with 70% increase 
in tourism and exports during 2006-2007 (Rubin, 2015). Then the global financial crisis 
hit the Egyptian economy in 2008-2009, as will be discussed in the next section. Then 
the Egyptian Revolution occurred in 2011 that will be discussed later in this chapter.  
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2.2.1.2 Global financial crisis (2008-2009) 
The financial crisis 2008-2009 was considered as the most horrible financial crisis since 
the Great Depression 1930s, at which collapse threatened the global financial system 
(Thakor, 2015). Lack of confidence prevailed among investors all over the world, 
causing 60%-70% reduction in stock exchange indices (Kopliku, 2010). 
Developing countries had been relatively less affected by the global financial crisis 
(GFC), but still every economy in the world has relatively entered a recession. According 
to Zaytoun et al. (2010), the growth rate in the Egyptian economy has been adversely 
affected by the global financial crisis, as it declined from 7.2 % (for 2007-2008) to 4.7 
% (for 2008-2009), with decline in job opportunities by 13% and the loss of US $20 
billion of foreign exchange amounts. 
Sectors that depend on external markets and world demand are more likely to be affected 
by GFC. That is why tourism industry is one of the sectors that was highly affected by 
the global financial crisis. In time of crisis, people tend to cover essentials of life, and 
therefore recreational activities decline, and thus tourism sector worldwide is highly 
affected (Zaytoun et al., 2010). The GFC resulted in a serious setback in the tourism 
industry, as according to United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), the 
growth of tourism industry declined by 5% during year 2008 with a high deterioration of 
the demand of international tourists (UNWTO, 2010). Moreover, according to World 
Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), during the global financial crisis, the tourism 
industry share in global GDP decreased by 0.5% due to the economic recession 
accompanied with this financial crisis. Moreover, according to the report of Egyptian 
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Ministry of Economic and Development (MED), Suez Canal and Tourism sectors were 
the most adversely sectors affected in the Egyptian economy during the GFC (MED, 
2009), as shown in figure 2-1. More details of the effect of GFC on the tourism industry 
is discussed later in this chapter. 
Figure 2-1 Growth Rates for Tourism and Other Activities in Egypt during 2007-2009 
 
Source: Ministry of Economic and Development report (MED, 2009) 
2.2.1.3  The Egyptian revolution (2011-2013) 
On October 1981, Mubarak has been appointed as the president of Egypt after the 
assassination of Sadat the previous president of Egypt. Mubarak has tried to adopt an 
economic reform programme for the Egyptian economy, however, little progress had 
been achieved especially by the beginning of 2000s as discussed in the previous sections. 
In recent years, there was a tremendous increase in corruption, injustice, inequality, and 
economic deterioration that affected the living conditions for most Egyptian citizens 
(Arafa, 2012). 
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After three decades of declining GDP and increase in unemployment rate, falsified 
parliamentary elections, inequality in income distribution, Arab spring begin to shine in 
Egypt and the Egyptian revolution went on January 25, 2011 (Elmassri et al., 2016). On 
February 11, 2011, and after nearly 30 years, Mubarak waived from being the president 
of Egypt. 
The Egyptian revolution was a transformative event at the political and economic sides, 
whereas, it has not reaped its benefits yet (Hosny et al., 2014). Post-revolution, social 
expectations were relatively high for a better living standards. Different segments of 
workers and employees hit strikes for pay increase despite the declining production and 
the inflation increase in the Egyptian economy at that time. Strikes continued and the 
economic performance of Egyptian economy declined with decreasing foreign currency 
reserves that had not been sufficient for imports (Elmassri et al., 2016). Moreover, the 
annual GDP has dropped from 5%-6% (between 2000-2010) to 1.82% in 2011 and 
continued to deteriorate up till year 2014 (Abdel-latif and Mishra, 2016). 
Instability of economic conditions and political conflicts accompanied with terrorism 
had threatened the security in Egypt during the period from 2011- 2013 and led to 
uncertainty by investors in the Egyptian business (Elmassri et al., 2016). Hosny et al. 
(2014) study examined how the Egyptian revolution has affected its economy. The study 
reported that sectors that has been faster in growing before the revolution are the ones 
that were highly deteriorated after the revolution. This has been the case for tourism 
industry that has been growing fast and blooming before the revolution. Tourism industry 
in Egypt was dramatically affected, revenues of tourism sector sharply declined during 
the revolution if compared with 2010 revenues. As according to the Egyptian Ministry 
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of Tourism, tourism industry began to achieve higher revenues with more than $12.5 
billion by the end of 2010. However, by the beginning of Egyptian revolution on 2011, 
a severe decline in tourism revenues began to happen. According to Egyptian Ministry 
of Tourism, tourism industry achieved $8.8 billion in 2011 and $5.9 billion in 2013.  
Auditors are expected to increase their professional scepticism and effort to respond to 
risky environment to avoid the higher probability of audit failure and damage of 
reputation. Auditors can respond to such risks using different strategies: (i) resign from 
the engagement or (ii) issue non-standard audit report or (iii) increase audit effort (Xu et 
al., 2013) or (iv) increase audit fees for the risk premium or (iiv) a mix of all of these 
strategies. Prior literature (Simunic, 1980; Seetharaman et al., 2002; Choi et al., 2008) 
supports the strategy of increasing audit effort by auditors in risky environments, so that 
they can defend their decisions in case of audit failure. The increase in audit effort may 
be in the form of collecting more audit evidence, increasing audit procedures, hiring 
more experienced experts and audit staff. This increase in audit effort may be reflected 
in both audit report lag and audit fees. Moreover, the risk surrounding the tourism 
industry during economic and political changes may affect the assessment of audit risk 
by auditors for companies working in this industry, and therefore may affect their audit 
fees and effort. Did auditors increase audit fees during the recent events as a 
compensation of higher risk cost during those events? Or did they increase audit fees due 
to an increase of audit effort? Or did they decrease audit fees due to recession in the audit 
market? This study main purpose is to find out which strategies have been adopted by 
auditors in Egypt to face recent economic and political events, i.e. GFC and Egyptian 
revolution. 
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2.2.2 Audit profession development, structure and regulations in Egypt 
The economic reform adopted in Egypt in the last three decades has broadened the 
auditing market in the Egyptian economy. The Big N auditing firms, established in UK 
and USA, begin to operate in Egypt (Ebaya, 2015; Khlif and Samaha, 2016). Big N 
auditing firms operate in Egypt by directly supervising affiliates in exchange of a share 
of profit of these affiliates (El-diasty, 2008). The Big N international affiliations in Egypt 
have assisted in increasing the quality of audit services in the Egyptian audit market 
(Khlif and Samaha, 2016). 
External auditing in Egypt is required by Company law 159/1981, the accounting 
practice law 133/1951, the capital market law 95/1992 and the Banking law, these set of 
laws represent the legal framework of the auditing profession in Egypt (El-Safty, 2009).  
The Egyptian Society of Accountants and Auditors (ESAA) plays an important role in 
the auditing profession in Egypt. ESAA, established in 1946 , is the first professional 
body supervising and organizing accountants and auditors in Egypt and is responsible 
for (El-Safty, 2009): 
i. supervising the training and education of accountants and auditors,  
ii. developing the accounting and auditing profession,  
iii. establishing professional standards by selecting the international accounting and 
auditing standards suitable for the Egyptian environment and translate it into 
Arabic considering any specific requirements for the Egyptian laws. 
ESAA membership is voluntary, and has 1200 members , 785 of them are actively 
practicing the accounting and auditing profession, members of ESAA should satisfy at 
least one of the following requirements (Samaha and Hegazy, 2010): 
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- At least three years of accounting or auditing practice and passing the ESAA two-
part examination or holding a doctoral degree in accounting 
- Membership of a chartered institute in any acceptable foreign professional body 
(providing the pass of Egyptian tax law and Company Law examinations by 
ESAA) 
In 1997, Ministerial Decree 478/1997 established the Permanent Committee for 
Accounting and Auditing standards to set those standards. However, ESAA was, in 
practice, responsible for issuing auditing standards by translating ISA into Arabic version 
and the final draft was submitted to the Permanent Committee for discussion and 
adoption, and this was the first issue of the Egyptian Standards of Auditing (ESA) (El-
Safty, 2009).  
In 2008, Ministerial Decree 166/2008 approved the issuance of 38 Egyptian audit 
standards to replace current standards, and they were in the Arabic version of related 
International Standards on Auditing (ISA). The introduction of ESA also stated that  ISA 
should be applied in the case of the absence of appropriate ESA (El-Safty, 2009; Samaha 
and Hegazy, 2010).  
On August 2002, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) applied some new rules that aims 
to maintain the timeliness and fair presentation of the financial statements. In 2007, CMA 
issued a code of ethics for auditors that discuss issues of independence, conflict of 
interest, competence, hiring of auditors and related audit fees…etc. This code of ethics 
is very similar to the APB Ethical Standards applied in the UK context that will be 
discussed later in this chapter.  
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Regarding pricing of audit services, the Company law 159/1981 stated that audit fees 
should be determined by the General Assembly of Stakeholders (or at least the Assembly 
determine the maximum range of audit fees) to maintain the independence of the auditors 
from the management, so that the management cannot use the audit fees as a tool to make 
pressure on the auditor to uncover any misstatement (Hamad, 2016). 
The Egyptian auditing profession and regulations are considered very close to that in the 
USA and UK, with auditing standards similar to the ISA that will be discussed in much 
detail later in this chapter. 
2.3 The UK context 
During 2000s, the UK had been one of the major developed economies and considered 
one of the highest economic growth rates and the strongest country in the European 
Union, up till the second quarter of 2008 when the UK entered the recession of GFC 
(Davis, 2007). 
2.3.1 Global financial crisis effect on UK 
A big shock occurred on September, 2008 when one of the largest banks in the world 
(Lehman Brothers) filed for bankruptcy, and this was the beginning of the global 
financial crisis (Kopliku, 2010). According to, Thakor (2015), many factors have 
contributed to the occurrence of the financial crisis, including, politics, fraud, monetary 
policies and fragmented regulatory structure. Companies faced a challenging 
environment of economic recession and illiquid markets which exposed companies to 
higher risk of violation of debt contracts and bankruptcy.  
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Both developed and developing countries have been affected, but with different degree. 
A contraction hit developed countries in a range of 3%-3.5% and developing countries 
of range 1.5%-2.5% (Zaytoun et al., 2010). A deep recession has affected the United 
States leading to the loss of nine million jobs in the period from 2008-2009 (Thakor, 
2015). A budget deficit of 13% in 2010 was reported for the United Kingdom which has 
been considered the highest deficit in the G20 countries (Kopliku, 2010).  
The British bank “Northern Rock” was the first commercial bank that asked for funding 
emergency from the British government as a result of the crisis (CFR, 2009). Except the 
agriculture sector, all elements of the British economy slowed down, with the sharpest 
shrink in the manufacturing sector that has been contracting by 4.6% (BBC, 2009). 
From figure 2-2, it is apparent that UK GDP has been hit sharply during the GFC, at 
which the GDP growth fall down to -2 which can be recognized as the greatest fall in 
GDP in UK in the last three decades. Moreover, as illustrated in figure 2-3, by the end 
of 2008, after the GFC, unemployment started to rise sharply with a rate over 5% or 1.6 
million. 
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Figure 2-2 The UK GDP Growth 
 
Source: (BBC, 2015) 
Figure 2-3 Unemployment and Jobseeker's Allowance in the UK 1992-2011 
 
Source: (BBC, 2015) 
This recession that has affected different countries and sectors during the GFC, increased 
the business risk associated with different companies in different sectors. Client’s higher 
risk can affect the auditing profession, as these conditions will create additional pressures 
on auditors to increase their audit procedures, audit time and may be audit fees. A risk 
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premium also could be charged as a compensation for higher litigation risk that auditors 
may face in case if they did not signal clients with going concern issues before they fail. 
Xu et al. (2013) reported an increase in audit fees in Australia during the global financial 
crisis and justified this increase because of the higher client related business risk during 
economic downturn. 
However, audit services as any other service could face lower demand in periods of 
economic recession. Economic downturn can decrease the demand for audit services and 
increase the competition in the audit market. Therefore, audit fee discounts could happen 
to attract clients to demand audit services. This was proved by Krishnan and Zhang 
(2014) who found that clients have negotiated lower audit fees in USA during the global 
financial crisis. Moreover, Niemi (2002) on his study on Finland listed companies 
indicated that clients who reported losses usually pay lower audit fees than those clients 
achieving higher profits. Literature did not much explore the impact of global financial 
crisis on the auditing profession, and even empirical findings gave mixed evidence. 
2.3.2 Audit regulations in the UK 
The UK government has undertaken accounting and auditing reforms in 2002 after the 
recent accounting scandals and corporate failures to maintain the effectiveness of 
auditing profession and the quality of financial reporting. By 2004, the APB issued the 
International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) (UK and Ireland) based on the ISA issued by 
the IAASB (International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board). The APB also 
issued Ethical Standards to provide guidance on specific issues concerning fees, 
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economic dependence, litigation and other specific circumstances that may adversely 
auditor’s independence and objectivity. 
International Standards on Auditing (ISA) gives guidance regarding auditor 
independence and explains the nature and scope of an audit. According to ISA, the 
purpose of an audit is to express an opinion by the auditor on whether the financial 
statements are fairly stated or not to enhance the confidence of users in the financial 
statements (ISA200, 2010).  
The basis of pricing audit services is the agreed upon audit fee with the client before 
undertaking the audit process. Paragraphs 6 (b) and 12 of (ISA210, 2010) state that audit 
fees should be agreed upon and stated in the audit engagement letter. Pricing of audit 
services reflects the time, skills and experience of the audit staff taking into the 
consideration the competitiveness of the audit market. ISAs and Ethical standards did 
not provide a definite basis to calculate audit fees, however, they defined the framework 
and the guidelines the auditor have to follow while pricing audit services to maintain 
auditor’s independence, objectivity and professional due care. 
According to all applicable auditing and ethical standards, the audit partner shall assign 
sufficient audit staff with required skills and time to perform the auditing process 
irrespective of the audit fee charged. Moreover, APB 5 states that total fees for audit and 
non-audit services should not exceed a certain percentage (10% for listed companies, 
15% for non-listed companies) of the annual fee income of the audit firm. This 
percentage should not be exceeded for keeping the auditing firm economically 
independent, and safeguard the auditor’s independence and objectivity. Maintaining the 
auditing firm economically independent from the audited company is fundamental for 
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the auditors’ objectivity to, in cases of, disagreement with management or issuance of a 
non-standard audit opinion (Para. 31, 32, 36). 
ISA also give guidance on the form and content of the audit report. Paragraph A19 and 
A20 of ISA 700/2012 state that the audit report date on a company’s financial statements 
shall be the date at which the auditor has gathered all information, approved all available 
evidence and expressed the appropriate audit opinion on the financial statements 
(ISA700, 2012). Paragraphs A48 and A49 of ISA 200 give important guidelines for the 
auditor concerning the timeliness of financial reporting and the balance between benefit 
and cost (ISA200, 2010). It states that financial statements users expect the auditor to 
issue his opinion in a reasonable period of time. Therefore, appropriate planning is 
required by the auditing firm with sufficient allocation of audit time and resources to 
conduct an audit and to issue the audit report in a timely manner.  
2.4 Tourism Industry 
2.4.1 Global importance of tourism industry 
Tourism plays an important role that contributes to the economy of many countries. 
According to World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO), tourism industry is the main 
source of income for around 40% of the world’s countries (UNWTO, 2009).  
Due to the attractive features of Egypt, in its history, location, climate, beautiful beaches, 
tourism industry is considered critical to the Egyptian economy. Tourism in Egypt has 
increased by around 9% annually for the period from 1990 to 2005, but it then suffered 
recession during the global financial crisis (Morakabati, 2007).  
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Tourism industry in the UK ranked sixth in the international tourism, and most 
international tourists arrive to London. The importance of the tourism industry in the UK 
is represented in two aspects. The first is the ability of tourism industry in increasing 
income, as tourism sector accounts for 1.2% of the UK economy, the second aspect is 
the creation of job opportunities, as over 2 million jobs are generated by the tourism 
activity in the UK (Morakabati, 2007). 
2.4.2 Economic and political environment effect on tourism 
According to Glaesser (2003), tourism industry is affected by several factors of the 
surrounding environment, figure 2-4 depicts these factors. Political and economic 
environment are considered important factors that directly affect tourism industry. 
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Figure 2-4 The tourism system 
 
Source: Glaesser (2003) 
According to the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), growth of 
global tourism was 5% in the first quarter of 2008 compared with the same quarter in 
2007 (UNWTO, 2010). In the Middle East, the growth was higher for a round 12.5%. 
However, UNWTO reported that international tourist demand highly deteriorated during 
the global financial crisis by the end of 2008 and during 2009 as shown in figure 2-5. 
Moreover, according to World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), during the global 
financial crisis, the tourism industry share in global GDP decreased by 0.5% due to the 
economic recession accompanied with this financial crisis. 
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Figure 2-5 Monthly Change in Global international tourist arrivals during GFC 
  
Source: (UNWTO, 2009) 
The tourism sector in the Egyptian economy was also highly affected by the high 
recession of lower tourist demands during the financial crisis as shown in figure 2-6.  
 
Figure 2-6 Monthly Change for tourist arrivals in Egypt during GFC 
 
Source: (Egyptian Ministry of Tourism, 2009) 
A successful industry requires stable political conditions at which tourists feel safe and 
out of harm. That is why, political instability would highly affect the tourism industry 
29 
 
and threaten tourism investments. By the beginning of the Egyptian revolution on 25 
January, 2011, tourism industry dramatically affected. By the end of year 2010 after the 
end of GFC, according to the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism, tourism industry began to 
achieve higher revenues with more than $12.5 billion. However, by the beginning of 
Egyptian revolution on 2011, a severe decline in tourism revenues began to happen. 
According to Egyptian Ministry of Tourism, tourism industry achieved $8.8 billion in 
2011 and $5.9 billion in 2013. Moreover, a severe decline in tourism revenues was 
realized after the Egyptian revolution. This severe decline in tourism revenues by 17.75 
% in 2011 and 45% decline by 2013 compared to tourism revenues in year 2010, has 
highly affected investments in tourism industry in Egypt and thus increased business risk 
associated with tourism business. 
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2.5 Summary 
A lot of economic and political events have taken place in recent years. Some events 
have affected most countries all over the world, such as the Global financial crisis. 
Other events have affected a fewer number of countries such as Arab spring that has 
taken place in the Arab countries. Global financial crisis affected most of the economies 
of the countries worldwide. Illiquid markets, unstable stock markets and global economic 
recession have affected the risk associated with companies and increased the associated 
agency costs. Political disturbance in Egypt during the period from 2011 to 2013 also 
affected the Egyptian economy, the stock market and the financial performance of 
companies.  
This chapter has presented an overview of the economic reform adapted in Egypt from 
1990s, the recession of the GFC and the political instability that occurred in Egypt during 
the Egyptian Revolution. It also highlighted how the economy of the UK has been 
affected by the GFC.  
Tourism industry as one of the important industries in the world is considered a very 
sensitive industry to any instability either economically or politically. As presented in 
this chapter, tourism industry has been affected negatively by the global financial crisis 
in Egypt and UK and by the Egyptian Revolution. 
As previously discussed, auditing profession in Egypt is very similar to that in the UK, 
at which Big N auditing firms have a good share in the audit market, and the audit 
regulations are in harmony with the international auditing standards applied in UK. Since 
the auditing profession is not isolated from the economic and political environment, 
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auditors’ decisions regarding audit fees and report lag might be affected by any 
instability in the surrounding environment and by the risky business of any industry. This 
what will be examined later in this study to find out whether auditors’ decisions have 
been affected or not. 
The theoretical framework outlined by audit fees and lag prior literature and other 
theories, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 Overview and theoretical framework 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a background for audit fees, delay, auditor choices and theoretical 
framework for the present study. First an overview of auditor choice of possible 
combinations between audit fees and report lag decisions. Then, audit fees and report 
delay are discussed by presenting their definitions, importance and selected seminal 
empirical studies formulating the basic theoretical framework. 
Later in this chapter, theories related to audit fees and report lag are summarized. Agency 
theory is discussed with a highlight of the principal-agent relationship. Followed by the 
signalling theory, that will be further explored to show how audit output can be 
considered a signal of higher quality companies. Then, the political theory will be further 
investigated to discuss how the agency and signalling theory could not be purely applied 
without considering the economic and political environment. Thereafter, client size 
theories are presented. Finally, a summary of the chapter is presented. 
3.2 Auditor choices for audit fees and report lag 
In the last four decades, audit market and services have attracted the attention of 
researchers and regulators. A large body of research has examined the different aspects 
of the audit market with increased interest in analysing the pricing of audit services and 
less interest in examining audit effort and delay. According to a literature review for 
auditing research by Causholli et al. (2010), most empirical studies interested in the audit 
market has not developed a broad picture of different aspects of auditing research. In 
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other words, researchers developed little integration between various elements of audit 
market which resulted in contrary perspectives between empirical results regarding 
various audit market studies. For example, prior literature (as will be discussed in detail 
in the next chapter) has supported the increase of audit fees after the issuance of SOX. 
But what the reason of the increase of audit fees? Was it because of the increase of audit 
effort and delay associated with the increase of audit requirements by SOX? Or was it 
because a risk premium due to the increase of the price of risk and penalties imposed by 
SOX? (Causholli et al., 2010). 
Auditors can respond to different risks, characteristics or events either by adjusting audit 
effort and/or increasing/decreasing audit fees, however, there is limited literature that 
examined how audit fees and effort are jointly adjusted in response to different events  
(Schelleman and Knechel, 2010). Integration of auditing research is needed across 
various components of the audit market to formulate a broader overview and provide a 
more comprehensive understanding of audit markets, fees, effort and production 
(Causholli et al., 2010). 
Simunic (1980) and subsequent studies have established the main attributes affecting 
audit fees. However, without making a good linkage of how audit effort is affected, it is 
hard to determine an appropriate justification of whether the increase in audit fees is due 
to a risk premium or because of the increase of audit costs passed to the client due to the 
higher audit effort exerted (Schelleman and Knechel, 2010).  
There is a logical expectation that higher audit effort is associated with longer audit 
report lag at a certain level of audit effectiveness and audit resource allocation (Knechel 
and Payne, 2001). Since data of actual audit hours is always confidential and only limited 
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researchers had accessed it, audit report lag is much used by researchers as a suitable 
proxy of audit effort (Causholli et al., 2010).  
Using prior literature and theories framework, that will be discussed in more detail in the 
next few sections, audit fees and delay models are constructed and hypotheses are tested 
to examine how audit pricing and delay are modified in response to various attributes 
and events surrounding the audit engagement, various choices can be selected by the 
auditor as suggested in table 3-1. Some attributes or events might result in higher/lower 
audit fees or higher/lower audit delay or a mix between them.  
Table 3-1 Combinations of auditor choices and suggested justifications 
 Lower audit fees Higher audit fees Audit fees not affected 
Longer 
audit 
report 
lag 
Choice (1) 
Audit risks 
discovered during the 
auditing process and 
after agreeing on the 
audit fees 
Choice (2) 
Higher audit effort and 
costs passed to the 
client 
Choice (3) 
Auditors are more 
conservative 
 
Shorter 
audit 
report 
lag 
Choice (4) 
• Recession in audit 
market 
• Economies of scale 
are realized because 
of more qualified 
audit staff 
Choice (5) 
Higher qualified audit 
staff with higher audit 
rate and costs passed to 
the client 
Choice (6) 
• To create higher 
competitive advantage 
in the audit market 
• Economies of scale are 
realized because of 
more qualified audit 
staff 
Audit 
report 
lag not 
affected 
Choice (7) 
• Audit fees discount 
to attract clients for 
competition issues 
• Client negotiation 
bargain 
• Recession in audit 
market 
Choice (8) 
• More audit staff 
needed with costs 
passed to the client 
• Audit risk premium 
Choice (9) 
Not significant driver of 
audit effort or fees, and 
therefore auditor has no 
response to that driver 
Source: The author 
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In the next sections, a brief discussion is presented regarding prior seminal studies of 
audit fees and report lag and the theories from which hypotheses are derived. 
 
3.3 Audit fees theory and the functional form of the audit fees 
model 
According to, Causholli et al. (2010), audit fees reflect interdependence of audit demand, 
audit market structure, audit firm nature and the actual cost of the auditing process. Some 
researchers defined audit fees as the cost determined in the contract to be incurred by the 
client to the auditing firm for auditing the financial statements (El-Gammal, 2012; 
Rusmanto and Waworuntu, 2015). Or as the amount of fees the company pays for the 
verification of financial statements to have an opinion assessing their consistency to 
GAAP (Santos et al., 2015). 
Audit fees paid to auditing firms are usually composed of three parts: (i) fixed cost of 
performing the audit process and issuing the audit opinion, (ii) litigation cost for possible 
audit failure and loss of reputation and (iii) profit margin determined by the audit firm 
and market competition (Zhang and Huang, 2013). 
Simunic (1980) has been the first study to examine audit fees by developing a model of 
the process by which the audit fees are determined. This seminal study considered the 
external audit to be a subsystem of the company’s financial reporting system and the 
audit service demanded by the company is viewed as an economic good that will result 
in marginal benefits and costs. The model developed by Simunic (1980) hypothesized 
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that audit fee is the product of the unit price and quantity of audit services demanded by 
the company’s management, in addition to, the auditor’s share in potential future losses 
from defects in the audited financial statements. In other words, audit fees consist of two 
main elements: (a) direct audit costs added to profit mark-up and (b) potential future 
losses that might arise related to the audit. Thus, audit fees model represents the 
determinants that affect audit quantity and price and potential associated audit risk. 
Simunic (1980) classic model of audit fees was: 
E(Č) = cq +E(đ| a,q)E(Ǒ), 
Where: 
E(Č) is the expected total audit cost, c is the cost per unit (including profit mark-up), q 
is the quantity of audit resources used, đ is the present value expected future losses that 
may arise from current audit, a represents the resources the client devoted to audit related 
activities and E(Ǒ) is the probability of suffering future loss by the auditor related to the 
current audit. 
However, this previous equation, cannot be applied empirically except by accessing 
internal data of the auditing firm that is not available to all researchers (Picconi and 
Reynolds, 2013). 
Francis (1984) has developed the previous equation to adopt the logarithmic audit fee 
model to define the association between the log of audit fees and other predictor 
variables. This logarithmic audit fees model has become the accepted standard used by 
most researchers in the accounting and auditing literature. According to Hay et. al. 
(2006), the common used estimation model used by most researchers is to regress audit 
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fees log to various measures and attributes that are hypothesized to have a positive or 
negative effect on audit fees, this model has the following form: 
Infi = b0 +b1 InAi + Ʃbigi +ei, 
Where, Infi is the natural log of audit fees as the dependent variable, while InAi is the 
natural log of total assets as a measure of client size. While, Ʃbigi are the independent 
variables that are considered potential audit fee drivers/determinants. 
Despite that (Picconi and Reynolds, 2013) study has criticized the above model, 
however, no literature has presented an alternative model. Moreover, an extremely large 
body of literature has been developed based on this classic audit fees model. These 
studies have served different purposes, the two major purposes were: (1) examining 
independence issues concerning the audit process, and (2) evaluating the competitiveness 
of audit markets (Hay et al., 2006).  These studies have tried to investigate the 
determinants of audit fees in different countries such as US  (Ettredge et al., 2007; 
Lowensohn et al., 2007; Mitra et al., 2007; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Scott and Gist, 
2013; Villiers et al., 2013; Bryan and Mason, 2016), UK (Beattie et al., 2001; 
Seetharaman et al., 2002; Matthews and Peel, 2003; McMeeking et al., 2006; Clatworthy 
and Peel, 2007; Giroux and Jones, 2007; Ding and Jia, 2012), Australia (Ferguson and 
Stokes, 2002; Ferguson et al., 2003; Goodwin-stewart and Kent, 2006; De George et al., 
2013; Yao et al., 2015), Canada (Bandyopadhyay and Kao, 2004), New Zealand 
(Rainsbury et al., 2009; Hay and Knechel, 2010), Korea (Jeong et al., 2005; Behn et al., 
2009), France (Audousset-coulier, 2015), China (Chen et al., 2007; Liu and 
Subramaniam, 2013; Cahan and Sun, 2015; Shan and Troshani, 2016; Lin and Yen, 
2016), Kuwait (Al-Harshani, 2008), Greece (Owusu-Ansah et al., 2010)…etc.  
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A review analysis has been made by Cobbin (2002) for determinants of audit fees 
literature, using 56 studies published during the period (1980-2000) in 17 countries. 
Moreover, using meta-analysis, Hay et al. (2006) decided to summarize a large body of 
research, about 122 studies, published during the period of (1980-2003) in more than 20 
different countries. Further meta-analysis was conducted by Hay (2013) to include more 
recent published studies on audit fees during the period (2004-2007). Different 
determinants of audit fees have been reported by various studies, which is discussed in 
much detail in the next chapter.  
 
3.4 Audit report lag theory and functional form of the audit 
report lag model  
Audit report lag can be defined as the time needed to complete the auditing process 
(Afify, 2009) or the period between fiscal year end and date of audit report (Leventis et 
al., 2005; Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Abbott et al., 2012; 
Habib, 2015; Shin et al., 2016; Abernathy et al., 2017). A study by Cullinan (2003) has 
divided the audit report lag into three components, as shown in figure 3-1, at which: 
• Client preparation time: refers to the time taken by the client to close records and 
prepare financial statements. 
• Audit pause: refers to the time between the date the financial statements are ready 
and the commencement of the audit process. 
• Audit completion time: refers to the time required to conduct the audit tests and 
completing the audit process to issue the appropriate audit report. 
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Figure 3-1 Audit report lag components 
 
    Source: Cullinan (2003, p. 184) 
 
However, Khlif and Samaha (2014) argued that client preparation time should not be 
taken into account when calculating the audit report lag, as management may cause much 
delay in the preparation of financial statements. That is why the study preferred to 
calculate audit report lag as the number of days between the date at which the audit 
mission begins (i.e., the date of management submission of financial statements) up till 
the audit report date. But, in most cases, the date at which the client submit financial 
statements to the auditor is unavailable. That is why most previous studies measured the 
report lag by the number of days between financial fiscal year end and audit report date 
(such as: (Leventis et al., 2005; Afify, 2009; Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011; Abbott et al., 
2012; Apadore and Noor, 2013; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014; Shin et al., 2016; Chan 
et al., 2016)).  
Univariate analysis has been used by the earlier studies in examining the relationship 
between audit lag and some corporate and auditing attributes. For example, Dyer and 
McHugh (1975) study in Australian setting, is considered one of the first studies to 
examine determinants of audit report lag using the financial reports of 120 companies 
during the period from 1965 to 1971. The study was interested in investigating the 
corporate attributes effect on audit delay, it reported that client size and fiscal year end 
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are significant determinants of audit delay. Courtis (1976) study in New Zealand settings 
has also examined various determinants of audit report lag for 204 companies during 
1974. However, Courtis (1976) results were in contrary with Dyer and McHugh (1975), 
as the study reported non-significant associations between client size and audit delay, 
this contrary results may be because of the sample characteristics, at which Courtis 
(1976) used only one year data.  
Multivariate analysis has been first used by two studies in US setting (Givoly and 
Palmon, 1982; Ashton et al., 1987) in examining determinants of audit delay using 
simple regression model.  The main form of audit report lag regression commonly used 
by researchers is as follows: 
Lit= b0 +ƩbitDit +eit 
Where, Lit is the audit report lag of company i in year t, and D represent independent 
variables that are considered audit report lag drivers/determinants. 
Afterwards, a substantial stream of literature has tried to investigate the main 
determinants of audit report lag using multivariate regression analysis, mostly,  in more 
developed countries such as US (Henderson and Kaplan, 2000; Johnson et al., 2002; 
Behn et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2009; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Blankley et al., 2014; 
Chen et al., 2014; Mitra et al., 2015; Pizzini et al., 2015), Canada (Knechel and Payne, 
2001), France (Soltani, 2002), Australia (Sultana et al., 2015) and New Zealand (Habib 
and Bhuiyan, 2011). Also some studies were undertaken in less developed countries like 
Egypt (Afify, 2009; Khlif and Samaha, 2014), China (Yan, 2012; Habib, 2015; Chan et 
al., 2016), Nigeria (Enofe et al., 2013), Bangladesh (Imam et al., 2001), Greece (Leventis 
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et al., 2005), Korea (Shin et al., 2016) , Malaysia (Apadore and Noor, 2013), Palestine 
(Hassan, 2016) and Indonesia (Mukhtaruddin et al., 2015). The next chapter discusses in 
detail the main determinants of audit report lag reported by prior literature.  
Personnel resources have been argued to be the key controller of report delay. As, by 
surveying 179 audit partners in a US international audit firm in 2001, Behn et al. (2006) 
have summarized the impediments that hinder auditors from finishing the audit process 
quickly. Results suggest that insufficient personnel resources for both the client and the 
audit firm is the biggest burden that hinder the reduction in audit report lag. Similarly, 
Knechel and Payne (2001) suggest that the availability of audit personnel  and their 
experience control the issuance of audit report in a timely manner. Moreover, Shin et al. 
(2016) found that if experienced personnel responsible for internal control exists in the 
company, this will help in completing the audit process more quickly due to the timely 
relevant information that will be provided to the external auditor. 
Researchers have been interested in examining audit report lag because it is considered 
a proxy of audit timeliness and efficiency. The more efficient the auditors perform, the 
more timely audit reports will be issued (Habib, 2015). In other words, the audit process 
can be perceived to be efficient, if the audit is conducted more quickly while obtaining 
an effective outcome (Knechel and Sharma, 2012). Moreover, audit report lag is 
considered the single most important determinant of timeliness for earnings 
announcements and financial information. Investors prefer shorter audit report lag 
because as early as they receive audit report, they can timely decide their investment 
preferences. Timely financial information has been perceived to have various benefits 
by academic studies. Afify (2009) assures that conveying audit opinion in a timely 
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manner helps in enhancing decision making for investors, reducing information 
asymmetry, and affecting the timing of earnings announcement by the company. 
Moreover, longer report lag reduces information quality (Knechel and Payne, 2001) and 
indicates a delay in earnings announcement which is directly related to stock prices and 
lead to a decrease in the efficiency of financial information in the market (Leventis et al., 
2005). Similarly, Mukhtaruddin et al. (2015) confirm that a delay in the financial 
information lead to a loss in the ability of financial statements to influence or make a 
difference in the investor decision making. Also, studies by (Apadore and Noor, 2013; 
Whitworth and Lambert, 2014) claim that excessive delay in reporting reduces the 
relevance, reliability and usefulness of reported financial statements and may lead to the 
loss of investors trust. Blankley et al. (2015) argue that abnormal audit report lag gives 
a warning signal of the likelihood of future restatements. Similarly, a study by Chan et 
al. (2016), found that companies with longer report lag are more likely to have non-
standard audit opinion and even restatements in subsequent years. 
After discussing the main prior studies that constitute the theory and functional forms of 
audit fees and report lag models, other theories that also underline assumptions of this 
study and prior studies are discussed in the next few sections. 
3.5 Agency theory 
Despite that the company is considered by law a separate legal entity, but it still does not 
act as an individual. Instead, management act as an agent for the company under certain 
contract and is appointed to manage daily operations of the company. Nowadays, there 
is a dispersed ownership at which shareholders are not mainly involved in the companies’ 
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decisions, while managements act as the agents who are responsible for the decision 
making. This how the agency relationship exists, it is represented by a contract under 
which the owners (principal) of the company engage another person (agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating the authority of decision making 
to the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The agency theory assumes that the company 
is a nexus of contracts between the principals and the agents who are responsible for 
using and controlling the economic resources invested by the principals/owners (Adams, 
1994). 
Management generally has an information advantage due to their direct involvement in 
the daily operations of the company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). That is why, 
information asymmetry is considered an important attribute of the financial statements. 
The financial statements are normally produced and controlled by management, while 
owners are not involved in their preparation. Owners need to have relevant and reliable 
financial information to be able to evaluate and expect the potential risks of their 
investment. According to the agency theory, conflict of interest between management 
and owners of the company may exist.  At which managers can misreport the financial 
information and exploit the information in favour of the management (Carcello et al., 
2002). Management may not provide all necessary information to owners, and even may 
manipulate it. For example, manipulation by management could happen by increasing 
the net income of the company in order to receive more bonus (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1983). 
The agency theory posits that the distinction between ownership and managerial decision 
making creates agency problems between agents and principals (Watts and Zimmerman, 
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1983). According to Adams (1994), there are two main problems related to the agency 
relationship between the principal and the agent. “Moral hazard” is the one of the agency 
problems, at which agents act against the interest of the owners and use the contracting 
process in favour of maximizing their wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The second 
problem is “Adverse selection” at which the principal does not fully access all the 
available information that the agent take into consideration during the decision-making 
process, which make the principal unable to evaluate whether this decision has been 
made for the best interest of the company or not (Adams, 1994). 
Lessening the effect of agency problems can be accomplished by monitoring the 
behaviour of the agent. Monitoring costs can involve appointing appropriate agents such 
as external auditors and paying audit fees to them, costs related to internal control 
implementation and creation of policies and procedures. Agency theory recognises 
external auditing as the most efficient monitoring activity to reduce information 
asymmetry and mitigate conflict of interests (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). The demand 
for auditing is highly connected to the agency theory. According to Wallace (1980), 
investors demand audit services to improve the quality of the financial information. He 
further suggests that audited financial statements can: (i) reduce both market risk and any 
company-specific risks, (ii) improve quality of information supplied for decision making.  
Auditors provide management, investors and other users with independent, reliable and 
timely assurance on the financial information and the value of assets. An independent 
audit should mitigates the risk of fraud or illegal reporting in the financial statements, 
and therefore provides recommendations that can improve the internal control and 
operational efficiency of the company (Wallace, 1980; Chow, 1982). 
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Therefore, according to the agency theory, the role of auditors is to mitigate the 
information asymmetry between managers and investors (Wallace, 1980). A company 
with more information asymmetry will need more audit effort, time and fees. Information 
asymmetry increases when company’s size, risk and complexity increase due to 
problems of difficulty in valuation of accounts and that need more audit tests by the 
auditor to make sure of the accounts accuracy.  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), costs paid by the principals for monitoring 
the actions of managers are called agency costs. Thus, audit fees are considered an 
important component of agency costs. Because auditors are responsible for ensuring that 
managers are behaving in favour of owners’ interests not their own wealth.  
In this study, the monitoring costs of appointment of auditors; i.e. audit fees, are studied 
as mechanisms that may mitigate agency problems. Moreover, the larger the agency 
problems, the more time the auditors will take in inspecting the company’s financial 
information and thus the longer audit report lag associated. Thus, the agency theory is a 
basic theory that provide a general framework for both audit fees model and audit report 
lag model. 
3.6 Signalling theory 
Signalling theory has been developed by Spence (1973) to explain why managers 
disclose accounting information. Similar to the agency theory, signalling theory 
addresses the information asymmetry resulted from the separation of managers and 
ownership. This theory argues that agency problem of information asymmetry can be 
reduced when management gives signals of information to investors (Ezat, 2010).  
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Signals are the actions taken by management to provide quality information concerning 
the financial position of the company to investors (Spence, 1973). Therefore, higher 
quality companies would like to distinguish themselves from lower quality ones by 
signalling their good performance and achieving higher good reputation. Also, 
companies with bad news have motivation to disclose more timely information to avoid 
bad reputation that may arise because of late disclosure (Ezat, 2010). 
The signalling theory explores how auditors can be considered a signal by management 
in the stock market. Companies may appoint higher quality auditors to send signals to 
interested parties on the quality of financial information. According to Moore and Ronen 
(1990), a better company can afford to appoint an expensive auditor to signal that it is a 
profitable company with higher quality expensive auditor that can add to the creditability 
of financial information. 
Moreover, stock price of the company could be influenced by the earnings announcement 
and issuance of financial information. Signals of good or bad news provided from the 
financial statements will affect the decision of the investors and consequently the stock 
price of the company (Mukhtaruddin et al., 2015). Therefore, timely accounting 
information signals a good quality information provided by the management while a 
lower quality company will tend to not provide information in a timely manner. Non-
timely information may give indication that there is bad news the company do not want 
to publish which may lead to a decrease in the company’s stock price. 
In this study, according to the signalling theory, a longer audit report lag could give a 
bad signal to investors concerning the company, while a shorter one confirms the quality 
of the information provided in the stock market. Moreover, the higher quality and 
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expensive audit firm could signal higher creditability for financial statements. Therefore, 
signalling theory provides a theoretical framework for our hypotheses for audit fees and 
report lag models. 
3.7 Political theory 
According to (Gourevitch, 2003; Roe, 2003; Pagano & Volpin, 2005), the political 
theory argues that any company is affected by the country’s political and social 
environment. The political and social environment defines how the rights of the 
investors are protected. As if the legal and political system is strong, investors rights 
are expected to be well protected and thus the agency problems are mitigated because 
of the strong legal environment will rescue investors in case of management abuse 
(La-Porta et al., 1998). However, in weak political and legal environment, the 
company will react to such weakness to protect investors in different ways 
(Gourevitch, 2003; Roe, 2003; Pagano & Volpin, 2005). Reshaping the company’s 
corporate governance mechanisms is one of the ways suggested by Roe (2003) that 
the company may select to face severe political and economic instability. Another 
way is to have a higher quality assurance services by selecting better auditing 
services. Better auditing services could mean more audit procedures with more effort 
and time by auditors and also may be higher fees. 
Therefore, in this study, only applying purely agency and signalling theories may 
not capture effectively the instable environment at which the study is conducted and 
thus will not be informative. That is why it is necessary to integrate  political theory 
with both the agency and signalling theories. Thus, taking into consideration the 
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political perspectives during the development of the study hypotheses. As the 
political environment in a country affects the related agency costs that investors have 
to bear to protect their rights.  
3.8 Client size theories 
According to Cullinan (2003), there are three theories related to the effect of client size 
on audit report lag and audit fees: 
• Client preparation theory: This theory suggest that larger clients are quicker in 
preparing financial statements because of the better internal control those clients 
enjoy. According to this theory, the larger the client, the faster the preparation of 
financial statement, and therefore the client preparation component of report lag 
is much shorter leading to a shorter audit report lag (Ashton et al., 1989). 
• Client service theory: This theory suggests that audit firms give priority to larger 
clients because of their importance due to the higher audit fees those clients pay. 
Thus, audit firms can devote their resources to finish auditing larger clients as 
soon as possible. According to this theory, larger clients enjoy shorter audit report 
lag because of the expected short pause component of audit lag (Bamber et al., 
1993; Schwartz and Soo, 1996).  
• The transactions theory: This theory suggests that larger clients have huge 
number of transactions. As the transactions increase, the effort and time exerted 
by the auditor increase. The increase in audit effort will lead to higher audit fees 
charged by the client and longer audit report lag accompanied because of the 
longer audit completion time component of the audit lag (Simnett et al., 1995). 
This theory is very related to client size that is considered a very important driver 
identified by prior literature of audit fees and report lag. 
49 
 
3.9 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the proposed suggested combinations of auditor choices and 
decisions concerning audit fees and report lag. Then it summarized some seminal prior 
literature of audit fees and report lag that constituted the theories and functional forms 
of these models. Afterwards, main theories shaping hypotheses of audit fees and report 
lag haven been discussed. 
Demand for auditing arise from the principal-agent relationship that involve conflict of 
interests and the assumption that agents may maximise their own self-interest at the 
expense of the owners. Owners need external auditing to give assurance that 
management is carrying out their role without manipulating the financial information. 
Agency theory recognises external auditing as a monitoring mechanism that play an 
important role in mitigating the agent-principal conflict. Audit fees reflect the economic 
costs for the company to monitor the performance of the management.  
Agency problem of information asymmetry can be reduced when management gives 
signals of information to investors. Signals are the actions taken by management to 
provide quality information concerning the financial position of the company to 
investors. Timely information is one of the signals that characterise the quality of the 
financial information. Audit report lag is one of the important drivers of the timeliness 
of financial information. Therefore, auditing services help in signalling the timeliness of 
the financial performance of the company to the investors that affect the stock price. 
In periods of instable economic and political conditions, applying a purely agency and 
signalling theories may not capture effectively the role of auditing. It is necessary to 
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integrate both the political theory with agency and signalling theories. As agency 
problems and bad signals may increase in severe economic conditions and political 
conflicts, at which the right of investors may not be fully protected, and thus the 
importance of assurance by independent auditor may increase. Risks associated with 
instable economy and political conflicts may lead to an increase in audit procedures, 
longer audit report lag and even higher audit fees. 
Client size theories also affect the strategy taken by the auditors during pricing audit 
services, performing the auditing process and exerting audit effort.  
In sum, prior literature results integrated with Agency, Signalling, Political and client 
size theories, underline the main hypotheses used by this study, as will be shown in 
chapter 5. The next chapter will critically analyse the main findings by prior studies 
concerning different determinants of audit fees and report lag. 
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Chapter 4 Determinants of audit fees and report lag: A 
Literature review 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the major results in previous studies focusing on determinants 
of audit fees and audit report lag. The aim of this chapter is to review results of various 
studies with evidence obtained from different auditing markets. Therefore, they are 
important references for this study in Egyptian an UK context. This chapter reviews 
literature on determinants of audit fees and audit report lag. Then a conceptual 
framework of the current study is outlined. A summary of this chapter is then presented. 
4.2 Determinants of audit fees and report lag 
Client, auditor, engagement attributes and surrounding environment, regulations and 
events are considered the main drivers that affect auditing decisions. These drivers affect 
both decisions related to pricing of audit services and audit report timeliness, as shown 
in figure 4-1. Meta-analyses of prior audit fees literature (Hay et al., 2006; Hay, 2013) 
and a review study by Abernathy et al. (2017), have also classified main determinants of 
audit fees and delay into client, auditor and engagement attributes, and, they have also 
included new events and regulations as drivers of audit fees and delay. 
However, despite that literature have found that these attributes affect both audit fees and 
report delay decisions, still most results of prior studies concluded different proxies for 
these attributes that have direct effect on audit fees and delay. A summary of different 
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proxies that commonly used in each model is summarized in Appendix II, these proxies 
are used as a reference while building audit fees and report delay models in this study. 
The next few sections will briefly discuss different determinants of audit fees and delay. 
A summary of the objectives, results and sample characteristics of prior studies are 
included in Appendix I.  
Figure 4-1 Determinants of audit fees and report lag 
 
Source: The author 
4.3 Client Attributes 
4.3.1 Client size, risk and complexity 
Larger client size means more accounts and transactions and thus more elements 
compromising the accounting population. Since external auditing is a sample based 
process, larger accounting population requires larger sample size (Simunic, 1980). More 
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effort and time are required to be exerted by the auditor to examine whether client’s 
accounts are prepared in conformity with GAAP (Generally accepted accounting 
principles) or not (Hay et al., 2006). Moreover, larger clients are usually more 
decentralized, thus asymmetry of information is highly highlighted and hence that needs 
greater effort for monitoring and auditing to resolve associated agency problems (Ahmed 
and Goyal, 2005). The more decentralization and diversification of the financial 
reporting entity, the more complex it is. Companies that are cross-listed in other countries 
indicate more complexity, effort and costs for the auditors to audit several client’s 
locations in various countries with diverse disclosure requirements and different 
shareholders’ backgrounds (Hay et al., 2006). The more complex a client is, the harder 
it is to audit and the more time-consuming the audit is likely to be.   
Audit risk is the risk that third parties litigate the auditing firm for damages related to 
misstatements in the financial statements audited (Simunic, 1980). Client’s business risk 
is defined by Arens and Loebbecke (2000) as the risk that the auditor will suffer harm 
because of his relationship with a client even if the audit report was correct. Client’s 
business risk increases auditor’s litigation risk, that may lead  to not just potential liability 
payments incurred by the auditor, but also a damage in reputation for the quality of its 
services which could much harm the audit firm (Lyon and Maher, 2005). For litigation 
financial and reputation costs, auditors must be prepared to defend their decisions in 
court (Tang et al., 2017). That is why litigation risk is considered an important factor 
while planning audit process. To avoid litigation risk, the auditor should increase audit 
evidence by exerting more effort in understanding client’s industry, strategy and 
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processes of the client  or charge audit fee premium to compensate related risks (Lyon 
and Maher, 2005; Bell et al., 2008).  
Simunic (1980) study was the first to give evidence of the significant positive effect of 
client size, complexity and risk on audit fees. Several studies afterwards (e.g. (Matthews 
and Peel, 2003; Dickins et al., 2008; Bryan and Mason, 2016; Sharma et al., 2017)), have 
reported the same evidence. A review analysis has been made by Cobbin (2002) for 
determinants of audit fees literature, using 56 studies published during the period (1980-
2000) in 17 countries. The review has given evidence that client size, complexity and 
risk are the most significant determinants of audit fees in all studies regardless of the 
level of differentiation across different countries. Moreover, using meta-analysis, Hay et 
al. (2006) decided to summarize a large body of research studies published during the 
period of (1980-2003) in more than 20 different countries. The meta-analysis study also 
confirmed that client size, complexity and risk are considered audit fee drivers that are 
consistently significant across studies, samples and countries. Further meta-analysis was 
conducted by Hay (2013) to include more recent published studies on audit fees during 
the period (2004-2007), and it also supported the previous results of the significant effect 
of client size, complexity and risk.  
However, prior literature of audit fees that confirmed the significance of client size, risk 
and complexity in audit pricing model are considered highly biased to samples drawn 
from developed countries. As Cobbin (2002) review of 56 studies includes 31 studies 
with evidence from US, UK and Australia. Meta-analysis by Hay et al. (2006) for 122 
studies includes 103 studies with samples from US, UK and Australia. Also Hay (2013) 
meta-analysis of 67 studies published during 2004-2007 includes 42 studies with samples 
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from the same developed countries. Whereas, different results have been observed from 
studies of samples drawn from developing countries. For example, a study by (Al-
Harshani, 2008) on Kuwait audit market during year 2006, has found that client 
complexity is not a significant indicator in audit fees model. Another study on emerging 
economies (Pakistan, India and Bangladesh) by Ahmed and Goyal (2005) for year 1998 
as a sample period, also has shown non-significant relation between audit fees and client 
complexity. This may give some indication that client complexity effect on audit fees 
may not apply to all audit markets in different countries, especially, less developed 
countries where clients are not often cross-listed or do not have subsidiaries in other 
countries. However, these two studies (i.e. (Ahmed and Goyal, 2005; Al-Harshani, 
2008)) have used a one-year sample which is considered a very limited time period to 
generalize conclusions concerning client complexity effect on audit fees model in 
developing countries. Further studies of audit fees model in developing countries for a 
longer sample period could be recommended for future research to confirm consistency 
between markets in audit fees drivers. 
Similarly, audit delay literature gives mixed evidence for different audit markets 
concerning client size effect on audit delay. Some studies, in less developing countries, 
argue that companies with large total assets are expected to take longer time to be audited 
due to the increased audit procedures needed which prolong the audit report lag. These 
results were reported by Afify (2009) study on Egyptian audit market, by Leventis et al. 
(2005) study on Greece audit market, and also by Yan (2012) on Chinese audit market. 
Whereas, most studies in US (Ettredge et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2009; Abbott et al., 2012; 
Whitworth and Lambert, 2014; Meckfessel and Sellers, 2017; Sharma et al., 2017), New 
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Zealand (Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011) and Australia (Shin et al., 2016) reported a negative 
relationship between client size and audit delay. Those studies argue that large 
companies have more advanced accounting systems and stronger internal controls that 
reduces the probability of financial errors to happen and thus lead to more timely audit 
reports. Or because larger clients are able to exert more power and pressure on auditors 
to finish audit report timely or can pay higher audit fees and appoint more qualified 
auditors to finish the auditing process as soon as possible. Differences between audit 
markets also appear to affect some determinants of audit report lag (which will also be 
highlighted in the next sections), that is why a literature synthesis study by Abernathy et 
al. (2017) has recommended future research in emerging economies concerning 
determinants of audit delay. 
For client complexity effect on audit report lag, a positive relationship was reported by 
most previous literature in different audit markets (Ettredge et al., 2006; Habib and 
Bhuiyan, 2011; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Chan et al., 2016; Abernathy et al., 2017). 
Companies characterized by complexity, diversity or significant number of domestic or 
foreign subsidiaries or high foreign sales ratio may have longer audit report delay 
because of the detailed audit work and effort needed (Bronson et al., 2017).  
4.3.2 Client profitability 
Profitability is one of the measures that gives evaluation of the company’s operations. It 
is related to how efficiently assets and other resources are used (Habib, 2015; Shin et al., 
2016). A more efficient use of assets and resources results in higher profits for the 
company (Moradi et al., 2012). Auditor can consider client profitability as a measure of 
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client performance. It may reflect the extent of loss exposure that could affect the auditor 
in case if the client is not financially stable (Simunic, 1980).  
Despite the argument by some studies that client profitability neither affect audit delay 
(Leventis et al., 2005; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Habib, 2015; Shin et al., 2016) nor 
audit fees model (Rainsbury et al., 2009; Owusu-Ansah et al., 2010; Scott and Gist, 2013; 
Audousset-coulier, 2015). Other studies argue that auditors may anticipate a financial 
failure for the company in case of recurring huge losses, which would drive the auditor 
to be cautious during the audit and spend more time and effort (Afify, 2009; Habib and 
Bhuiyan, 2011). Many prior studies reported that companies achieving losses suffer from 
longer audit report delay (Lee et al., 2009; Abbott et al., 2012; Munsif et al., 2012; 
Blankley et al., 2014; Chan et al., 2016; Meckfessel and Sellers, 2017) and higher audit 
fees charged (Simunic, 1980; Matthews and Peel, 2003; Hay and Knechel, 2010; Ittonen 
and Peni, 2012; Fung et al., 2012; Kwon et al., 2014).  
A strong criticism could be addressed to previous studies in that they ignore the reason 
causing the company to loss, and hypothesis that the only reason for the loss achieved is 
because of the failure of the management in using company’s assets and resources which 
raise the auditor’s doubt towards company’s performance and increase assessed audit 
risk. Although, there are many reasons that may lead the company to achieve loss other 
than the management performance. For example, during the global financial crisis, a lot 
of companies worldwide were suffering loss due to the economic recession affecting the 
whole economy all over the world. Moreover, the country where the company is 
operating may suffer any political or economic instability which may affect companies’ 
performance negatively. Certain industries may suffer from losses during some periods 
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because of different reasons; such as; introduction of new advanced industries or the 
overpricing of some inputs during certain periods. Moreover, companies at the beginning 
of their operations achieve losses because of the beginning up costs that is compensated 
afterwards when the company achieves success in the market. All these reasons might 
not give any indication of risk to the auditor regarding the failure of the company 
especially if reasons for achieving loss is temporary and might be recovered afterwards. 
Consequently, this might give an explanation for different results reported by prior 
studies regarding the effect of client profitability effect on audit fees and report lag. 
Further investigations for the effect of different reasons of companies’ losses should be 
addressed by future researchers for different countries and during various time periods, 
to find out how economic and political instability could affect companies’ performance, 
industry riskiness and the related audit effort, report lag and audit fees.  
 
4.3.3 Client financial condition 
Clients with high leverage ratio may give indication of financial problems which could 
lead to a manipulation in financial information to brighten the company’s image. Prior 
literature results give mixed evidence concerning the effect of client financial condition 
on audit fees and report lag. Mostly, the difference between these results is because of 
the market from which the sample was drawn. As we can find that most studies with US 
evidence reported that companies with high leverage suffers from longer audit delay 
(Ettredge et al., 2006; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014) and 
audit fees premium (Francis et al., 2005; Bryan and Mason, 2016). These studies argue 
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that financial condition of clients take a considerable attention by the auditors when 
assessing audit risk. The auditor may need extra time for additional effort exerted to 
reduce audit risk associated with clients suffering bad financial conditions or ask for 
audit fee premium to compensate such risks. 
However, in other markets, different results were obtained than those reported by US 
studies. As in the Chinese market, studies reported that companies with high leverage 
enjoy shorter audit delay (Habib, 2015; Chan et al., 2016). Moreover, lower audit fees 
for high leverage companies have been reported by (Al-Harshani, 2008) in Kuwait 
market. The justification for these results was that companies with high leverage attracts 
more monitoring from creditors and thus should be associated with less audit risk, shorter 
audit report lag and lower audit fees.  
Criticism should be addressed to prior literature as they deal with leverage as it is only a 
risky attribute to the company without taking into consideration the surrounding 
economic environment. Taking into consideration the economic conditions for each 
market might justify the differences between studies in finding out the drivers of audit 
fees and audit delay. For example, in case of boom economic periods in any country, 
leverage might not be risky, because interest on debt might be written off the generated 
revenue and thus there is no risk associated in this case. While in recession economic 
periods, leverage may cause cash outflow problems because there might not be enough 
revenues to cover the interest payments. Therefore, associated economic environment 
should be clarified while explaining the effect of client leverage on auditor assessment 
of audit risk. Moreover, the trust in the banking system differ from one country to 
another. Some countries might have a good banking system that auditors can trust in 
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monitoring clients, while other countries at which bribes are common, the auditor may 
not trust that creditors can fully monitor the clients’ operations and therefore might 
highly assess audit risk. 
Future research could address such concerns about different economic characteristics 
and level of corruption for each market and how that may affect the assessed audit risk 
by the auditor. 
4.3.4 Industry 
The unique characteristics and the operations nature of some sectors; such as, the 
financial sector, non-profit and charity sectors, set them completely apart from non-
financial profit-seeking companies. Some researchers have been interested in examining 
the audit fees drivers in the financial sector (Fields et al., 2004; Cameran and Perotti, 
2014; Ettredge et al., 2014; Krishnan and Zhang, 2014). and in non-profit and charity 
sector (Beattie et al., 2001; Vermeer et al., 2009). There may be no apparent basis to 
hypothesize any specific industry effects on audit fees or delay. However, a number of 
studies (e.g.: (Simunic, 1980; Matthews and Peel, 2003; Hay et al., 2006)) have asserted 
that certain industries may be more complex, risky or time consuming for an auditor than 
other industries, which may cause differences in estimating the required audit fees and 
timely reporting audit opinion for different industries. For example, some researchers 
argue that financial industries are more complex and require more audit effort than non-
financial industries. This was confirmed by Ettredge et al. (2006) study that reported a 
longer audit report lag for financial sector, also, Taylor and Simon (1999) study reported 
audit fee premium for financial companies and utility sector. 
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Moreover, Ettredge et al. (2006) argues that high-tech industries are less complex and 
are characterized by shorter report lag because of their advanced accounting information 
systems that allow audit tasks to be done faster. Manufacturing sector has been proven 
to be charged higher audit fees than non-manufacturing counterparts because of the 
complexity in auditing manufacturing companies (Matthews and Peel, 2003; Griffin and 
Lont, 2011). Also, companies working in mining sector have been reported to be charged 
higher audit fees (Goodwin-stewart and Kent, 2006). 
Not only the complexity of the industry that could affect the associated audit fees or 
delay, but even social norms towards a certain industry can affect the audit engagement. 
A study by Leventis et al. (2013) has explored what is described as “sin” companies in 
US; i.e. companies that work in such industries that are considered averse to social 
norms; such as: alcohol, firearms, gambling, tobacco and nuclear power. The study 
provided evidence that such industries are charged higher audit fees than other industries 
may be because of the adverse context towards those industries that may increase client’s 
business risk assessed by auditors. To the best of researcher’s knowledge, no other 
studies explored these industries, despite its importance and anticipated effect on audit 
fees in some countries, for example, alcohol and gambling companies in countries where 
prevailed religion beliefs are against these industries.  
Most prior were only concerned with how the difficulty of auditing a certain industry can 
affect the audit engagement. However, each industry can be sensitive to other factors 
related to social norms and other macroeconomic or political circumstances (e.g. tourism 
industry as previously discussed in the last chapter) in certain countries or during specific 
periods that can affect related risk assessments by the auditor and subsequent auditing 
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decisions. More research is needed to explore the sensitivity of some industries to such 
factors and the related effect on the audit engagement.  
 
4.3.5 Corporate governance  
Recent research has begun to investigate the corporate governance effect on auditing 
related decisions of pricing and timeliness. The quality of board of directors’ oversight 
is considered an important tool for corporate governance, that is why researchers used it 
as a proxy for corporate governance in examining its effect on audit fees. Moreover, SOX 
made the audit committee directly responsible for appointing, compensating and 
overseeing the external auditor (Owens-jackson et al., 2009). For the importance of the 
audit committee as a corporate governance tool to protect interests of shareholders, many 
studies have been interested in analysing the relationship between different 
characteristics of audit committee and audit fees. There have been many proxies of 
corporate governance that were used by researchers to determine its effect on audit fees, 
some researchers addressed internal control reliance and internal audit role as tools of 
corporate governance to find their effect of audit fees and lag. 
A study by Carcello et al. (2002) on 258 observations for US companies during the period 
1992-1993, has reported a significant positive relationship between some characteristics 
of board of directors (independence, diligence and expertise) and audit fees. The study 
claimed that higher quality board of directors require higher quality audit than normally 
provided, and thus more audit effort and fees. The study argued that audit committee 
characteristics are not a significant variable and gives no incremental explanatory power 
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when the board variables are included in the model. A replicate of Carcello et al. (2002) 
study has been done by Goodwin-stewart and Kent (2006) but in a less regulated setting 
in Australia for 400 listed companies during year 2000. Results indicated that higher 
audit fees are associated with more frequent meetings by the audit committee. Board of 
directors independence and audit committee characteristics have been reported as a non-
significant determinant of audit report delay in most prior studies in Egyptian setting 
(Khlif and Samaha, 2014), Malaysian setting (Apadore and Noor, 2013) and Chinese 
setting (Habib, 2015; Chan et al., 2016). While CEO duality has been proven by Habib 
(2015) study to increase audit report lag due to the higher assessment of audit risk by the 
auditor because roles of chairman or chief executive are combined, and thus lead to a 
longer audit report lag. 
Another requirement imposed by SOX Section 404 requires companies to include an 
internal control report in their annual report. This requirement imposes more work and 
risk on the auditor and thus increases the importance of internal control as a corporate 
governance proxy when pricing audit fees (Griffin and Lont, 2007). In cases of control 
deficiencies, higher control and audit risk are assumed, and therefore more detailed audit 
tests and longer audit report lag are reported (Ettredge et al., 2006; Abbott et al., 2012; 
Blankley et al., 2014; Khlif and Samaha, 2014; Mitra et al., 2015) and higher audit fees. 
Raghunandan and Rama (2006) have reported in their study, that on year 2004, audit fees 
were 43% higher for firms that disclosed a material weakness than other firms without 
such disclosure. Some studies also found that remediating companies from past material 
weakness in internal control may incur lower audit fees than companies that continue to 
report material weaknesses (Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Hoag and Hollingsworth, 2011; 
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Munsif et al., 2011; Calderon et al., 2012) and a shorter audit report lag (Munsif et al., 
2012). 
Professional auditing standards stated that internal auditors may help in auditing the 
financial statements by either working under the supervision of external auditors or 
independently during the year, and thus external auditors can rely on them and decrease 
their efforts and fees (Felix et al., 2001). Internal auditing is considered essential in 
providing assistance to external auditors due to their client-specific knowledge and their 
familiarity with the company’s processes, suppliers and customers (Abbott et al., 2012). 
The internal auditors can influence external auditing activities in two ways. First, the 
internal auditors can maintain a strong system of internal control and, thereby, reduce 
control risk. Second, external auditors can rely on work performed by internal auditors, 
depending upon the quality of internal auditors, the higher quality the internal auditors 
are, the more reliance by external auditors on them (Pizzini et al., 2015). Therefore, 
reliance of external auditors on internal audit department has been reported by prior 
literature to reduce time consumption of the auditing processes and therefore results in 
shorter audit report lag (Abbott et al., 2012; Pizzini et al., 2015) and lower audit fees 
(Felix et al., 2001; Ho and Hutchinson, 2010; Mohamed et al., 2012; Abbass and Aleqab, 
2013). However, Goodwin-stewart and Kent (2006) and Singh et al. (2014) have 
documented a positive relationship between audit fees and internal audit. They claim the 
reason for this positive relationship is that internal and external auditing are 
complementary, and clients tend to strength their corporate governance mechanisms by 
engaging internal audit department and pay for higher quality external audit.  
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Mixed results concerning internal audit may be because the studies did not take into 
account the quality of internal audit, as highly qualified internal auditors could cooperate 
and help external auditors, but non-qualified internal auditors will not render much help 
and may consume more time.  
4.3.6 Form of Ownership 
The demand of audit assurance emerges from the agency problem of information 
asymmetry between company’s management (as agents) and shareholders (as owners). 
Researchers have examined how the form of ownership could affect auditing decisions 
regarding audit fees and delay. 
A study in Finland setting by Niemi (2005) has investigated the influence of various 
forms of ownership in 200 companies during 1996 on pricing of audit services. The study 
argued that lower audit fees are associated with management majority-owned companies 
due to lower information asymmetry, whereas, higher audit fees are associated with 
foreign majority-owned companies because of the higher complexity associated with 
multinational companies. As each subsidiary of a multinational company may require to 
produce additional financial statements with a different language and thus requires more 
effort, besides the need to make required foreign currency transformations and transfer 
pricing. All that would add more complexity to the auditor and therefore more effort and 
fees. Mitra et al. (2007) study on 358 US companies during year 2000 also confirmed a 
negative effect of managerial ownership on audit fees. However, both studies used one-
year sample that hinder generalization of the results concerning the influence of 
managerial ownership on pricing of audit services. 
66 
 
Governmental ownership effect has been analysed by Liu and Subramaniam (2013) in 
their study on 8116 observations during the period from 2001 to 2008. The study argued 
that in governmental owned companies, auditors tend to charge lower audit fees in 
exchange of reaping benefits from political connections. However, the Finland sample 
study by Niemi (2005) argued that governmental owned companies do not differ from 
other private companies when pricing audit services. These mixed results concerning the 
effect of governmental ownership on audit fees could be due to differences between 
countries. As taking advantage and benefits from political connections differ depending 
on the strict legal legislations applied, corruption and nepotism prevalence in each 
country. This also confirms that auditing profession is not in isolation from the legal, 
social or economic circumstances in the surrounding environment and therefore could be 
affected by these circumstances. 
Despite that audit fees literature support the effect of ownership structure on pricing audit 
services,  ownership structure was proved to not affect audit report lag by a number of 
studies in different countries such as Greece (Leventis et al., 2005), Egypt (Afify, 2009; 
Khlif and Samaha, 2014), Malaysia (Apadore and Noor, 2013) and China (Chan et al., 
2016). This confirms that ownership structure is not a driver in the audit delay model, 
and that the auditor exerts the same effort whatever the form of the ownership of the 
company. This may indicate that any increase in audit fees in some cases in ownership 
structure is a risk premium for potential litigation risk by shareholders and not an increase 
in audit effort. 
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4.4 Auditor Attributes 
4.4.1 Audit firm size 
Over the last 30 years, a series of mergers and takeovers have changed audit market 
structure. There have been Big 8 international auditing firms in 1985, ended up to Big 4 
auditing firms by the beginning of 2000s.  These structural changes in the audit market 
have raised many questions of how that might affect the auditing profession, fees and 
timeliness. Would audit services offered by Big N be with superior advantages of higher 
quality services accompanied by faster audit processes and lower audit fees? Or would 
the demand on Big N auditing firms be high and lead to longer audit delay and higher 
audit fees charged? There is still contradiction between the results of the studies about 
the relationship between audit office size, audit fees and audit delay. 
A replication of Simunic (1980) study of audit fees in US has been made by Francis 
(1984) but with a sample drawn from the Australian market. A contradiction in the results 
of the two studies has been reported concerning the effect of audit firm size on audit fees. 
At which, Simunic (1980) reported no differences between Big N audit firms and non-
big N in pricing audit services, however, Francis (1984) reported that Big N charge 
higher audit fees than non-big N. 
Further analysis of the audit fees in Australian market was conducted by Francis and 
Stokes (1986) to find out the reason of contradictory results between Simunic (1980) and 
Francis (1984). Francis and Stokes (1986) reported that, for larger clients in Australia, 
there were no differences in pricing audit services  between Big N and non-big N auditing 
firms, which was consistent with Simunic (1980) study on US audit market characterised 
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by relatively large clients. Thus, for very large clients, audit firm size is not significant 
in affecting audit fees. However, the study reported that Big N charge higher audit fees 
than non-big N for smaller clients in Australian market, which is consistent with Francis 
(1984). Therefore, cross-country audit markets with different characteristics and various 
client size range, may report differences in results reported by studies. 
Recent studies have argued that Big N auditing firms offer the advantage of faster audit 
process with shorter audit delay (Leventis et al., 2005; Meckfessel and Sellers, 2017) and 
charge lower audit fees (Sundgren and Svanström, 2013). Leventis et al. (2005) study on 
Athens stock exchange documented that larger audit firms’ engagements are associated 
with shorter report delay. The study argues that big N auditing firms are expected to 
provide higher quality and faster audit processes than their counterparts of local audit 
firms because they use higher quality staff, superior technology, more efficient audit 
planning and resources. Moreover, a study by Sundgren and Svanström (2013) have 
reported audit fees discount by Big N audit firms in Sweden audit market. The study 
argued that, the reason behind audit fees discount offered by Big N auditing firms in 
Sweden, is the allocation of audit related overhead costs to larger number of clients which 
can lead to lower cost per client and therefore lower audit fees. 
However, larger audit firms might suffer workload compression during busy season and 
despite the larger staff they had, it has not been proven whether auditor/client ratio could 
compensate this high audit work load or not, and thus larger audit firms’ engagements 
might be accompanied with longer audit delay as reported in some prior studies (Imam 
et al., 2001; Austine et al., 2013; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014; Shin et al., 2016). Also, 
many researcher have claimed that Big N auditing firms charge audit fees premium 
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because of the more audit hours and effort invested, or because of the higher expertise 
of the auditor that takes the form of higher rate per hour (Hay, 2013). Choi et al. (2008) 
on his study of audit markets in 15 countries, have reported that Big N charge audit fees 
premium, especially in countries with stronger regimes, as a compensation of the 
potential legal liability cost that is considered higher for big N than non-big N. Similarly, 
a study on New Zealand audit market by Griffin et al. (2009) has argued that big N 
auditors spend more time and effort – than non-big N- to comply with IFRS, and 
therefore, they charge audit fees premium. Big N audit fees premium has been supported 
by the results of many empirical studies especially in US (Whisenant et al., 2003; 
Ettredge et al., 2007; Munsif et al., 2011; Leventis et al., 2013; Shan et al., 2015).  
On the other side, most previous studies results have given empirical evidence that the 
size of auditing firms has no effect on audit delay (Afify, 2009; Lee et al., 2009; Apadore 
and Noor, 2013; Khlif and Samaha, 2014; Habib, 2015; Chan et al., 2016). Moreover, 
audit firm size has been found to have no effect on audit fees by some researchers who 
analysed audit fees using UK data samples (Seetharaman et al., 2002; Matthews and 
Peel, 2003; Chaney et al., 2004), and other audit fees samples from  Finland (Niemi, 
2005; Ittonen and Peni, 2012) and New Zealand (Rainsbury et al., 2009; Hay and 
Knechel, 2010).  
Prior studies can be criticized for being analysing audit firm size in isolation of level of 
competitiveness in the audit market. Competitiveness in the audit market and Big N 
dominance could highly resolve the reason behind this contradiction in results. Chen et 
al. (2007) study on Chinese audit market have found that Big N auditing firms only 
charge higher audit fees in less competitive market where their dominance are high. 
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Differences in competitiveness and dominance of Big N in different audit markets and 
across countries could highly affect the relationship between auditing firm size and audit 
fees or report lag.  
4.4.2 Auditor tenure 
Auditor rotation has been viewed by regulators as a means of maintaining auditor 
independence and improving the quality of financial reporting (Brooks et al., 2017). 
However, according to a report by General Accounting Office (GAO, 2003), auditors 
take at least two or three years to know thoroughly client’s business and operations. 
Ashton et al. (1987) suggest that for new clients, the auditor is required to become 
familiar with client’s operations, transactions, control. This start up time for new clients 
lead to longer audit processes and thus result in more audit delay. On the other side, long-
tenured auditors became familiar with the client operations and controls which save 
much effort and time during the audit process and result in shorter audit delay. This 
negative relationship between auditor tenure and report lag has been supported by the 
results of prior literature (Lee et al., 2009; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Whitworth and 
Lambert, 2014; Chan et al., 2016; Meckfessel and Sellers, 2017). However, if the 
auditing firm make adequate planning for the allocation of its resources, the auditing 
process might not take a long time in presence of adequate audit staff. That is why some 
researchers (Leventis et al., 2005; Munsif et al., 2012; Yan, 2012; Blankley et al., 2014; 
Habib, 2015; Shin et al., 2016) proved that auditor tenure has no significant effect on 
audit report timeliness. 
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Despite that new clients need more effort and time from the auditor, most audit fees 
literature (Whisenant et al., 2003; Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006; Krishnan and Yu, 2011; 
Evans Jr. and Schwartz, 2013) reported empirical evidence that auditors usually offer 
initial discounts for new clients. Obtaining a reduced audit fee from a new auditor is a 
common reason for clients to change auditors. This may justify the reason why auditors 
offer these initial discounts.  
However, it is not reasonable that a new client, who needs more audit resources with 
higher audit cost, to have an initial fees discount. That is why studies by Bell et al. (2008) 
and Munsif et al. (2011) have reported that new clients do not enjoy any fee discounts 
for initial engagements. 
Again, audit market competitiveness could play an important role in determining whether 
new clients would have initial discounts or do they really are accompanied by much audit 
delay. Would initial discounts/faster audit delay be offered in a competitive audit market 
to the same extent like that in a non-competitive one? Would initial discounts/faster audit 
delay be offered by an auditing firm which dominate the audit market or by an auditing 
firm with a small share in the audit market? Or in other words, do an auditing firm that 
dominate the audit market, offer initial discount/faster audit delay to attract clients? All 
these questions were not answered by prior literature, and need much research to be 
conducted to answer these questions. 
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4.4.3 Auditor Specialization 
Industry specialist auditors are those auditors who are well trained and largely 
experienced in a particular industry (Bae et al., 2016). As a differentiation strategy, audit 
firms tend to specialize in specific industries to render higher quality services to clients 
than other non-specialist audit firms (Hay, 2013). Auditor specialization is considered 
the gained expertise by the auditor through training, learning, and practicing of auditing 
in a certain industry (Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003).  
Industry specialized auditors are perceived to have a comprehensive understanding of 
client’s operations and characteristics due to their training and experience that is focused 
in a certain industry (Bae et al., 2016). Because of the industry related knowledge, 
training and skills acquired by industry specialist auditors, they are expected to finish 
audit work faster and thus have shorter audit report lag (Yan, 2012). 
The relationship between auditor specialization, audit fees and delay is still an open 
question, where results are still mixed. Some researchers argue that engaging an industry 
specialist auditor lead to several benefits of (a) a shorter audit delay because industry 
specialists are expected to have the required skills to finish audit faster than non-
specialists (Whitworth and Lambert, 2014), and, (b) an audit fee discount due to the 
effect of economies of scale from spreading audit investment costs over a large number 
of clients in the same industry and so they can pass the benefits of cost savings to clients 
in the form of fee discount (Defond et al., 2000; Fields et al., 2004). 
Other researchers did not support these benefits and claimed that specialist auditors are 
associated with longer audit report lag because auditor specific industry expertise attracts 
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clients with much sophisticated audit issues that may require additional time to resolve 
(Blankley et al., 2014). Moreover, audit firms tend to invest in developing skills specific 
to industries and expertise needed, and they require a fee premium to compensate their 
investment (Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2009; Fung et al., 
2012; Zerni, 2012; Scott and Gist, 2013). Also, Bae et al. (2016), argue that higher audit 
fees associated with auditors’ industry specialization is due to higher audit rate per hour 
charged by specialized auditors or greater audit hours. 
 The conflicting evidence of the literature of the effect of industry specialization on audit 
fees and delay is mainly because of the definition of industry specialist. According to 
literature, an audit firm can be an industry specialist if (a) its market share (based on 
audit fees or client audited total assets) is higher than a specific cut-off (e.g. 20% or 30%) 
(Craswell et al., 1995; Habib, 2011), or (b) its market share is considered from the top 
one or two auditing firms in the industry (Ferguson and Stokes, 2002; Ferguson et al., 
2003), or (c) if the audit revenue realized in a certain industry is considered the highest 
(Hay and Jeter, 2011; Habib, 2011). Various definitions and measurements of industry 
specialist used in different studies results in different findings of the effect of industry 
specialization on audit fees or report delay. More research need to be conducted on 
evaluating various definitions of industry specialization and finding out what is the most 
appropriate definition to be used for either audit fees model or audit delay model.  
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4.4.4 Audit partner gender, education and experience 
Individual characteristics of auditors might be an important determinant in the whole 
engagement process between the client and audit firm, as it could affect engagement 
planning, negotiation skills and risk preference.  
Audit partner gender has been one of the individual attributes that attracted the attention 
of some researchers. Due to the differences between female and male, some studies were 
interested in investigating the relationship between audit partner gender and audit fees.  
A study by Ittonen and Peni (2012) examined the effect of auditor’s gender in Nordic 
countries (Finland, Denmark and Sweden) on audit fees. The study concluded that female 
audit partners charge higher audit fees, and suggested that potential reasons for this audit 
fees premium are the special characteristics of female auditors of higher level of 
preparation against audit risk, more diligence and lower overconfidence. Similar results 
were obtained by some other studies (Li and Shi, 2012; Nan-wei et al., 2014) in Chinese 
audit markets, where findings reported higher fees charged by female auditors than male 
counterparts. Potential results were suggested that female auditors are more risk 
aversions and exert more effort and time in audit engagements. In the contrary, a study 
by Huang et al. (2015), in Taiwan audit market, documented a negative relationship 
between the existence of a female audit partner and audit fees. The study accused 
Taiwan’s auditing industry to be discriminative as it proved that female audit partners 
are associated with higher client earnings quality, which prove that audit fees differences 
cannot be explained by the superior audit quality of male. 
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Quantitative methodology adopted by prior literature cannot explain individual 
characteristics differences between male and female auditors. Only suggestions by 
authors with no theoretical basis or empirical evidence have been presented to explain 
the reason why would female auditors charge higher/lower audit fees than male auditors. 
Qualitative methodology by interviews or questionnaire can be used besides the 
quantitative one to find out whether there are real differences between female and male 
auditors in performing audit procedures, negotiating audit fees or assessing audit risk. 
Semi-structured interviews were adopted by Abed and Al-badainah (2013) study in 
Jordan audit market and found that audit partner gender has no effect in determining 
audit fees. However, the sample has been very limited consisting of only 5 male 
interviews and 5 female interviews, and therefore, results cannot be generalized. 
Moreover, discrimination between male and female is another factor that differ across 
countries depending on the prevailed social beliefs, and thus, should be taken into 
consideration when evaluating the effect of gender on audit fees.  
Education and experience of audit partner are other individual attributes that few studies 
have investigated. A study by Allen and Woodland (2010) examines the effect of the 
150-hour education required to enter the US accounting profession on audit fees and 
finds higher audit fees were realized after the implementation of this requirement. In the 
Chinese audit market, a study by Cahan and Sun (2015) also reported that audit fees 
increase when the audit partner’s years of experience increase or  when the audit partner 
has a postgraduate degree.  
However, researchers only concluded that audit fees increase when the experience and 
education of the audit partner increase without analysing how the auditing process can 
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be affected by different audit partners with different experiences and education levels.  
Again, qualitative methodology can be used by future researchers to analyse how 
experience and education level of audit partners could affect the audit process and pricing 
of audit services. Future research also is needed to analyse whether individual auditor 
attributes have an effect on audit delay, as there is no single study that have tried to 
analyse this relationship. 
 
4.4.5 Auditor Location 
Some researchers have argued that pricing of audit services is affected by the auditor 
location, especially in more developed cities. It was claimed that higher fees could be 
charged to some cities in some countries where costs are higher than the rest of the 
country (Hay et al., 2006).  
Clatworthy and Peel (2007) on their study on UK audit market, found that auditors 
located in London charge higher fees than other cities. However, a study by (Chen et al., 
2007), found that auditors in more developed cities in China (Beijing, Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, Guangzhou) charge lower audit fees than other less developed cities in China.  
Most large companies are located in more developed cities, and therefore audit fees may 
be higher in developed cities because clients are usually larger and therefore have more 
transactions than those located in non-developed cities. Thus, the reason that audit fees 
is higher in developed cities can be because of the large size of clients located in the city 
not because of the development of the city by itself.  This may be why auditor location 
77 
 
has not been used as an audit fees driver by most researchers. No single study has 
reported that auditor location could affect audit delay.  
4.5 Engagement Attributes  
4.5.1 Non-audit services 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, accounting firms began to market a variety of high-
margin non-audit services to their audit clients. In those years, the accounting profession 
was criticized by focusing on non-audit services which affected required independence. 
Auditors were accused of being not sceptical enough and not implementing auditing 
standards in a sufficient manner because of the lack of oversight and accountability (Zeff, 
2003) 
After Andersen demise, SOX prohibited auditors from providing some categories of non-
audit services to audit clients. Examples of these categories were: bookkeeping services, 
financial information systems design and implementation, management functions or 
human resources, and outsourcing of internal audit services. This rule was issued due to 
the belief that non-audit services affect auditor’s independence, in that auditors might 
use their auditing services as a loss leader to attract non-audit services (Cosgrove and 
Niederjohn, 2008) 
Results of prior studies (Francis et al., 2006; Hay et al., 2006; Holland and Lane, 2012; 
Hay, 2013) suggest that disclosure of non-audit and audit fees are of relevance to 
investors, as well as the information about auditor income. Regulations obligated 
auditors to disclose both audit and non-audit fees paid by clients, this requirement was 
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raised because of the belief that economic bonding generated by fees can impair 
perceived levels of auditor independence. As, Mironiuc and Robu (2012), claimed that 
the independence of the auditor has been affected by the level of the audit and non-audit 
fees paid by the client company and concluded that a high level of non-audit fees with a 
low level of audit fees led to a higher level of fraud risk in the New York Stock Exchange 
listed firms between 2001 and 2002 before the issuance of SOX. That ensures how non-
audit fees might affect the independence of the auditor and that shareholders might 
perceive a threat to auditor independence at high total relative fee levels.  
A great attention has been directed by researchers towards the relationship between audit 
fees and the existence of non-audit services. Some studies have argued that non-audit 
services provision has no effect neither on audit fees (Bell et al., 2008; Kwon et al., 2014) 
nor on audit delay (Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014). 
Whereas, other studies have argued that the provision of non-audit services can lead to 
lower audit fees because of cross-subsidization of fees between audit and non-audit 
services and many empirical studies have documented a negative relationship 
(Clatworthy and Peel, 2007; Krishnan and Yu, 2011; Ittonen and Peni, 2012; Hay, 2013). 
Moreover, other researchers have also argued that knowledge spill-over from non-audit 
services give the auditor a deeper understanding of the client’s operations and an easier 
resolving of potential accounting problems that might result in a shorter audit delay (Lee 
et al., 2009; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Blankley et al., 2014). 
Most researchers do not have enough data to find out whether the audit team engaged to 
perform the auditing services is the same one who performed the non-audit services or 
not. Actually, most auditing firms nowadays, have different departments each one is 
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specialized in rendering different services, some are specialized in auditing certain 
industries and other are specialized in performing non-audit services of tax, consulting, 
bookkeeping services. Thus, if not confirmed that the same team have performed both 
audit and non-audit services, independence of auditors is not affected and no knowledge 
spill over is achieved. This point worth to be further investigated to find out, in terms of 
specialization applied in auditing firms, do non-audit services really affect the auditing 
process? 
4.5.2 Audit Opinion 
Auditors have the responsibility to assess the client’s financial reports and issue an audit 
opinion accordingly (Kausar et al., 2017). Any report other than the standard unqualified 
opinion might indicate audit problems identified by the auditor. Problems identified 
during the auditing process indicate higher risk assumed by the auditor, higher audit work 
done and therefore more audit costs and fees (Leventis et al., 2005). Moreover, qualified 
or modified opinion is expected to give bad news in the stock market about the company 
which may affect its stock prices (Yan, 2012). That is why management often do not 
prefer qualified or modified opinions and might negotiate with the auditor for the 
remarks and the content of the audit report which is considered a time-consuming process 
that might prolong audit delay. 
That is why most empirical research have reported that, clients who have been issued 
non-standard audit reports, charged higher audit fees (Francis et al., 2005; Ghosh and 
Lustgarten, 2006; Behn et al., 2009; Leventis et al., 2013; Cahan and Sun, 2015) and 
suffered longer report delay (Payne and Jensen, 2002; Ettredge et al., 2006; Knechel and 
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Sharma, 2012; Blankley et al., 2014; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014; Chan et al., 2016; 
Shin et al., 2016).  
4.5.3 Busy Season 
The term “busy season” is known to most of the auditors as the point of time at which 
most companies have their fiscal year end. Usually December 31 is the fiscal year end 
for most companies, and therefore January and February are considered the busy season 
for the auditors.  
Obviously, audit services conducted during busy season will require more audit staff to 
work overtime and thus they may charge extra auditing fees during busy season and offer 
fees discount for working outside busy season (Hay et al., 2006). These results have been 
proven by most audit fees studies (Chaney et al., 2004; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Lin 
and Liu, 2013). Moreover, most audit delay studies also argued that at busy season, 
auditors are exposed to high work load that prolong audit report lag (Payne and Jensen, 
2002; Lee et al., 2009; Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011; Abbott et al., 2012; Austine et al., 
2013; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014).  
Any auditing firm, especially Big N, can manage busy season by balancing the audit 
workload with the availability of audit staff, good planning and allocation of its staff. If 
the auditing firm efficiently matches its human resources with the required audit 
engagements needed to be completed, no report delay will be expected and even audit 
fees offered can be competitive by competitors. Thus, if an audit firm efficiently matched 
workload with audit resources, would then audit fees and audit delay be competitive, in 
comparison with non-efficient match by another auditing firm? This research point has 
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not been clarified by prior literature and thus, need to be investigated by future 
researchers. 
 
4.6 New regulations and events 
4.6.1 Andersen demise and SOX issuance 
Auditing regulations can have a significant effect on the audit market due to the increase 
in auditor effort and documentation required by these regulations. That is why 
researchers try to evaluate the impact of some auditing regulations on both audit fees and 
lag to find out the costs of issuing such regulations and compare it with the benefits 
claimed by the regulators imposed those regulations. 
In October 2001, Enron, one of the largest public companies in the United States at the 
time, became the subject of investigations by Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) for its accounting practices. This investigation indicated high level of financial 
fraud that has been going on for several years. Shortly after Enron scandal, many other 
scandals were uncovered including large auditing firms like Arthur Andersen. In an 
attempt to restore public confidence after all these financial scandals, Congress passed 
the Sarbanes- Oxley Act (SOX) in July 2002. This act aimed to increase the oversight of 
the accounting profession and improve the role of corporate governance. SOX imposed 
strict independence rules by: prohibiting the provision of most types of non-audit 
services to audit clients, rotating audit partners off audit engagements every five years 
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and providing an audit of internal control over financial reporting for public companies 
(Cosgrove and Niederjohn, 2008). 
But despite the benefits of SOX in increasing the regulations governing auditing 
profession and restoring public confidence, it was argued that SOX was passed very 
quickly with costs exceeding its benefits (Cosgrove and Niederjohn, 2008).  
Many researchers have been concerned with studying the effect of SOX on audit fees. 
Mainly their results supported the increase in audit fees after SOX  (Griffin and Lont, 
2007; Salman and Carson, 2009; Evans Jr. and Schwartz, 2013) and argued that, from 
the auditor’s point of view, the increase in regulations, increases client risk and therefore 
requires more time effort from the auditor to collect evidence in support of the audit 
opinion, and thus is associated with higher audit fees. Griffin and Lont (2007) study has 
tried to analyse audit fees for US companies audited by Big N during the period of 2000-
2004, following the issuance of SOX. The study concluded that audit risk, effort and 
implementation of section 404 on internal control are the most influential factors that led 
to increase in audit fees in the period following SOX. Similar results were reported by 
Evans Jr. and Schwartz (2013) study on US market for the period (2000-2010). 
Moreover, non-US companies registered in the US have also suffered from higher audit 
fees after the issuance of SOX. Salman and Carson (2009) study has assessed the impact 
of SOX on Australian companies with foreign registrant status in the US for the period 
from 2001 to 2005, compared with audit fees for other Australian companies. The study 
reported substantial increases in audit fees after SOX issuance for Australian companies’ 
registrant in US as a consequence of increase in audit effort and risk. 
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Longer audit report lag was also reported by some researchers (Ettredge et al., 2006; 
Pizzini et al., 2015) after the implementation of SOX and the issuance of section 404 on 
internal control which increased audit procedures required during the auditing process 
and led to substantial increase in audit delay. 
On the other side, Cosgrove and Niederjohn (2008) study has suggested another reason 
for the increase in auditing fees after SOX. The study argued that the increase may be 
due to self-correction of cross subsidization of services. Many large auditing firms, have 
been using their auditing services as a loss leader to attract non-audit services. Since, 
SOX prohibited many categories of non-audit services to be rendered to audit clients, 
then auditing firms will not have a great opportunity to recover their auditing costs 
through non-audit services and that have led to an increase in audit fees. Similarly, 
Knechel and Sharma (2012) have concluded that companies that have been rendering 
non-audit services before SOX, have the largest increase in audit report lags after SOX. 
Kohlbeck et al. (2008) and Srinidhi et al. (2012) were interested in finding how Andersen 
demise has affected its previous clients. Using a sample of former Andersen clients, they 
find that successor big 4 auditors charged an audit fee premium for ex-Andersen clients 
compared to existing clients and non-Andersen switch-ins. They suggest that audit fee 
premium is attributable to auditor conservatism towards clients previously audited by a 
risky auditing firm. 
It is observable that literature have only focused on analysis of the implementation of 
new audit regulations in the US, whereas, regulations issued in other countries did not 
have that attention by researchers. This bias in the auditing research towards US audit 
market make it difficult to generalize the literature results on all audit markets. Therefore, 
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future researchers can analyse the effect of different regulations issued on other audit 
markets to enrich the auditing literature about the effect of implementation of various 
audit regulations on the auditing profession. 
4.6.2 IFRS 
International Financial Reporting Standards “IFRS” adoption has been claimed by 
regulators and standard setters to enhance quality of financial reporting, however, it has 
been considered to be costly to companies due to the increase in effort and knowledge 
needed to implement those new standards (De George et al., 2013). Therefore, the true 
returns to IFRS adoption should be considered by evaluating its benefits and its costs. 
An increase in audit fees and delay after IFRS adoption can be considered direct costs of 
this transition, that can be used in evaluating the true returns of IFRS. That is why many 
researchers investigated if IFRS adoption has any effect on audit fees or audit delay.  
A study by Zhu and Sun (2012) has investigated the impact of IFRS adoption in China 
in 2007. The study finds that the new IFRS- based Chinese accounting standards 
adoption has led to an increase in audit fees in China during 2007. The new accounting 
standards increase the disclosure requirements of the companies about their market risk 
which increases the audit risk and related fees as argued by the study. However, the 
investigation of only one year which was 2007 is considered a bias reference for 
evaluating the impact of IFRS adoption on audit fees in China. Further investigations are 
needed for subsequent years after the IFRS adoption to find out the trend of audit fees 
afterwards. Also, a study by (Habib, 2015) examined the impact of IFRS adoption on 
audit report lag in China for a sample of Chinese companies during the period from 
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(2003-2011). Habib (2015) study gives evidence that audit report lag increased after 
IFRS adoption because of the adoption of fair value measurement in the new accounting 
standards which makes companies increase their disclosures about market risk. This 
increase the additional time and effort required by auditors to verify such estimations 
that are considered inherently risky. 
The European Union countries adopted the IFRS on 2005. A study by Kim et al. (2012), 
has tried to examine the impact of IFRS transition on audit fees in 14 European Union 
countries for a sample period (2004-2008) to capture the change in audit fees pre- and 
post- IFRS transition.  The study gives evidence that the IFRS adoption increases the 
audit task complexity and thus, audit fees premium has been observed post- IFRS 
adoption.  
Australia also adopted IFRS on 2005, and a study by De George et al. (2013) on 
Australian companies reported an increase in the audit fees mean by 23% in the year of 
IFRS transition. The study argues that IFRS adoption led to an increase in audit effort 
exerted by the auditors to be knowledgeable about these new standards and to evaluate 
the implementation of such standards. Also, IFRS are considered more detailed and 
requires increased disclosures more than that previously required. This likely make 
auditors increase their audit fees to recover these increased efforts. 
Griffin et al. (2009) study on the impact of New Zealand adoption of IFRS on audit fees 
reported similar results that support the increase of audit fees post-IFRS transition due 
to the increase in disclosure requirements. Habib and Bhuiyan (2011) also reported 
longer report lag post-IFRS adoption because of the increased amount of work required 
by auditors. 
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From the prior literature discussed, it is obvious that not only the change in auditing 
standards that could affect the auditor, but also the change in accounting standards; this 
is because the auditor uses accounting standards as the benchmark for assessing the 
quality of financial statements. That is why the issuance of IFRS has affected the scope 
of the audit and increased the time required by the auditor to understand the standards, 
which in turn, increased the audit tests to issue the report, and therefore audit fees 
premium has been charged and audit delay has been observed.  
However, these standards are not new forever, as after some years, auditors will be fully 
knowledgeable of the IFRS requirements and therefore will not exert the same efforts 
previously exerted. Therefore, audit report lag will tend to be shorter again and audit fees 
may also be decreased. Further investigation using longer sample span can be considered 
for future research to capture the full effects of IFRS adoption and evaluate whether the 
increase in audit fees and report lag previously reported at the beginning of IFRS 
adoption has diminished over time or not. 
 
4.6.3 Global Financial crisis 
Generally, economic decline periods increase company’s associated risks, their 
probability of bankruptcy and thus may affect the demand of auditing services and the 
related audit effort, time and fees charged (Alexeyeva and Svanström, 2015). 
Some studies have reported an increase in audit fees associated with global financial 
crisis  in different countries, such as, Australia (Xu et al., 2013), China (Zhang and 
Huang, 2013), Sweden (Alexeyeva and Svanström, 2015). These studies argue that 
87 
 
during GFC, managers’ incentives to manipulate accounting information may increase 
to cover the low performance of their companies. This anticipated increase in client’s 
risk requires more audit procedures to be exerted, and thus higher audit fees to be charged 
to compensate auditors’ efforts. However, other studies have documented a negative 
effect of global financial crisis on audit fees in US (Krishnan and Zhang, 2014) and in 
Korea (Sonu et al., 2017). These studies argue that negative relationship is because of 
lower demand of audit services by clients in the recession period of global financial 
crisis, which led auditors to cut their fees to increase their competition in the audit 
market.  
Mixed results obtained from literature regarding the effect of global financial crisis on 
audit fees because of the difference in GFC economic consequences from one country to 
another. As some countries were highly affected by GFC than other countries, so it is 
hard to have a generalized result for all markets. Moreover, studies that investigated the 
effect of macroeconomic factors on auditing profession are few and most of them have 
used shorter time spans that can be considered very bias to generalize conclusions about 
the effect of global financial crisis on auditing profession. Therefore, much research is 
needed to examine the effect of global financial crisis on audit fees and report lag in 
different countries during longer sample periods. 
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4.6.4 XBRL Requirement 
According to Valentinetti and Rea (2013), XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting 
Language) is:  
“an application of the extensible Markup Language (XML) aimed to provide a 
standardized method of preparing, publishing and exchanging financial information. 
From the technical point of view, it consists of collections of business reporting concepts, 
called taxonomies, and electronic documents containing business information, called 
instance documents. Each company can create and instant document to report their 
business facts according to a prescribed taxonomy. The extensibility of the language also 
allows users to define customized elements to meet their specific reporting requirements 
and needs.” 
Throughout the world, regulators are promoting the use of XBRL adoption to simplify 
and enhance the communication of financial information. Two studies by (Shan et al., 
2015; Shan and Troshani, 2016)  have tried to find out whether XBRL adoption has any 
effect on audit fees. The study of  Shan et al. (2015) on US and Japanese companies 
found that lower audit fees were associated with XBRL implementation in both 
countries. The study claimed that audit fees discount is realized because of the greater 
transparency associated with the use of XBRL that facilitates external auditing functions 
and thus reduce audit risks and costs. Similar results have been proven by Shan and 
Troshani (2016) on their study on the effect of XBRL implementation on Chinese audit 
fees.  
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To the best of researcher’s knowledge, only those two studies have investigated the 
impact of XBRL on audit fees, and no single study has examined its impact on audit 
report lag, which gives opportunity for future research to further investigate this issue in 
different countries implementing XBRL.  
After reviewing literature of determinants of audit fees and report delay, the next section 
will outline the conceptual framework of this study. 
4.7 Conceptual framework 
This section presents the conceptual framework of the study as developed from the 
literature review on determinants of audit fees and audit report lag. It demonstrates the 
linkage between dependent and independent variables in this study. The conceptual 
model is developed from the prior literature as reviewed in the previous sections of this 
chapter. 
A conceptual framework represents a map of the area of the study highlighting the 
linking relationships between concepts (Novak and Cañas, 2007). Miles and Huberman 
(1994:18) define a conceptual framework as it: 
“explains, either graphically or in a narrative way, the main elements to be studied, the 
key factors, concepts, or variables and the assumed relationships among them” 
Depending on the results of prior studies illustrated in the previous sections of this study 
concerning determinants of audit fees and report lag models, a conceptual framework is 
depicted in Figure 4-1. The conceptual framework suggests that various client, auditor, 
engagement attributes together with surrounding regulations, economic and political 
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events could affect auditing decisions of pricing and timeliness of the audit services. So, 
to satisfy the first objective of this study of investigating the determinants of audit fees 
and audit report timeliness, audit fees and report lag models will be run based on 
determinants and proxies of audit fees and report lag identified in prior literature once in 
the Egyptian context and then in UK context during the sample period from 2008 to 
2013. So that the study could answer the first research question of how audit fees and 
report lag decisions vary according to various client, audit and engagement attributes, 
and whether those decisions and determinants relationships differ across different 
countries (i.e. Egypt and the UK) or not. 
To satisfy the second objective of this study to find out how the economic and political 
events could affect these determinants and therefore to answer the second research 
question of the study, audit fees and report lag models are run for subsample periods in 
both the Egyptian and UK contexts. The subsample periods include Global Financial 
Crisis period (2008-2009), Pre- revolution period (2008-2010) and Post-revolution 
periods (2011-2013). Comparing the results of these subsamples could give an indication 
of how auditors’ decisions react to surrounding events and regulations and how auditors’ 
response to such events are reflected in the determinants of audit fees and delay. 
To fulfil the third objective of this study of making a comparison between the response 
of auditors towards economic and political instability in both countries and to answer the 
third and fourth research questions, a comparison of results is made for both models and 
across both countries. The comparison for determinants of audit fees and timeliness 
decisions give an analysis of how auditors mix and integrate audit pricing and timeliness 
decisions to respond to various attributes and events. Moreover, how this integration of 
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decisions could differ across countries is also analysed to satisfy the objectives of this 
study.  
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Figure 4-2 Conceptual Framework 
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4.8 Summary 
This chapter reviewed previous literature relating to determinants of audit fees and audit 
report lag. Tables in appendix I provide a summary of main literature studies on audit 
fees and audit report lag. 
Despite that the same determinant affect audit fees and report lag, however, based on 
prior studies results, proxies affecting them are not the same. Tables in appendix II 
provide a summary of most appropriate proxies used for audit fees and report lag models.  
 It is apparent that prior studies pay more attention to client, auditor and engagement 
attributes as if auditing is in isolation from surrounding environment. Most literature 
neglect economic and political events that may affect auditing profession and related 
decisions of pricing and increasing or decreasing audit procedures and reporting time. 
Therefore, in this study, we can contribute to the literature by exploring the Egyptian and 
UK context, we analyse the effects of economic and political events on attitudes and 
behaviour of auditors while performing auditing process by analysing determinants of 
audit fees and report lag during periods of economic and political events. 
The next chapter will discuss the research methodology applied in this study and the 
hypotheses underlying audit fees and delay models. 
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Chapter 5 Research Methodology and Hypothesis 
development 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts with highlighting how the researcher understands the ways and values 
of developing and gaining knowledge, which constitutes the researcher philosophical 
paradigm in dealing with the research problem. That is why the chapter begin with 
discussing research philosophies and approaches commonly used by researchers. Then a 
brief discussion of the chosen research design for the current study will be presented to 
highlight the key procedures that will be used in conducting the current study. After that, 
the chapter presented a discussion of sample characteristics, sources of collecting data 
and statistical procedures used in analysing data. Then the set of hypotheses that 
contribute in solving the main research questions is demonstrated. 
 
5.2 Research Philosophies, paradigm and approaches 
In this section, a brief discussion of research philosophies, paradigm and approaches 
commonly used by researchers are briefly discussed. Then, in the next section, the 
research philosophy, paradigm and approach chosen by the researcher for this current 
study are explained and discussed. 
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5.2.1 Research Philosophies 
The research philosophy which is adopted by a researcher underlines the assumptions 
that s/he views the world through. Johnson and Clark (2006) noted that philosophical 
commitments researchers make, impact significantly their choice of research strategy 
which helps them in understanding what they investigate. 
Research philosophy relates to the nature and development of the knowledge, and it 
shapes the hypotheses constructing the research strategy (Saunders et al., 2012). 
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2008), the main reasons for understanding the 
research philosophy is to clarify research designs, to help the researcher to understand 
the best framework that can be adapted. Therefore, failure to understand the research 
philosophies may mitigate the quality of research design. 
The researcher should first decide how s/he defines the nature of the reality (Ontology). 
Ontology explains the nature of reality from the standpoint of the researcher (Saunders 
et al., 2012). There are two aspects of ontology. First aspect is Objectivism; this 
represents the position that social entities exist independent of social actors (Crotty, 
1998). While the second aspect is Subjectivism, that portrays that social phenomena are 
created from the consequent actions of social actors (Saunders et al., 2012).  
Also it is very important to the researcher to determine the acceptable knowledge in the 
particular field of study s/he is engaged in, or what is called "Epistemology" (Johnson 
and Clark, 2006). The researcher should determine whether s/he is working in the 
tradition of natural scientist who is concerned with the collection of only facts and real 
objects data, or will take the pace of the feelings researcher who is concerned with the 
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feelings and attitudes of social actors in the society. "Axiology" is another aspect that 
should be taken into consideration by the researcher, that is about determining the role 
of values in all stages of the research process (Saunders et al., 2012). 
Determining the research philosophies is concerned with determining the appropriate 
ontology, epistemology and axiology aspects that the researcher adopt. Different 
research philosophies will be discussed: positivism, realism, interpretivism, pragmatism 
in the next few sub-sections. 
 
5.2.1.1 Positivism 
A researcher who adopts positivism philosophy is the one who adopts the work of natural 
scientist who views the world theorized by definite laws. This is the one who is likely to 
use existing theory to develop hypothesis, test and confirm hypothesis to develop the 
theory which can then be tested by further research. Positivism researcher will probably 
use structured methodology and quantifiable observation and statistical analysis. 
Positivism researcher characteristics can be summarized as follows (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori, 2009; Saunders et al., 2012): 
• Ontology: Positivists believe that there is a single reality independent of social 
actors. 
• Epistemology: Positivists focus on observable phenomena, laws and 
generalizations, and supports the independence of the knower and the known. 
• Axiology: Positivists believe that inquiry is value free. 
• Data collection techniques: Positivists emphasize on quantitative deductive logic. 
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5.2.1.2 Realism 
Realism is some much similar to positivism. There are two forms of realism: “Direct 
realism” supports the belief that, what we experience through our senses reflects the 
accurate world; while “Critical realism” argue that what we experience through our 
sensations are not the real things, because our senses deceive us. Saunders et al. (2012) 
have summarized the characteristics of realism as follows:  
• Ontology: Realism believes that the reality is independent of social actors but is 
interpreted through social conditioning. 
• Epistemology: Realism focus on explaining within a context. 
• Axiology: Realism believe that the researcher is biased by the world views and 
cultural experiences. 
• Data collection techniques: Realism believes that method chosen must be 
appropriate to the study whether it is quantitative or qualitative. 
 
5.2.1.3 Interpretivism 
Interpretivism argue that social world is more complex than being definite by laws. This 
philosophy supports the necessity of conducting research on the differences between 
humans rather than objects. Interpretivism characteristics can be summarized as follows: 
(Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; Saunders et al., 2012) 
• Ontology: Interpretivism believes that there are multiple constructed realities  
• Epistemology: Interpretivism focus on the reality behind the details, the 
subjective meanings motivating actions, and support that the knower and the 
known are inseparable. 
• Axiology: Interpretivism believe that research is value bond. 
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• Data collection techniques: Interpretivism emphasize on qualitative inductive 
logic. 
 
5.2.1.4 Pragmatism 
Pragmatism is the philosophy that believes that choosing between one method and the 
other is practically unrealistic, and so it advocates mixed methods. Teddlie and 
Tashakkori (2009) suggests that the researcher should think about a certain philosophy 
as a continuum rather than opposite positions. Characteristics of Pragmatism could be 
summarized as (Saunders et al., 2012): 
• Ontology: Pragmatism believes that there are multiple realities, the chosen reality 
is the one that best answer the research question. 
• Epistemology: Pragmatism focus on both observable phenomena and subjective 
meanings. 
• Axiology: Pragmatism believes that values play a large role in interpreting results, 
and the researcher adopt both objective and subjective points of view. 
• Data collection techniques: Pragmatism emphasizes the use of mixed method 
including both quantitative and qualitative designs. 
 
5.2.2 Research paradigm 
Research paradigm refer to the researcher choice of the ways of collecting data. It can be 
classified as either qualitative or quantitative paradigms. This section will present a brief 
discussion of these paradigms. 
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5.2.2.1 Quantitative paradigm 
Quantitative paradigms are concerned with collecting numerical data to quantify social 
phenomena and inferences are presented statistically (Saunders et al., 2012). This is 
achieved by using statistical models that link variables using cause and effect 
relationships of the assumed hypotheses drawn from theories (Ezat, 2010). Objectivity 
and reliability are the main advantages of adopting quantitative approach (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997). 
5.2.2.2 Qualitative paradigm 
Qualitative research can be defined as any type of research with findings not statistically 
processed or quantified (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). It involves the in-depth 
understanding of individual behaviour and real-world settings (Creswell, 2003).  Data 
are collected from observation or documents examination with the aim of understanding 
human behaviour and related values, beliefs and emotions (Nachmias and Nachmias, 
2008). 
5.2.3 Research approaches 
There are two research approaches, Deduction and Induction. The two approaches could 
be explained as follows: 
5.2.3.1 Deduction approach 
Robson (2002) explained deduction research progress in five stages: 
• Deducting a testable hypothesis; concerning the relationship between two or more 
variables from the theory. 
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• Explaining the hypothesis; in operational terms, i.e., demonstrating how the 
variables are going to be measured. 
• Testing the hypothesis 
• Examining the results 
• If necessary, modifying the theory according to the results 
In deduction approach, the researcher is testing a theory at which he should be 
independent of what is being observed and the variables need to be measured 
quantitatively. 
 
5.2.3.2 Induction approach 
In induction approach, the researcher may be building a theory or gaining an 
understanding of the meanings human attach to events. At which the researcher is more 
likely to work with qualitative data, and will use different method to collect these data in 
order to establish different views of phenomena (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). 
 
5.3 The chosen research methodology 
For fulfilling the objectives of this study and to answer the research questions, a suitable 
research methodology should be chosen. After giving a summary, in the previous section, 
of different research philosophies, paradigms and approaches that can be adopted by any 
researcher, the chosen methodology by the researcher to meet the objectives and 
questions of the current study will be explained in the following lines. 
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5.3.1 Research philosophy 
The primarily aim of this study is to investigate the determinants of auditing decisions 
of pricing and timeliness in Egypt and the UK. To satisfy this aim, the researcher is likely 
to use existing theories and prior literature results to develop the hypotheses of this study, 
test it and find out whether these hypotheses have been accepted or rejected according to 
the statistical analysis. In this regard, the research philosophy employed in this study is 
the positivism philosophy that is more suitable to meet the objectives and answer the 
research questions previously discussed in section 1.3. 
5.3.2 Research paradigm 
As will be discussed in the following few sections, the researcher tried to collect data 
through electronic surveys addressed to auditors and researchers in auditing to have some 
answers about audit fees and delay variables. However, the response rate has been very 
limited which would be bias to use few responses in analysing relationships. That is why 
it was better to analyse actual audit and financial data to investigate audit fees and report 
delay models.  This quantitative data has been collected from the financial statements of 
public companies in Egypt and UK during the period 2008-2013. These data have been 
analysed using Prais-Winsten Panel data technique to test and interpret relationship 
between various variables in the audit fees and report lag models in Egypt and the UK to 
answer the research questions.  Therefore, the quantitative paradigm is the most suitable 
paradigm with the positivism philosophy and for the research design of this study. 
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5.3.3 Research approach 
During the current study, the researcher has passed through the following steps: 
1. Auditing literature and related theories concerning the research topic have been 
reviewed  
2. Gaps in literature have been identified and research problem has been highlighted  
3. Research questions have been established 
4. Related hypotheses have been assumed based on prior literature and existing 
theories  
5. Quantitative data has been collected  
6. Statistical techniques are used to analyse data and test the hypotheses.  
7. Findings has been interpreted after accepting or rejecting the hypotheses 
previously assumed 
According to the above steps the researcher has passed during this study, it is clear that 
the current study implements deduction approach where data is collected and analysed 
to test the relationship between the dependent variables and the independent variables. 
After determining the appropriate research philosophy, paradigm and approach, a 
suitable design and plan of the current study can be developed. The chosen population, 
the time horizon over which the research is undertaken, the sources for collecting data 
and the model design are demonstrated in the following sections. 
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5.4 Sample characteristics 
This section is concerned with explaining the sample characteristics of the two contexts, 
i.e., Egypt and UK. 
 
5.4.1 Egyptian sample 
The initial Egyptian sample for this study is 212 companies listed in the Egyptian Stock 
Exchange by 2013. It includes large, medium, and small sized companies to avoid any 
data bias. Moreover, they constitute a broad range of various industry sectors as shown 
in table 5-3. The sample period covers fiscal years from 2008 to 2013. This time period 
was selected because it includes two important events (i.e. the global financial crisis and 
the Egyptian revolution), which this study aims to explore their effects on determinants 
of audit pricing and audit report timeliness.  
Following most previous studies, 23 companies working in the financial and banking 
sector were deducted1. Moreover, we exclude companies: (1) with missing audit 
                                                 
1 Due to the unique characteristics of the financial sector that set them completely apart 
from non-financial companies during the auditing process. And due to the nature of the 
operations that could make some variables (such as quick ratios, inventory and 
receivables ratio) meaningless for financial companies. Most previous studies tend to 
exclude financial companies from the sample. 
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information and (2) companies whose annual reports for the current or the previous years 
are missing. The final sample for the Egyptian context is summarized in table 5.1. 
 
Table 5-1The Egyptian Sample size 
Companies in Egyptian stock exchange  212 
Less:  financial and banking sector companies (23) 
No. of non-financial companies in the sample 189 companies 
Multiply by: 6  
* 6 
For 6-year period (2008-2013)                 
No. of observations 1134 observations 
Less:  Missing audit data (291) 
Less: Missing client attributes data (184) 
Final sample      659 observations 
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5.4.2 UK sample 
The initial UK sample for this study include FTSE-350 companies listed in London Stock 
Exchange. The FTSE-100 comprises the 100 largest companies and the FTSE 250 
comprises next largest 250 companies. Together they comprise the largest FTSE-350 UK 
listed companies. According to, Beattie et al. (2003), FTSE-350 account for 74% of listed 
companies’ total audit fees. The sample period covers fiscal years from 2008 to 2013. 
This time period was selected because it can capture the global financial crisis effects on 
audit pricing and audit report timeliness in the UK context. 
Following most previous studies, 120 companies working in the financial and banking 
sector were deducted. Moreover, we exclude companies: (1) with missing audit 
information and (2) companies whose annual reports or auditor information for the 
current or the previous years are missing. Ending with final sample of 651 observations 
for the UK context, as summarized in table 5.2. 
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Table 5-2 The UK Sample size 
FTSE 350 350 
Less:  financial and banking sector companies (120) 
No. of non-financial companies in the sample 230 company 
Multiply by: 6 
* 6 
For 6-year period (2008-2013)                 
No. of observations 1380 Observation 
Less:  Missing audit data (439) 
Less: Missing client attributes data (290) 
Final sample      651 observations 
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Table 5-3 Distribution of the sample among industries1 
Industry 
Egypt  
% 
UK 
% 
Oil & Gas 2.58 7.23 
Basic Materials 8.35 9.28 
Industrials 28.98 32.29 
Consumer Goods 22.15 13.49 
Health Care 5.01 3.61 
Consumer Services 27.31 22.41 
Telecommunications 2.88 2.29 
Utilities 0.00 4.94 
Technology 2.73 4.46 
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 
                                                 
1 This table provides the distribution of the sample amongst industries. The definitions 
of the industries are based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). 
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5.5 Sources of Data 
The researcher tried to collect data through electronic surveys addressed to auditors and 
researchers in auditing to have some answers about audit fees and delay variables. 
However, the response rate has been very limited which would be bias to use few 
responses in analysing relationships. That is why it was better to analyse actual audit and 
financial data to investigate audit fees and report delay models. Sources of data from 
which the sample has been collected in both the Egyptian and UK contexts are being 
illustrated in the next sections. 
5.5.1 Egyptian sample 
For each company, financial information and board of directors’ data were retrieved 
manually from company’s website and “Egypt for information dissemination” website1 
(EgID, 2014), this website is specialized in providing and analysing the annual reports 
of companies in the Egyptian stock market.  
For the information concerning audit fees, it is collected manually from the Egyptian 
Stock Exchange website 2 (Egx, 2014). Table 5-4 summarizes the sources of variables’ 
data for Egyptian sample. 
 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.egidegypt.com 
2 www.egx.com.eg 
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Table 5-4 Source for data for Egyptian sample 
 
  
Variable  Source 
LNAF Audit fees Minutes of the company’s general assembly 
from Egyptian Exchange website 
LNRE_LAG Audit report lag Balance sheet (Annual report) and Auditor 
report: company’s web site and egID 
LNTA Total assets Balance sheet (Annual report): company’s 
web site and egID 
QUICK Quick ratio Balance sheet (Annual report): company’s 
web site and egID 
REC Receivables ratio Balance sheet (Annual report): company’s 
web site and egID 
INVENT Inventory ratio Balance sheet (Annual report): company’s 
web site and egID 
Leverage Leverage Balance sheet (Annual report): company’s 
web site and egID 
FORG Foreign 
subsidiaries 
Footnotes disclosure (Annual report): 
company’s web site and egID 
ROA Return on assets Income statement and Balance sheet (Annual 
report): company’s web site and egID 
Loss Loss realized Income statement (Annual report): company’s 
web site and egID 
BODIND BOD independence Board of Directors data: egID 
CEODUAL CEO duality Board of Directors data: egID 
Big N Big 4 auditing 
firms 
Auditor report: company’s web site and egID 
SPECZ Auditor 
specialization 
Auditor report: company’s web site and egID 
INITIAL Initial engagement Auditor report: company’s web site and egID 
Tenure Auditor tenure Auditor report: company’s web site and egID 
AUDOP Auditor opinion Auditor report: company’s web site and egID 
BUSY Busy season Balance sheet (Annual report): company’s 
web site and egID 
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5.5.2 UK sample 
For each company, financial data, audit fees and board of directors’ data are obtained 
from DataStream database. A sample of the data acquired from DataStream database has 
been validated and matched with the actual financial reports of the companies to assure 
its accuracy. Auditing firm data and audit report dates were collected manually from 
companies’ websites. Sources of data for the UK sample are summarized in table 5-5 as 
follows. 
 
Table 5-5 Source of data for the UK sample 
Variable  Source 
LNAF Audit fees DATASTREAM database 
LNRE_LAG Audit report lag DATASTREAM database and Auditor report: 
company’s web site 
LNTA Total assets DATASTREAM database 
QUICK Quick ratio DATASTREAM database 
REC Receivables ratio DATASTREAM database 
INVENT Inventory ratio DATASTREAM database 
Leverage Leverage DATASTREAM database 
FORG Foreign 
subsidiaries 
DATASTREAM database 
ROA Return on assets DATASTREAM database 
Loss Loss realized DATASTREAM database 
BODIND BOD 
independence 
DATASTREAM database 
CEODUAL CEO duality DATASTREAM database 
Big N Big 4 auditing 
firm 
Auditor report: company’s web site  
SPECZ Auditor 
specialization 
DATASTREAM database 
INITIAL Initial engagement Auditor report: company’s web site 
Tenure Auditor tenure Auditor report: company’s web site 
AUDOP Auditor opinion Auditor report: company’s web site 
BUSY Busy season DATASTREAM database 
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5.6 Panel data estimation for regression models 
Multiple regression model is used to study the effects of independent variable on the 
dependent variables. In other words, it is the prediction of dependent variable based on 
a set of independent variables. A simple equation for the linear model can be written as 
follows: 
Y=α +βX + error term 
Where: 
Y is the dependent variable 
α is the intercept 
β is the coefficient of the estimate 
X is the independent variables being investigated 
Ordinary Least Squares model, known as OLS, is the popular approach used to estimate 
the classical linear model. OLS is one of the most popular estimators used in the literature 
of audit fess and audit report lag. OLS aim is to minimize the value of residuals; the 
variance between real and estimated values. Certain assumptions constitute the basis of 
OLS such as; Linearity, absence of multicollinearity, Homoscedasticity, absence of 
autocorrelation (Field, 2013). However, the violation of these assumptions may lead to 
biased results. 
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Empirical data analysis for regression models could be done either using (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009):  
• Time series data analysis refers to observing a set of observations on the values 
of variable(s) over different periods of times such as daily, weekly, monthly or 
annually. Despite that it is used heavily by researchers, it has a serious problem 
in that it assumes that the mean and variance do not vary over time (stationary 
problem). 
• Cross section data analysis refers to observing value of variable(s) for several 
sample units at the same point in time. Cross-sectional data is criticized because 
it does not take into account the size and scale effect of various heterogenous 
sample units in the statistical analysis. 
• Pooled (combined) data analysis  refers to observing value of variable(s) for 
several sample units over a period of time, it analyses data that are elements of 
both time series and cross-section data. 
• Panel data/longitudinal analysis  is a special type of pooled data at which each 
cross-sectional unit is analysed over time. Cameron and Trivedi (2010: 235) 
define panel data as: 
“panel data or longitudinal analysis are repeated measurements at 
different points in time on the same individual unit, such as person, firm, state or 
country. Regressions can then capture both variations over units, similar to 
regression on cross- section data, and variation over time” 
 
 
 
113 
 
There are some problems regarding estimation and inference (e.g. heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation) may be accompanied with panel data (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
However, panel data has its advantages over using simple pure cross section or time 
series analysis (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010): 
- Panel data can better detect certain effects that could not be measured by cross-
section analysis only or time series analysis only.  
- Panel data gives more informative data with lower collinearity among variables 
and more efficiency. 
- Panel data is more helpful in studying dynamics of change and complicated 
behavioural models.  
A panel data regression equation could be summarized as (Baltagi, 2008): 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋ⅈ𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
Where i denoting sample units (cross-section dimension) and t denotes the time-series 
dimension. α is a scalar, β is the coefficient and X is the explanatory variable. 
If each individual unit (firm, country... etc.) in the panel data has the same number of 
observations and observed in all time periods, this is called a balanced panel. Whereas, 
if each individual unit in the panel data has different number of observations and not 
observed in all time periods, it is called unbalanced panel (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
Despite the advantages of the panel data methodology, it has not been fully used by most 
researchers looking to explain audit fees and audit report timeliness models. Therefore, 
it is considered a contribution of this study to provide more precise estimates using 
econometric techniques and data that go beyond the existing literature. In the next 
sections, some panel data techniques used and compared in this study will be discussed. 
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5.6.1 Pooled OLS Model 
The pooled OLS model simply pool all the observations and estimate the overall 
regression with a single overall intercept term, neglecting the cross-section and time 
series nature of the data and ignores its panel (Henderson and Kaplan, 2000; Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009).  
5.6.2 Fixed effects Model 
The fixed effects (FE) model pool all observations but includes an intercept for each 
cross-section unit to capture its specific effects (Henderson and Kaplan, 2000; Gujarati 
and Porter, 2009). FE model can be used whenever the variables change overtime. 
However, for variables that do not change over time, fixed effects model may not 
appropriate to be used, and then other panel data models can be used instead (Baltagi, 
2008). 
5.6.3 Random effects Model 
Random effects model assumes variation between cross-section units and also variations 
within cross-section units over time. In random effects model, the intercept of each 
sampling unit is assumed to be random. One of the advantages of random-effects model 
is that variables that do not change over time (such as: gender, religion) can be introduced 
in the model (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
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Some tests can be performed to find out which is the most appropriate model for the data  
analysis, Breush-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier and Hausman tests are two well-known tests 
used in comparing different models to find out the most appropriate model. 
Random-effects vs Pooled OLS: Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test 
Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, proposed by Breusch and Pagan (1980), helps 
to decide whether the random-effects model or the simple pooled OLS is appropriate. 
The null hypothesis in the LM test is that variances across entities is zero. This is, no 
significant difference across units (i.e. no panel effect). 
Random vs fixed-effects: Hausman Test 
In order to check whether fixed or random effects is the most appropriate model which 
results can be relied on, a Hausman test is performed. In the Hausman test, the null 
hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects while the alternative hypothesis 
is that the fixed effects is the preferred model. 
5.6.4 Prais-Winsten panel-corrected standard error Model (PCSE) 
If heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are exhibited in the error terms of fixed or 
random-effects estimators, then, in this case, fixed and random-effects estimators are 
inefficient and biased. Therefore, an appropriate methodology is needed to correct the 
standard errors for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The appropriate panel data 
regression model capable of accounting for error terms that exhibit heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation is Prais-Winsten regression. 
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Prais- Winsten panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) technique take into account the 
heteroscedasticity and correlations problems. Thus, it is perfect in situations where time 
dimension is more limited than cross-section dimension, like the case of this study.  
Prais-Winsten estimation was recommended by Beck and Katz (1995). This technique 
allows for disturbances that are heteroskedastic and auto correlated panels.  It is often 
used as an alternative method in studies focusing on relatively “short and wide” panels 
like this study. Following some prior literature in business, (Lapré and Tsikriktsis, 2006; 
Mehic et al., 2013; Onder and Karal, 2013; Thomas et al., 2014), Prais- Winsten 
regression estimation is used in this study to account for both heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation between units in the audit fees and delay models. A discussion of why 
Prais- Winsten model is used and tests conducted are presented in the next chapters. 
5.7 Hypothesis development for audit fees model 
Following previous research (Simunic, 1980; Taylor and Simon, 1999; Lyon and Maher, 
2005; Ettredge et al., 2007; Bell et al., 2008; Wang and Zhou, 2012; Ittonen and Peni, 
2012; De George et al., 2013; André et al., 2016; Huang et al., 2016; Foster and Shastri, 
2016; Cheng et al., 2016), and others, regression model will be used to employ variations 
of the regression of audit fees to several variables. 
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Audit fees proposed model could be summarized in an equation as follows: 
𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐹 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴 +  𝛽2𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾 +  𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐺 +  𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽7 𝐵𝑂𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽9𝐵𝑖𝑔𝑁 +  𝛽10 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑍 
+ 𝛽11𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽12𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑂𝑃 + 𝛽13𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌 + 𝛽14𝑇𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑆𝑀 
+ 𝛽15 𝑑𝑢𝑚2008 + 𝛽16𝑑𝑢𝑚2009 +  𝛽17𝑑𝑢𝑚2011 +  𝛽18 𝑑𝑢𝑚2012 
+ 𝛽19𝑑𝑢𝑚2013 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 
Where: 
LNAF is the natural log of external audit fees,  
LNTA is the natural log of total assets,  
QUICK is the ratio of current assets less inventory to current liabilities,  
REC is the percentage of receivables over total assets,  
INVENT is the percentage of inventories over total assets,  
FORG is a dummy variable given the value 1 if the company has foreign subsidiaries, 
and 0 otherwise,  
ROA is the ratio of net income before tax divided by total assets,  
BODIND is the percentage of independent directors on the board,  
CEODUAL is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the CEO and Chairman of board 
is the same person,  
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BigN is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is used, and 0 
otherwise, SPECZ is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the auditor is a specialized 
industry, 0 otherwise,  
INITIAL is a dummy variable given the value 1 if this is the first year the auditor is 
appointed with the client, and 0 otherwise,  
AUDOP is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a company receives a non-standard 
unqualified audit opinion, and 0 otherwise,  
BUSY is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if fiscal year-end is December/January, 
TOURISM is a dummy variable given the value 1 when the company is in the tourism 
sector, and 0 otherwise,  
dum2008, dum2009, dum2011, dum2012, dum2013 are dummy variables for years 
2008, 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively 
 
5.7.1 Dependent Variable 
Following prior research, such as: (Whisenant et al., 2003; Lyon and Maher, 2005; 
Ettredge et al., 2006; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Wang and Zhou, 2012; De George et 
al., 2013; André et al., 2016; Huang et al., 2016; Foster and Shastri, 2016; Cheng et al., 
2016), 𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐹 is audit fees dependent variable that is transformed to natural log to achieve 
normality of data, reduce skewness within the data and to prevent large firms from 
influencing the results. 
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Independent Variables 
5.7.2 Client size 
Some researchers have used various indicators of client’s size such as: client’s market 
value, turnover, number of employees and sales, but most researchers (such as: (Simunic, 
1980; Seetharaman et al., 2002; Yatim et al., 2006; Barua and Smith, 2013)) favour the 
value of total assets as the most commonly used indicator of client’s size. Value of total 
assets is usually transformed using the natural logarithm to normalize the distribution of 
the data set. 
𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴 is used as a measure of client size and is defined as the natural log of total assets 
(Simunic, 1980; Seetharaman et al., 2002; Yatim et al., 2006; Barua and Smith, 2013). 
It is argued that as the size of the client increases, that requires more effort to be exerted 
by the auditor to examine the client accounts, and thus that will increase the audit fees.  
So, higher audit fees are expected to be charged to larger client. 
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between client size and audit fees  
5.7.3 Client risk 
Inherent risk for certain accounts in the client’s balance sheet is another issue that 
literature proved that it is an important variable affecting audit fees. Auditors and 
researchers considered some accounts like receivables and inventories to be inherently 
risky, as they involve higher risk of misevaluation and needs specific audit procedures. 
Results of many studies suggest a strong positive relationship between inherent risk 
(represented by receivables and inventory accounts ratio to total assets) and audit fees 
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(Hay et al., 2006). However, inventory ratio still has mixed results on its effect on audit 
fees. As some US sample based studies (Carcello et al., 2002; Scott and Gist, 2013) have 
found that inventory ratio has no effect on audit fees. While some Chinese sample based 
studies (Liu and Subramaniam, 2013; Cahan and Sun, 2015) have found a negative 
relationship between inventory ratio and audit fees, this also was evident by (Shan et al., 
2015) in a  Japanese sample. 
The variables REC and INVENT are the client’s accounts receivable and inventory as a 
proportion of total assets. It is used as a proxy of client risk by most prior studies. Simunic 
(1980) argued that accounts receivable and inventory are considered risky items in the 
balance sheet. That is why they require more audit procedures and effort to decrease the 
risk of audit failure and thus result in increased audit fees. This argument was supported 
by the results of many subsequent studies (such as: (Kealey et al., 2007; Charles et al., 
2010; Habib et al., 2013)). So, companies with higher receivables and inventories ratios 
are expected to be charged higher audit fees. 
H2a: There is a significant positive relationship between receivables ratio and audit fees  
H2b: There is a significant positive relationship between inventory ratio and audit fees 
QUICK is the quick ratio which is equal to the ratio of the current assets (excluding 
inventory) to current liabilities, and is used as a proxy of client risk. Prior literature 
argued that quick ratio is negatively related to audit fees as a trade-off for auditor's 
litigation risk (Simunic and Stein, 1996; Whisenant et al., 2003; Choi et al., 2008; Wang 
and Zhou, 2012; Scott and Gist, 2013). 
H2c: There is a significant negative relationship between quick ratio and audit fees 
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5.7.4 Client Complexity 
FORG is defined as a dummy variable in which we assign a value of 1 if the company 
owns a subsidiary in a foreign country and 0 otherwise. The more decentralization and 
diversification of the financial reporting entity, the more complex it is. Researchers 
typically expect that the more complex a client, the harder it is to audit and the more 
audit fees likely to be charged (Simunic, 1980; Mitra et al., 2007; Ghosh and Pawlewicz, 
2009; De George et al., 2013). 
H3: There is a significant positive relationship between client complexity and audit fees 
5.7.5 Client profitability 
ROA is the ratio of firm's net income to total assets. Previous studies used ROA as a 
proxy for client profitability. It is expected that the wealthier the client is, the higher audit 
fees the auditor will bill to compensate the effort and time spend in auditing huge 
revenues and expenses. 
H4: There is a significant positive relationship between client profitability and audit fees 
 
5.7.6 Client industry- Tourism 
Tourism is a very sensitive industry towards any economic and political instability could 
happen in any country. According to the United Nations World Tourism Organization 
(UNWTO), growth of global tourism was 5% in the first quarter of 2008 compared with 
the same quarter in 2007. In the Middle East, the growth was higher for a round 12.5%. 
However, by the end of 2008 and during 2009, the tourism industry worldwide witnessed 
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a decline according to UNWTO World Tourism Barometer. Therefore, the GFC affected 
world tourism growth. In Egypt, by the end of GFC, according to the Egyptian Ministry 
of Tourism, tourism industry began to achieve higher revenues with more than $12.5 
billion by the end of 2010. However, by the beginning of Egyptian revolution on 2011, 
a severe decline in tourism revenues began to happen. According to Egyptian Ministry 
of Tourism, tourism industry achieved $8.8 billion in 2011 and $5.9 billion in 2013. This 
risk surrounding the tourism industry during economic and political changes will affect 
the assessment of audit risk by auditors, and therefore may affect their audit fees and 
effort. So, a significant relationship between clients working in the tourism industry and 
audit fees can be hypothesized. 
H5: There is a significant relationship between clients in tourism industry and audit fees 
5.7.7 Corporate governance 
Board of directors’ independence and CEO duality are commonly used proxies for 
client’s corporate governance. Prior literature reported their significant effect on audit 
fees (Carcello et al., 2002; Goodwin-stewart and Kent, 2006; Mitra et al., 2007; Singh et 
al., 2014). 
H6a: There is a significant positive relationship between CEO duality and audit fees  
H6b: There is a significant positive relationship between board of directors’ 
independence and audit fees. 
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5.7.8 Audit firm size 
Big N is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the partner's audit firm is one of the big 4 
auditing firms and 0 otherwise. Thinggaard and Kiertzner (2008) study believed that 
audit office size has no effect on audit fees, while (Choi et al., 2008; Campa, 2013) 
believed that audit office size has a positive effect on audit fees. Because of the conflict 
in results between prior studies, a meta-analysis by Hay (2013) recommend further 
investigation by researcher for the effect of audit office size on audit fees. However, a 
positive relationship between audit fees and audit firm size can be expected. 
H7: There is a significant positive relationship between audit firm size and audit fees 
5.7.9 Auditor specialization 
SPECZ can be defined as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the audit partner is an 
industry specialist and 0 otherwise. Consistent with prior literature, audit firm market 
share is used as a proxy for auditor specialization (Palmrose, 1986; Carcello and Nagy, 
2004; Francis et al., 2005). 
The auditor market share is based on the percentage of audited assets within each 
industry. The auditing firm is considered industry specialist if it is ranked among the top 
two auditing firms in an industry at a specified year. A negative effect of auditor 
specialization on audit fees is expected.  
H8: There is a significant negative relationship between auditor specialization and audit 
fees 
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5.7.10 Initial engagements 
INITIAL is a dummy variable that equals 1 if this is the initial engagement of the partner 
to the client, 0 otherwise. Most prior studies gave evidence that auditors offer discounts 
for initial engagements (Whisenant et al., 2003; Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006; Krishnan 
and Yu, 2011; Evans Jr. and Schwartz, 2013). 
H9: There is a significant negative relationship between initial engagements and audit 
fees 
5.7.11 Busy season 
Busy season is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the client’s fiscal year end is on 
December/ January, 0 otherwise. Audit services conducted during busy season will 
require more audit staff to work overtime and thus they may charge extra auditing fees 
during busy season and offer fees discount for working outside busy season (Hay et al., 
2006). This was proven by many studies (such as: (Chaney et al., 2004; McMeeking et 
al., 2006; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Lin and Liu, 2013)). So, a positive relationship 
between audit fees and busy season can be expected. 
H10: There is a significant positive relationship between busy season and audit fees Audit 
Opinion 
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5.7.12 Audit opinion 
Audit opinion is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a non-standard audit opinion was 
issued for the client, 0 otherwise. A positive relationship was proven by some researchers 
between audit fees and audit reports in case of qualified or modified audit reports 
(Francis et al., 2005; Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006; Behn et al., 2009; Leventis et al., 
2013; Cahan and Sun, 2015). So, higher audit fees can be hypothesized to be associated 
with non-standard audit opinion 
H11: There is a significant positive relationship between auditor opinion and audit fees 
 
5.7.13 Global financial crisis and Egyptian revolution 
Year dummies 2008 and 2009 tend to account for the effect of global financial crisis on 
audit fees. While, year dummies 2011,2012 and 2013, tend to account for the effect of 
political instability and economic recession on audit fees during the revolution in Egypt. 
Economic and political instability may make the auditor be more cautious about the 
company’s financial condition in this instable environment, and thus increase audit 
procedures and audit fees. Or, the auditor may be exposed to the recession in the audit 
market during the economic instability and thus decrease audit fees. So, a significant 
effect of global financial crisis and Egyptian revolution on audit fees can be 
hypothesized. 
H12a: There is a significant effect of global financial crisis on audit fees  
H12b: There is a significant effect of Egyptian revolution on audit fees 
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Table 5-6 Hypothesis summary for audit fees model 
Hypothesis Variable Expected 
sign 
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between 
client size and audit fees 
Client size (LNTA) + 
H2a: There is a significant positive relationship between 
receivables ratio and audit fees 
Client risk (REC) + 
H2b: There is a significant positive relationship between 
inventory ratio and audit fees 
Client risk (INV) + 
H2c: There is a significant negative relationship between 
quick ratio and audit fees 
Client risk (QUICK) - 
H3: There is a significant positive relationship between 
client complexity and audit fees 
Client complexity 
(FORG) 
+ 
H4: There is a significant positive relationship between 
client profitability and audit fees 
Client Profitability 
(ROA) 
+ 
H5: There is a significant relationship between clients in 
tourism industry and audit fees  
Tourism Industry ? 
H6a: There is a significant positive relationship between 
CEO duality and audit fees 
Corporate 
governance - CEO 
duality 
+ 
H6b: There is a significant positive relationship between 
board of directors’ independence and audit fees. 
Corporate 
governance- BOD 
independence 
+ 
H7: There is a significant positive relationship between 
audit firm size and audit fees 
Audit firm size + 
H8: There is a significant negative relationship between 
auditor specialization and audit fees. 
Auditor 
specialization 
- 
H9: There is a significant negative relationship between 
initial engagements and audit fees 
Initial engagement - 
H10: There is a significant positive relationship between 
busy season and audit fees 
Busy season + 
H11: There is a significant positive relationship between 
auditor opinion and audit fees 
Audit opinion +  
H12a: There is a significant effect of global financial crisis 
on audit fees 
Global financial 
crisis 
? 
H12b: There is a significant effect of Egyptian revolution 
on audit fees 
Egyptian 
Revolution 
? 
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5.8 Hypothesis development for audit report lag model 
Following previous research by (Ettredge et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2009; Habib and 
Bhuiyan, 2011; Abbott et al., 2012; Apadore and Noor, 2013; Whitworth and Lambert, 
2014; Habib, 2015) , regression model will be used to employ variations of the regression 
of audit report lag to several variables. 
 Audit report lag proposed model could be summarized in an equation as follows: 
𝐿𝑁𝑅𝐸_𝐿𝑎𝑔  = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉 +  𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝑂𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔𝑁 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑍 + 𝛽10 𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌
+  𝛽11 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑂𝑃 +   +𝛽12𝑇𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑆𝑀 + +𝛽13𝑑u𝑚2008 + 𝛽14 𝑑𝑢𝑚2009 
+  𝛽15 𝑑𝑢𝑚2011 +  𝛽16 𝑑𝑢𝑚2012 + 𝛽17 𝑑𝑢𝑚2013 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
 
LNRE_lag is the natural log of audit report lag in days, 
LNTA is the natural log of total assets  
FORG is a dummy variable given the value 1 if the company has foreign subsidiaries, 
and 0 otherwise,  
LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets,   
Loss is a dummy variable given the value 1 if net income is negative, and 0 otherwise,  
CEODUAL is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the CEO and Chairman of board 
is the same person,  
BODIND is the percentage of independent directors on the board,  
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BigN is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is used, and 0 
otherwise, SPECZ is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the auditor is a specialized 
industry, 0 otherwise,  
AUDOP is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a company receives a non-standard 
unqualified audit opinion, and 0 otherwise,  
Tenure is the number of years the auditor has been performing the audit to the company, 
BUSY is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if fiscal year-end is December/January, 
TOURISM is a dummy variable given the value 1 when the company is in the tourism 
sector, and 0 otherwise,  
dum2008, dum2009, dum2011, dum2012, dum2013 are dummy variables for years 
2008, 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively 
5.8.1 Dependent Variable 
Audit report lag is the time taken by the auditor to finish the auditing process, and it 
equals to the number of days between fiscal year end and audit report date. Following 
prior research, such as: (Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Blankley et al., 2014; Whitworth 
and Lambert, 2014; Shin et al., 2016), 𝐿𝑁𝑅𝐸_𝐿𝑎𝑔  represents the report lag in days 
transformed to natural log to achieve normality of data, reduce skewness within the data.  
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Independent Variables 
5.8.2 Client size 
𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴 is used as a measure of client size and is defined as the natural log of total assets 
(Afify, 2009; Munsif et al., 2012; Chan et al., 2016). Most previous studies report 
significant effect of client size on audit report lag, but whether it is negative or positive 
effect differ from one study to another. That is why a significant relationship can be 
hypothesized between client size and audit report lag. 
H1: There is a significant relationship between client size and audit report lag 
5.8.3 Client complexity 
Following prior studies (Blankley et al., 2014; Khlif and Samaha, 2014; Shin et al., 
2016),  FORG is used as a proxy for the complexity of the client. FORG can be defined 
as a dummy variable in which we assign a value of 1 if the company owns a subsidiary 
in a foreign country and 0 otherwise. Researchers typically expect that the more complex 
a client, the more time-consuming the audit is likely to be and the longer the audit report 
lag, (Ettredge et al., 2006; Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Chan 
et al., 2016). 
H2: There is a significant positive relationship between client complexity and audit 
report lag 
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5.8.4 Client financial condition 
Leverage was used by previous studies as a measure of client’s financial condition 
(Ettredge et al., 2006; Abbott et al., 2012; Munsif et al., 2012; Chan et al., 2016).  LEV 
can be defined as the leverage of the client that equal to the ratio of the firm's total debt 
to total assets, and is used as a proxy of client financial condition. The auditor may need 
extra time for additional effort exerted to reduce client risk associated with bad financial 
conditions. That is why some previous studies (Ettredge et al., 2006; Knechel and 
Sharma, 2012; Khlif and Samaha, 2014; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014; Chan et al., 
2016; Shin et al., 2016) found a positive relationship between leverage ratio and audit 
report lag. Therefore, a significant positive relationship can be hypothesized between 
client financial condition and audit report lag. 
H3: There is a significant positive relationship between client leverage and audit report 
lag 
5.8.5 Client performance 
LOSS was used as a measure of client performance by previous literature. LOSS is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm reported loss and 0 otherwise. Some studies 
used LOSS as proxy for client performance (Yan, 2012; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014; 
Chan et al., 2016), and argued that companies experiencing losses may wish to delay this 
bad news and auditors tend to be cautious during the audit and spend more time 
accompanied with longer audit report lag.  
H4: There is a significant positive relationship between client loss and audit report lag  
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5.8.6 Client Industry- Tourism 
Tourism industry was globally affected by economic recession during GFC in most 
countries. Moreover, a severe decline in tourism revenues was realized after the Egyptian 
revolution. Ministry of tourism in Egypt reported a decline in tourism revenues by 17.75 
% in 2011 and 45% decline by 2013 compared to tourism revenues in year 2010. High 
industry risk associated with tourism could increase audit risk, and therefore auditors 
might spend more time auditing this risky industry especially after any economic and 
political change. So, a longer audit report lag can be expected for tourism industry clients. 
H5: There is a significant positive relationship between clients in tourism industry and 
audit report lag 
5.8.7 Corporate governance  
Previous studies (Afify, 2009; Khlif and Samaha, 2014; Habib, 2015) have used 
𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵𝑂𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷 as measures of client’s corporate governance strength. 
CEODUAL can be defined as a dummy variable of 1 in case of CEO also holds the 
position of Chairman, 0 otherwise. BODIND could be defined as the percentage of 
independent directors on the Board. Researchers give mixed results of the relationship 
between corporate governance characteristics and audit report lag, but, we can 
hypothesize that a positive relationship exists between board of directors’ independence, 
CEO duality and audit report lag. 
H6a: There is a significant positive relationship between CEO duality and audit report 
lag  
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H6b: There is a significant positive relationship between board of directors’ 
independence and audit report lag  
5.8.8 Audit firm size 
Big N is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the audit firm is one of the big 4 auditing firms 
and 0 otherwise.  Big N has been used as a proxy of audit firm size by previous literature 
(Leventis et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2009; Yan, 2012; Shin et al., 2016). It is expected that 
big N auditing firms are able to provide higher quality and faster audit processes than 
their counterparts of local audit firms because they use higher quality staff, superior 
technology, more efficient audit planning and resources. So, we can hypothesize that a 
negative relationship exists between audit firm size and audit report lag.  
H7: There is a significant negative relationship between audit firm size and audit report 
lag 
 
5.8.9 Auditor industry specialization 
SPECZ can be defined as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the auditor is an industry 
specialist and 0 otherwise. A partner can be considered industry specialist if the partner 
is ranked among the top two partners in an industry at a specified year based upon the 
amount of total assets audited in a certain industry. Because of the industry related 
knowledge, training and skills acquired by industry specialist auditors, they are expected 
to finish audit work faster and thus have shorter audit report lag. Therefore, a significant 
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negative relationship exists between audit report lag and auditor specialization can be 
hypothesized. 
H8: There is a significant negative relationship between auditor specialization and audit 
report lag. 
5.8.10 Auditor tenure 
TENURE can be defined as the number of years of auditor tenure auditing the client. 
(Lee et al., 2009; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014; Chan et al., 
2016) have proven a negative relationship between auditor tenure and audit report lag. 
They argue that long-tenured auditors became familiar with the client operations and 
control which save much effort and time during the audit process 
H9: There is a significant negative relationship between auditor tenure and audit report 
lag 
5.8.11 Busy season 
Following (Payne and Jensen, 2002; Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011; Austine et al., 2013), 
BUSY refers to a dummy variable of 1 if the company’s fiscal year end is on 
December/January, 0 otherwise. At that time of fiscal year end, auditors tend to be very 
busy and therefore audit report lag tend to be prolonged. 
H10: There is a significant positive relationship between busy season and audit report 
lag  
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5.8.12 Global financial crisis and Egyptian revolution 
Year dummies 2008 and 2009 tend to account for the effect of global financial crisis 
effect on audit report lag. While, year dummies 2011,2012 and 2013, tend to account for 
the effect of political instability and economic recession during the revolution in Egypt. 
Economic and political instability may make the auditor be more cautious about the 
company’s financial condition in this instable environment, and thus increase audit 
procedures and report lag. Or, the auditor may be exposed to pressure from management 
to finish the auditing process as fast as possible to avoid bad rumours in the stock market 
and to provide timely information for investors. So, a significant effect of global financial 
crisis and Egyptian revolution on audit report lag can be hypothesized. 
H11a: Global financial crisis significantly affects audit report lag 
H11b: Egyptian Revolution significantly affects audit report lag 
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Table 5-7 Hypothesis summary for audit report lag model 
Hypothesis Variable Expected 
H1: There is a significant relationship between client 
size and audit report lag 
Client size ? 
H2: There is a significant positive relationship between 
client complexity and audit report lag 
Client complexity + 
H3: There is a significant positive relationship between 
client leverage and audit report lag 
Client financial 
condition 
+ 
H4: There is a significant positive relationship between 
client loss and audit report lag 
Client performance + 
H5: There is a significant positive relationship between 
clients in tourism industry and audit report lag  
Tourism Industry + 
H6a: There is a significant positive relationship 
between CEO duality and audit report lag 
CEO duality + 
H6b: There is a significant positive relationship 
between board of directors’ independence and audit 
report lag. 
BOD independence + 
H7: There is a significant negative relationship between 
audit firm size and audit report lag 
Audit firm size - 
H8: There is a significant negative relationship between 
auditor specialization and audit report lag. 
Auditor specialization - 
H9: There is a significant negative relationship between 
auditor tenure and audit report lag 
Auditor tenure - 
H10: There is a significant positive relationship 
between busy season and audit report lag 
Busy season + 
H11: There is a significant positive relationship 
between auditor opinion and audit report lag 
Audit opinion +  
H12a: There is a significant effect of global financial 
crisis on audit report lag 
Global financial crisis ? 
H12b: There is a significant effect of Egyptian 
revolution on audit report lag 
Egyptian Revolution ? 
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5.9 Summary 
During the current study, the researcher has reviewed auditing literature and related 
theories concerning the research topic, and identified gaps in literature from which the 
research problem has been addressed. Appropriate research design and model have been 
selected, and related hypotheses have been assumed. Then, quantitative data has been 
collected and statistically analysed, findings has been interpreted. Implications and 
recommendations have been suggested as will be discussed in the following sections. 
The researcher has adopted for the current study is positivism research philosophy by 
relying upon empirical evidence and actual data of audit fees and report lag to explain 
its relationship with client and audit attributes. Accordingly, the current study 
implements quantitative paradigm and deduction approach where data is collected and 
analysed to test the relationship between the dependent variables and the independent 
variables. 
Consistent with prior literature, the log of audit fees and log of audit report lag are used 
as the dependent variables in the audit fees model and audit report timeliness models 
respectively. 
The two models are constructed and a set of hypotheses are stated. These models are 
tested using two samples; one sample includes 212 Egyptian companies listed in the 
Egyptian stock market and, another sample includes the top 350 companies (FTSE 350) 
listed in the London Stock Exchange. The study covers the period of six financial years 
from 2008 to 2013. Hypothesis are derived for each model to investigate the determinants 
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of audit fees and audit report timeliness in Egypt and UK, and how these determinants 
are affected during severe economic and political instability. 
Because of the advantages of panel data statistical analysis, Prais- Winsten panel-
corrected standard error (PCSE) technique that take into account the heteroscedasticity 
and correlations problems has been selected for analysing data. As this technique is 
considered perfect in situations where time dimension is more limited than cross-section 
dimension, like the case of this study.  
After the detailed description provided by this chapter regarding the sample 
characteristics, the sources of data, the measurement of independent variables, the 
suitable analytical techniques used and hypotheses assumed. The next three chapters will 
discuss the results of analysing audit fees model and audit report lag models in Egypt 
and the UK.  
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Chapter 6 Empirical analysis and Discussions- Egypt 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the data analysis based on the research methods 
discussed in the previous chapter. Hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter 
concerning audit pricing and audit report lag are tested in the Egyptian context. First 
descriptive statistics are discussed. Then related correlation coefficients are presented. 
Discussion of the results of the testing of hypotheses are illustrated. Additional analysis 
of the effect of audit firm size and client size on audit fees and report lag models are then 
highlighted. Finally, a summary of the analysis is presented. 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6-1 presents the descriptive statistics of main variables used in audit fees model 
and audit report lag model for the full period of the study (2008–2013), for the global 
financial crisis (2008-2009), pre-revolution (2008-2010) and post- revolution (2011-
2013) periods in Egypt.  
Audit fees Log LNAF mean in Egypt is 11.07 and audit report lag log (LNRE_Lag) is 
4.2. The mean of total assets LNTA is 20.238. 11.8% of full sample total assets are 
represented by the account receivable and 18.5% are represented by inventories. It is 
observable that receivables and inventories increased from 10.7% and 16.9 % in pre-
revolution period to 12.8% and 19.9% respectively in the post-revolution period, that 
might indicate a higher client’s risk and an economic recession in the post-revolution 
139 
 
period. This is also indicated in the QUICK ratio that was 37 % in pre-revolution period 
and decreased to 32.5% in the post-revolution period.  
Regarding the firm’s complexity, we can find that, in Egypt, only 15.7% of the 
companies in our full sample have foreign subsidiaries. This percentage decreased by 
nearly 3% post-revolution period in Egypt due to the instability in the economic and 
political environment which may have affected the companies’ investments. 
In terms of firms’ performance, the mean of ROA and LOSS in Egypt were around 8.8% 
and 12.898% respectively. After revolution, a reduction in ROA (from 10.7% to 7.1%) 
and an increase in LOSS (from 7.54% to 17.51%) appear as another indicator of client’s 
business risk and economic recession associated with the political and economic changes 
in Egypt.   
For board of director’s variables, the average proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on board of directors in Egypt is 75.8%. Around 37% of the firms in the 
Egyptian sample have CEO duality, which is considered a relatively high percentage 
comparable with the UK descriptive statistics of only 3.5%, as will be demonstrated in 
the next chapter. 
In terms of auditor and engagement attributes, around 39% of the Egyptian sample 
companies engage with Big 4 auditing firms, and 26% of the sample companies have 
appointed an industry specialist auditor.  
Egyptian companies tend to change auditors more frequently with 26% of the sample are 
initial engagement for auditors and with average auditors’ tenure of 3 years. For busy 
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season, we can find that 82% of the Egyptian firms are audited during year end 
December/January. 
On average, 19% of the Egyptian companies in the sample have been issued qualified or 
modified audit report during the sample period. Tourism industry constitutes 10.47% of 
the Egyptian sample  
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Table 6-1 Descriptive statistics- EGYPT 
Panel A: Continuous variables 
          
 
FULL SAMPLE 2008-2009  2008-2010  2011-2013  
Variable N Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
N Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
N Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
N Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
LNAF 659 11.075 0.967 195 10.937 0.909 305 10.992 0.900 354 11.146 1.018 
LNRE_Lag 659 4.159 0.486 195 4.106 0.4776 305 4.144 0.503 354 4.173 0.472 
LNTA 659 20.238 1.697 195 20.270 1.768 305 20.276 1.743 354 20.206 1.657 
QUICK 659 0.346 0.206 195 0.378 0.232 305 0.370 0.224 354 0.325 0.187 
REC 659 0.118 0.134 195 0.106 0.130 305 0.107 0.130 354 0.128 0.137 
INVENT 659 0.185 0.161 195 0.171 0.142 305 0.169 0.142 354 0.199 0.174 
ROA 659 0.088 0.102 195 0.108 0.105 305 0.107 0.104 354 0.071 0.097 
BODIND 659 0.758 0.148 195 0.769 0.138 305 0.768 0.138 354 0.750 0.155 
Tenure 659 2.835 1.609 195 1.385 0.488 305 1.786 0.797 354 3.737 1.585 
(continued)             
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Panel B: Dummy variables 
 
FULL SAMPLE 2008-2009  2008-2010  2011-2013  
 
N % N % N % N % 
FORG 659 15.781 195 16.920 305 17.377 354 14.407 
LOSS 659 12.898 195 6.670 305 7.541 354 17.514 
CEODUAL 659 37.329 195 36.920 305 36.721 354 37.853 
BigN 659 38.695 195 37.440 305 37.705 354 39.548 
SPECZ 659 26.404 195 29.230 305 30.164 354 23.164 
INITIAL 659 26.252 195 58.970 305 42.623 354 12.147 
AUDOP 659 19.120 195 17.950 305 19.344 354 18.927 
BUSY 659 82.398 195 82.560 305 81.639 354 83.051 
TOURISM 659 10.470 195 10.260 305 10.164 354 10.734 
LNAF is the natural log of external audit fees, LNRE_lag is the natural log of audit report lag in days, LNTA is the natural log of total assets, QUICK is the 
ratio of current assets less inventory to current liabilities, REC is the percentage of receivables over total assets, INVENT is the percentage of inventories 
over total assets, LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, FORG is a dummy variable given the value 1 if the company has foreign subsidiaries, and 
0 otherwise, ROA is the ratio of net income before tax divided by total assets, Loss is a dummy variable given the value 1 if net income is negative, and 0 
otherwise, BODIND is the percentage of independent directors on the board, CEODUAL is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the CEO and Chairman 
of board is the same person, BigN is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is used, and 0 otherwise, SPECZ  is a dummy variable given 
the value of 1 if the auditor is a specialized industry, 0 otherwise, INITIAL is a dummy variable given the value 1 if this is the first year the auditor is 
appointed with the client, and 0 otherwise, AUDOP is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a company receives a non-standard unqualified audit opinion, 
and 0 otherwise, Tenure is the number of years the auditor has been performing the audit to the company, BUSY is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if 
fiscal year-end is December/January, TOURISM is a dummy variable given the value 1 when the company is in the tourism sector, and 0 otherwise. 
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6.3 Correlation matrix 
The correlation matrix aims at examining whether there is any correlation between the 
independent variables, and that any correlation is less than 80 per cent (Gujarati, 2003). 
Multicollinearity problem, should be considered if the correlation is over 80 per cent as 
it may threaten the regression analysis. 
From the correlation coefficients for the audit fees and delay models, shown in tables 6-
2 and table 6-3, no high correlation is found among the variables. As a result, collinearity 
does not appear to create a threat to the interpretation of regression coefficients of the 
independent variables in this model.  
A relatively high correlation coefficient is found between receivables (REC) and quick 
ratio (QUICK) for 0.5437, this correlation is expected, as it suggests that companies with 
higher receivables have higher quick ratio. Another high correlation (51.7%) is found 
between log of total assets (LNTA) and companies with foreign subsidiaries and that 
indicate that larger companies in Egypt always extend their activities to other foreign 
countries. Also, Big N and specialist auditor SPECZ has high correlation coefficient of 
0.5344 which suggests that mostly specialized auditors in Egypt are Big N audit firms. 
However, given these relatively high correlations, correlation matrix values are within 
acceptable limits, or in other words, all values are less than 0.8.
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Table 6-2 Correlation matrix- audit fees model: Egypt 
 LNTA QUICK REC INVENT FORG ROA BODIND CEODUAL BigN SPECZ INITIAL AUDOP BUSY TOURISM 
               
LNTA 1              
QUICK -0.2212 1             
REC -0.1647 0.5437 1            
INVENT -0.2677 -0.0472 0.2162 1           
FORG 0.517 -0.0827 -0.0612 -0.0648 1          
ROA 0.0124 0.2289 -0.0941 -0.0777 -0.0025 1         
BODIND 0.1723 -0.0978 -0.0122 -0.1503 0.0519 -0.0645 1        
CEODUAL 0.1845 -0.1236 -0.1224 0.0707 0.2425 -0.0325 -0.0916 1       
BigN 0.3884 -0.1206 -0.0827 0.0028 0.4338 0.0896 0.0789 0.2629 1      
SPEC 0.4453 -0.0802 -0.0628 -0.0822 0.3427 0.117 0.0357 0.174 0.5344 1     
INITIAL -0.0758 0.0913 0.0174 0.0408 -0.0312 0.0634 -0.0021 0.003 0.0217 -0.0293 1    
AUDOP -0.0382 0.0096 0.0183 -0.081 -0.1258 -0.25 -0.0462 -0.0242 -0.109 -0.075 0.0169 1   
BUSY 0.0021 -0.1587 0.0203 0.0564 0.0689 -0.0644 0.0206 0.1261 0.1545 0.1891 0.0041 -0.1806 1  
TOURISM 0.0934 -0.2272 -0.1967 -0.2745 -0.0257 -0.1186 0.0607 -0.1 0.0438 -0.0783 -0.0125 -0.0276 0.158 1 
LNTA is the natural log of total assets, QUICK is the ratio of current assets less inventory to current liabilities, REC is the percentage of receivables over 
total assets, INVENT is the percentage of inventories over total assets, LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, FORG is a dummy variable 
given the value 1 if the company has foreign subsidiaries, and 0 otherwise, ROA is the ratio of net income before tax divided by total assets, BODIND is 
the percentage of independent directors on the board, CEODUAL is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the CEO and Chairman of board is the same 
person, BigN is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is used, and 0 otherwise, SPECZ  is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if 
the auditor is a specialized industry, 0 otherwise, INITIAL is a dummy variable given the value 1 if this is the first year the auditor is appointed with the 
client, and 0 otherwise, AUDOP is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a company receives a non-standard unqualified audit opinion, and 0 
otherwise, BUSY is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if fiscal year-end is December/January, TOURISM is a dummy variable given the value 1 
when the company is in the tourism sector, and 0 otherwise, dum2008, dum2009, dum2011, dum2012, dum2013 are dummy variables for years 2008, 
2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively 
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 Table 6-2 Correlation matrix- audit report lag model: Egypt 
 LNTA FORG LEV LOSS CEODU
AL 
BODIND Tenure BigN BUSY AUDO
P 
SPECZ TOURI
SM 
             
LNTA 1.0000            
FORG 0.5170 1.0000           
LEV 0.2091 0.2153 1.0000          
LOSS -0.0316 -0.0672 0.1052 1.0000         
CEODUAL 0.1845 0.2425 0.0452 0.0680 1.0000        
BODIND 0.1723 0.0519 -0.0514 0.1033 -0.0916 1.0000       
Tenure 0.0722 0.0057 -0.0632 0.0368 0.0209 0.0330 1.0000      
BigN 0.3884 0.4338 0.1634 -0.0176 0.2629 0.0789 -0.0152 1.0000     
BUSY 0.0021 0.0689 -0.0778 0.0471 0.1261 0.0206 0.0070 0.1545 1.0000    
AUDOP -0.0382 -0.1258 0.0592 0.1698 -0.0242 -0.0462 -0.0172 -0.1090 -0.1806 1.0000   
SPECZ 0.4453 0.3427 0.0599 -0.0135 0.1740 0.0357 0.0392 0.5344 0.1891 -0.0750 1.0000  
TOURISM 0.0934 -0.0257 -0.1317 0.1641 -0.1000 0.0607 -0.0326 0.0438 0.1581 -0.0276 -0.0783 1.0000 
LNTA is the natural log of total assets FORG is a dummy variable given the value 1 if the company has foreign subsidiaries, and 0 
otherwise, LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets,  Loss is a dummy variable given the value 1 if net income is negative, and 
0 otherwise, BODIND is the percentage of independent directors on the board, CEODUAL is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if 
the CEO and Chairman of board is the same person, BigN is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is used, and 0 
otherwise, SPECZ  is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the auditor is a specialized industry, 0 otherwise, AUDOP is a dummy 
variable given the value 1 when a company receives a non-standard unqualified audit opinion, and 0 otherwise, Tenure is the number 
of years the auditor has been performing the audit to the company, BUSY is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if fiscal year-end is 
December/January, TOURISM is a dummy variable given the value 1 when the company is in the tourism sector, and 0 otherwise 
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6.4 Findings and discussions 
6.4.1 Audit fees model: Findings and discussion 
This study examines the effect of different independent variables on audit fees as a 
dependent variable, thus a multiple regression analysis is considered to be used in this 
study following most previous literature. Due to the advantages of panel data over 
ordinary OLS analysis, as discussed in the previous chapter, panel data analysis will be 
used in our testing of hypotheses. Different types of panel data models could be applied, 
as shown in table 6-4, the two most common models are estimated: fixed-effects 
regression and random-effects regression, in addition to, the estimation of the ordinary 
OLS model.  
Table 6-3 OLS vs Random vs Fixed data analysis 
Variable OLS Random Fixed 
LNTA 0.30465255*** 0.19060689*** 0.04901955 
QUICK -0.47140886** -0.27112051** -0.20363854* 
REC 0.48107965* 0.01261742 -0.02483528 
INVENT -0.62516159*** -0.08707405 -0.0430068 
FORG -0.01760423 0.14961233* 0.15103022* 
ROA 0.15752798 0.27894242 0.21662026 
BODIND 0.00888111 0.115847 0.05308885 
CEODUAL 0.13778973** 0.07755196 0.06137074 
Big N 0.74446367*** 0.73767147*** 0.69041177*** 
SPECZ -0.07667237 0.0052487 0.0456361 
INITIAL 0.08660763 -0.04496003 -0.04846697 
AUDOP 0.05074453 0.1097264** 0.10332675** 
BUSY 0.00595226 0.07521283 0.10326563 
TOURISM 0.14139371 0.29165972 (omitted) 
dum2008 -0.26214124* -0.17518117*** -0.19916681*** 
dum2009 -0.07242332 -0.09667461*** -0.10658967*** 
dum2011 0.02802147 0.02897929 0.03909883 
dum2012 0.08578964 0.0582695* 0.06856134* 
dum2013 0.10227983 0.07422471* 0.09605186** 
_cons 4.7639217*** 6.7765468*** 9.6885272*** 
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N 659 659 659 
r2 0.65187134  0.51175017 
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
To find out which statistical estimation method is appropriate for the Egyptian sample, 
first, Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, proposed by Breusch and Pagan (1980) is 
performed to decide between random-effects regression and simple OLS regression. The 
null hypothesis in the LM test is that variances across entities is zero. As illustrated 
below, the test results indicate that there is significant difference across units, thus, the 
null hypothesis is rejected and therefore, the random-effects estimation is more 
appropriate than ordinary OLS.  
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
        LNAF[ID,t] = Xb + u[ID] + e[ID,t] 
Estimated results: 
 Var sd = sqrt(Var) 
LNAF .9359977 .9674698 
e .0402206 .2005506 
u .3722614 .6101322 
   Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                             chibar2(01) =   764.76 
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 
When N is large while T is small (as in the case of this study), the estimates by fixed 
effect regression and random effects regression can significantly differ (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009). To decide between fixed or random effects, a Hausman test can be run. In 
the Hausman test, the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects while 
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the alternative hypothesis is that the fixed effects is the preferred model. As shown 
below, the results of the test rejected the null hypothesis and hence the fixed-effects 
estimation is more appropriate for our model than the random-effects. 
Table 6-4 Hausman Fixed Random 
 Coefficients   
 (b) 
Fixed 
(B) 
Random 
(b-B) 
Difference 
sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
S.E. 
LNTA .0490195 .1906069 -.1415873 .0261883 
QUICK -.2036385 -.2711205 .067482 .0348626 
REC -.0248353 .0126174 -.0374527 .0465307 
INVENT -.0430068 -.0870741 .0440672 .0566424 
FORG .1510302 .1496123 .0014179 .0251313 
ROA .2166203 .2789424 -.0623222 .0414141 
BODIND .0530888 .115847 -.0627581 .0570172 
CEODUAL .0613707 .077552 -.0161812 .0314064 
BigN .6904118 .7376715 -.0472597 .0252892 
SPECZ .0456361 .0052487 .0403874 .0146392 
INITIAL -.048467 -.04496 -.0035069 .0051214 
AUDOP .1033267 .1097264 -.0063997 .0082188 
BUSY .1032656 .0752128 .0280528 .024394 
dum2008 -.1991668 -.1751812 -.0239856 .0071436 
dum2009 -.1065897 -.0966746 -.0099151 .0022773 
dum2011 .0390988 .0289793 .0101195 .0032252 
dum2012 .0685613 .0582695 .0102918 .0043536 
dum2013 .0960519 .0742247 .0218272 .0062168 
  b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                 chi2(18) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)   =       39.86 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0022    
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) has been calculated to check for multicollinearity 
problem. Gujarati (2003) suggests that a VIF value of less than 10 is acceptable, which 
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means that if VIF value is above 10, this suggests the existence of collinearity among 
variables, while if it is close to 1, this means there is no collinearity. The mean value of 
VIF tests is 1.60, as shown in table 6-6, which indicates that there is no concern about 
multicollinearity problem. 
Table 6-5 VIF: checking for multi-collinearity 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
dum2008 2.53 0.395640 
INITIAL 1.98 0.505031 
QUICK 1.92 0.521460 
LNTA 1.84 0.543299 
dum2012 1.77 0.563739 
REC 1.76 0.569059 
dum2011 1.75 0.572979 
dum2013 1.72 0.580089 
BigN 1.69 0.590559 
SPECZ 1.67 0.599626 
dum2009 1.64 0.610106 
FORG 1.57 0.637560 
INVENT 1.37 0.729541 
ROA 1.31 0.761807 
TOURISM 1.27 0.785269 
BUSY 1.20 0.833811 
CEODUAL 1.18 0.847034 
AUDOP 1.16 0.861370 
BODIND 1.10 0.908293 
Mean VIF 1.60  
 
Gujarati and Porter (2009) stated that problems concerning heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation may be accompanied with panel data.  Assuming homoscedastic 
disturbance when heteroscedasticity exists results in non-efficient estimates. Therefore, 
in order to check heteroscedasticity in the model, Wald test for panel-level 
heteroscedasticity can be performed. As shown below, the results of the test suggest the 
existence of heteroscedasticity. 
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Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity in fixed effect regression model 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
chi2 (139)  =   6.4e+32 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000  
Moreover, ignoring the existence of autocorrelation results in biased standard errors and 
inefficient regression estimates. Therefore, to test the null hypothesis of no first-order 
serial correlation in the residuals, the test for autocorrelation setup by Wooldridge (2002) 
can be used. According to such tests, the results suggests the existence of autocorrelation. 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,     119) =    163.952 
           Prob > F =      0.0000 
Based on the results of the above tests, we need a panel data model that can account for 
both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Since, in this case, fixed and random-effects 
estimators are inefficient and biased, we need a methodology which corrects the standard 
errors for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The panel-corrected standard error 
(PCSE) technique suggested by Beck and Katz (1995) is often used as an alternative 
method in studies focusing on relatively “short and wide” panels like this study. Prais- 
Winsten regression method is used to account for both heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation between units in the audit fees model (Stata command: xtpcse). Table 6-
7 summarizes audit fees regression results in Egypt using Prais-Winsten analysis. 
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Table 6-6 Audit fees regression results- Egypt 
Variable FULL SAMPLE 
(2008-2013) 
During GFC 
(2008-2009) 
BEFORE REVO 
(2008-2010) 
AFTER_ EVO 
(2011-2013) 
     
LNTA 0.28534305*** 0.25004978*** 0.2286882*** 0.34271426*** 
QUICK -0.46173318*** -0.61421071*** -0.56344618*** -0.40474442* 
REC 0.41305208** 0.23114971 0.33368739 0.55642642* 
INVENT -0.40490087*** -0.87863769*** -0.97088047*** -0.29249596* 
FORG 0.05093022 0.16944547 0.1892207** -0.10420737 
ROA 0.34332095** 0.57780799* 0.44177284** 0.15074246 
BODIND 0.16479215 -0.10194634 0.08373565 0.09984535 
CEODUAL 0.13379577*** -0.01511042 0.02232799 0.19850466*** 
BigN 0.73755285*** 0.79821133*** 0.76158523*** 0.71224791*** 
SPECZ -0.06901154* -0.12359611 -0.0813167 -0.07963902 
INITIAL -0.01374808 -0.06473174 -0.08218412** -0.04879903 
AUDOP 0.10254448** 0.10696982 0.1083177* 0.0741109 
BUSY -0.00246675 -0.10593739 -0.05249303 0.03853665 
TOURISM 0.08011526 -0.01531529 -0.0784351 0.11060411 
dum2008 -0.19241707***    
dum2009 -0.09630371***    
dum2011 0.02915033    
dum2012 0.06688459*    
dum2013 0.08307203*    
_cons 5.0234272*** 6.0750694*** 6.355342*** 3.9011528*** 
     
N 659 195 305 354 
r2 0.98996516 0.97503749 0.9874525 0.98479173 
***, **, and *denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
LNTA is the natural log of total assets, QUICK is the ratio of current assets less inventory to current 
liabilities, REC is the percentage of receivables over total assets, INVENT is the percentage of 
inventories over total assets, LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, FORG is a dummy 
variable given the value 1 if the company has foreign subsidiaries, and 0 otherwise, ROA is the ratio 
of net income before tax divided by total assets, BODIND is the percentage of independent directors 
on the board, CEODUAL is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the CEO and Chairman of 
board is the same person, BigN is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is used, 
and 0 otherwise, SPECZ 1 is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the auditor is a specialized 
industry, 0 otherwise, INITIAL is a dummy variable given the value 1 if this is the first year the 
auditor is appointed with the client, and 0 otherwise, AUDOP is a dummy variable given the value 1 
when a company receives a non-standard unqualified audit opinion, and 0 otherwise, BUSY is a 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if fiscal year-end is December/January, TOURISM is a dummy 
variable given the value 1 when the company is in the tourism sector, and 0 otherwise, dum2008, 
dum2009, dum2011, dum2012, dum2013 are dummy variables for years 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012 
and 2013, respectively 
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It is expected that more accounts and transactions compromising financial information 
of larger clients, require more time and effort by auditors. Thus, larger clients are 
expected to be charged higher audit fees. As expected in (H1) audit fees are higher for 
larger clients than smaller ones. Results show a significant positive coefficient for log of 
total assets LNTA (as a proxy of client size) and audit fees in Egypt and that larger clients 
are charged nearly 28.5% higher fees than smaller clients. This is consistent with results 
of prior literature (Simunic, 1980; Matthews and Peel, 2003; Dickins et al., 2008; Hay, 
2013; Bryan and Mason, 2016; Lin and Yen, 2016). 
Specific auditing procedures are needed for auditing and evaluating some complex and 
risky accounts such as accounts receivables. So, clients with more complex and risky 
balance sheet components are expected to be charged a premium to compensate auditors 
for the increased effort and audit risk assumed. Results of Egyptian sample audit fees 
model confirm our expectation (H2a) and previous studies results (Carcello et al., 2002; 
Chen et al., 2007; Liu and Subramaniam, 2013; Shan and Troshani, 2016) by reporting 
a positive significant coefficient for receivables ratio REC. It is observable that 
receivables ratio coefficient is higher during the revolution period 2011-2013 than before 
the revolution by around 22%. This indicates that client complexity and risk concerns 
highly raised auditors’ concerns while pricing audit services in periods of political and 
economic instability. 
Significant negative coefficient for inventory ratio was reported in some audit fees 
studies in China by (Liu and Subramaniam, 2013; Cahan and Sun, 2015; Lin and Yen, 
2016). Similarly, inventory ratio INV shows a significant negative coefficient in Egypt 
especially during the global financial crisis, despite it is in contrary to our expectation 
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(H2b). The only explanation for this result is that increased inventory may give an impact 
of an economic recession. So, as a way of increasing the demand on audit services in 
recession periods, auditors may try to offer discounted audit fees, especially, when 
recession consequences are affecting the client in the form of a high inventory ratio.  
Another proxy of client risk and complexity is quick ratio QUICK. Consistent with 
hypothesis (H2c) and results of previous studies (Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 
2005; Fung et al., 2012; Krishnan and Zhang, 2014), quick ratio has a negative significant 
effect on audit fees. The better the client’s liquidity position, the less risk the client is  
and the less audit risk assumed and so a discount of audit fees can be offered. During 
GFC, quick ratio coefficient tended to be higher by around 15% in Egypt than in the full 
sample indicating the auditors’ trust in companies with good financial conditions during 
the global financial crisis led them to offer audit fee discount for those clients.  
Foreign subsidiaries existence FORG is another proxy that increase client complexity. 
In Egypt, in contrary to our hypothesis (H3), results show it is not a significant variable. 
However, this is consistent with results of a Japanese a study made by (Shan et al., 2015), 
and study in Kuwait by (Al-Harshani, 2008) that client complexity is a non-significant 
variable in the audit fees model.  
Results suggest a positive significant relationship between ROA and audit fees which is 
consistent with results of a Chinese sample based study by Cahan and Sun (2015). This 
may be because auditors tend to charge higher audit fees to clients when they seem more 
wealthy, achieving higher profits and audit fees costs may not be a burden to them. 
Another explanation may be that higher profits require more audit time to accurately test  
for revenues and expenses identification to avoid management profit manipulation. 
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However, after the revolution, we can find that ROA has a non-significant effect on audit 
fees. This may be due to the decrease in the mean of ROA ratio for the clients from 
10.7% before the revolution to 7.1% after the revolution. Therefore, auditors try not to 
increase the burden of audit fees on clients in that instable less profitable period of time.  
Weak corporate governance leads to greater audit risk and higher audit fees. That is why 
companies of no segregation of duties between CEO and BOD chairman (CEODUAL) 
pay higher audit fees in the Egyptian sample, this is consistent with results of Lin and 
Liu (2013) study on Hong Kong exchange market. It is also noticeable that CEODUAL 
coefficient was not significant before the revolution, and gained much significant higher 
coefficient of 19.85% after the revolution. This indicates that auditors became more 
cautious after the revolution for companies with poor corporate governance mechanisms. 
BOD independence does not seem to have a significant effect on audit fees, this indicates 
that auditors in Egypt worry more about companies with poor corporate governance than 
companies with higher quality corporate governance. 
Big 4 auditing firms are claimed to render higher quality audit services than non-big 4. 
Accordingly, Big 4 audit firms are expected to spend more audit hours or give higher 
rate per hour for experienced auditors working in those firms. To compensate these 
increasing audit costs, Big 4 audit firms charge higher audit fees than non-big 4 audit 
firms. Consistent with previous audit literature (Hay et al., 2006; Choi et al., 2008; 
Sundgren and Svanström, 2013) and with our expectations (H7), Big N audit firms in 
Egypt seem to charge a higher rate than non-big 4 by around 74%. It is notable that Big 
N premium coefficient in Egypt decreased from 76.2% before the revolution to 71.2% 
after the revolution. This relatively lower premium may be an attempt by Big N to retain 
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or even to increase their market share (which actually increased by nearly 5% after the 
revolution) in a recession post-revolution period. 
By specializing in a certain industry, auditors gain special experience in that industry and 
therefore become more adaptive in addressing specific auditing issues within that 
industry. This could provide the auditing firm with the advantage of decreasing costs as 
a result of economies of scale, which can be passed to the client in the form of lower 
audit fees. Consistent with prior studies (Defond et al., 2000; Fields et al., 2004), a 
significant negative relationship between audit fees and auditor’s specialization SPECZ 
is documented in the Egyptian audit fees sample.  
Consistent with previous literature (Bell et al., 2008; Hay and Knechel, 2010; Fung et 
al., 2012; Zhu and Sun, 2012), initial audit engagements are reported to have no effect 
on audit fees determination in Egypt. However, it has a negative coefficient that may 
imply initial engagement discount in some cases, as we can find that during the period 
2008-2010, initial engagement discount of around 8% was offered to new clients. 
However, after that period, the coefficient decreased to 4% and became non-significant 
for initial engagements, may be because of the riskier political environment that made 
auditors do not want to offer discounts for clients they ignore much about the quality of 
their management and financial statements misstatements. 
Qualified or modified audit reports usually indicate potential problems found during the 
auditing process. These problems give a signal for higher audit risk assumed by the 
auditor and accompanied by higher audit efforts and costs. Therefore, higher audit fees 
are expected to be charged to cover these higher costs and risks. A significant positive 
audit opinion coefficient in the Egyptian audit fees model support our expectation and 
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results of previous audit fees literature (Francis et al., 2005; Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006; 
Behn et al., 2009; Cahan and Sun, 2015).  
Consistent with some previous studies (Ferguson et al., 2003; Wang and Zhou, 2012; 
Sundgren and Svanström, 2013; Audousset-coulier, 2015), busy season was reported as 
a non-significant variable in the Egyptian sample. However, this result is inconsistent 
with our hypothesis.  
Despite that TOURISM coefficient was not significant in the full sample audit fees 
model in Egypt, we can notice that TOURISM coefficient changed from negative sign 
(discount) of 7% during pre-revolution period to positive sign (premium) of 11% post 
revolution which imply higher risk associated with the decline in revenues of the tourism 
sector. This confirms that political instability during Egyptian revolution has affected 
some industries especially tourism industry and therefore could affect auditors while 
pricing audit services.  
Consistent with Krishnan and Zhang (2014) study on the effect of global financial crisis 
on audit fees in US. In the Egyptian context, GFC period dummy variables (2008, 2009) 
have significant negative coefficient in audit fee model. As auditors in Egypt tend to cut 
their fees due to the recession and bad financial conditions influencing the world. This is 
also apparent in the increase of the discount offered for clients with better financial 
conditions (represented in higher quick ratio QUICK), as previously discussed. Also, it 
seems that auditing services sector has suffered from recession that led auditors to offer 
10% discount for clients with fiscal year end in December/January. 
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Revolution period dummy variables (2011, 2012, 2013) have positive coefficients which 
are significant in years 2012 and 2013. This is also apparent in the effect of some 
variables on pricing decision during the revolution period. As we can find that REC, 
CEODUAL and TOURISM are variables that might seem to alert the auditors of 
potential risks during the revolution period and lead them to pay special attention and 
may charge the company higher audit fees. As previously discussed, REC coefficient 
increased by 22% after the revolution as a proxy of higher client risk assessment during 
this period. Also, CEODUAL coefficient increased after revolution by 17% due to the 
more cautious auditors became towards risky clients with lower quality corporate 
governance. TOURISM coefficient changed from negative coefficient to a positive 
coefficient of 11% that implies more audit risk assessment for risky client industry highly 
affected by political instability. A client in a such political and economic instable 
environment with these risky variables, certainly will increase auditors’ anxiety and lead 
them to increase efforts, costs and fees to mitigate anticipated risks. 
 
6.4.2 Audit report lag model: Findings and discussion 
This study examines the effect of different independent variables on audit delay as a 
dependent variable, thus a multiple regression analysis is considered to be used in this 
study following most previous literature. Due to the advantages of panel data over OLS 
as previously discussed, panel data analysis will be used in our testing of hypothesis. 
Fixed-effects regression and random-effects regression, besides that we estimated the 
ordinary OLS model analyses are shown in table 6-8.  
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Table 6-7 OLS vs Random vs fixed data analysis 
Variable OLS Random Fixed 
LNTA 0.06063405*** 0.06883806** 0.11683593** 
FORG -0.0280287 -0.09430689 -0.10810044 
LEV 0.17591023 0.1006664 0.04310232 
LOSS 0.04986115 0.06107128 0.07391915 
CEODUAL 0.01616669 0.04654025 0.06591995 
BODIND 0.25523472 0.41378996** 0.54105274** 
Tenure -0.00433637 0.00593902 0.0153691 
BigN 0.03400555 0.05446637 0.11012902 
BUSY 0.10265757* 0.19299256** 0.27644793*** 
AUDOP 0.18994596*** 0.13801261*** 0.13799789** 
SPECZ -0.2039469*** -0.10924004* -0.09032463 
TOURISM -0.04496756 -0.03246737 (omitted) 
dum2008 -0.08727649 -0.05524538 -0.0315352 
dum2009 -0.12100242 -0.10374881** -0.09105176* 
dum2011 -0.04895167 -0.03019718 -0.0363858 
dum2012 -0.03558674 -0.04452575 -0.06767468 
dum2013 -0.00666427 -0.01092134 -0.04339467 
_cons 2.6764307*** 2.2707023*** 1.0927686 
N 659 659 659 
r2 0.09904059  0.10795884 
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
First, a Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test. Results indicate that the random-effects 
is more appropriate.  
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
        LNRE_Lag[ID,t] = Xb + u[ID] + e[ID,t] 
    Estimated results:  
 Var sd = sqrt(Var) 
LNRE_Lag .2363319 .4861398 
E .0620293 .2490568 
U .1651104 .4063378 
        Test:   Var(u) = 0                              chibar2(01) =   769.94 
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 
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Then, a Hausman test has been performed to decide between fixed effects model and 
random effects model. The results of the test accepted the null hypothesis and hence the 
random-effects model is applicable for the Egyptian sample.  
Table 6-8 Hausman test: Fixed vs Random 
 Coefficients   
 (b) 
Fixed 
(B) 
Random 
(b-B) 
Difference 
sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
S.E. 
LNTA .1168359 .0688381 .0479979 .0384272 
FORG -.1081004 -.0943069 -.0137935 .0482035 
LEV .0431023 .1006664 -.0575641 .062006 
LOSS .0739192 .0610713 .0128479 .0135033 
CEODUAL .0659199 .0465402 .0193797 .0557407 
BODIND .5410527 .41379 .1272628 .107396 
Tenure .0153691 .005939 .0094301 .0089475 
BigN .110129 .0544664 .0556627 .0490048 
BUSY .2764479 .1929926 .0834554 .0468899 
AUDOP .1379979 .1380126 -.0000147 .0162004 
SPECZ -.0903246 -.10924 .0189154 .027145 
dum2008 -.0315352 -.0552454 .0237102 .0170026 
dum2009 -.0910518 -.1037488 .012697 .0084209 
dum2011 -.0363858 -.0301972 -.0061886 .0090219 
dum2012 -.0676747 -.0445258 -.0231489 .0173061 
dum2013 -.0433947 -.0109213 -.0324733 .0267458 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                 chi2(16) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       20.55 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.1965   
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The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) has been calculated to check for multicollinearity 
problem. The mean value of VIF tests in Egypt is 1.55 which indicates that there is no 
concern about multicollinearity problem, as shown in table 6-10. 
Table 6-9 VIF: checking for multi-collinearity 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
dum2013 2.23 0.448199 
Tenure 2.20 0.454471 
dum2012 1.96 0.511410 
dum2008 1.85 0.540007 
dum2011 1.76 0.568460 
LNTA 1.74 0.573388 
BigN 1.69 0.590336 
dum2009 1.69 0.593131 
SPECZ 1.68 0.594764 
FORG 1.57 0.636477 
TOURISM 1.18 0.845279 
CEODUAL 1.17 0.851666 
LEV 1.17 0.853972 
LOSS 1.17 0.854795 
BUSY 1.15 0.868746 
BODIND 1.12 0.895765 
AUDOP 1.09 0.913782 
Mean VIF 1.55  
 
To perform a reasonable inference about the model results, homoscedasticity and no 
autocorrelation in the data need to be assumed. Since autocorrelation in linear panel data 
models biases the standard errors and causes the results to be less efficient, we need to 
test its existence. To test the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation in the 
residuals, autocorrelation test setup by Wooldridge (2002) is run. As shown below, 
results report the existence of autocorrelation: 
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Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,     119) =     20.825 
           Prob > F =      0.0000 
Finally, in order to check heteroscedasticity in the model, Wald test is performed to find 
out panel-level heteroscedasticity. The test suggests the existence of heteroscedasticity 
as shown below: 
Modified Wald test for groupwise  
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
chi2 (139)  =   8.3e+31 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
Since the error terms exhibit heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, it has to be decided 
which panel data approach need to be chosen to correct for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Since in this case random-effects estimators are inefficient and biased, 
we require a methodology which corrects the standard errors. The appropriate panel data 
regression model in this case is Prais-Winsten regression with PCSEs. From table 6-11, 
results can be summarized as follows: 
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Table 6-10 Audit report lag regression results- Egypt 
Variable FULL_SAMPLE 
(2008-2013) 
During_GFC 
(2008-2009) 
BEFORE_REVO 
(2008-2010) 
AFTER_REVO 
(2011-2013) 
     
LNTA 0.06273102*** 0.05019445** 0.06851248*** 0.05072521** 
FORG -0.06764385 -0.0114411 -0.13185989 0.06651972 
LEV 0.17545021** 0.14718799 0.16589024 0.22845441* 
LOSS 0.04933962 0.16732701* 0.03081174 0.10598946 
CEODUAL 0.02808622 0.01461729 0.06745865 -0.03896849 
BODIND 0.30301392** 0.13720974 0.35995265** 0.07808861 
Tenure -0.00017854 -0.0603551 0.0025019 0.02392563 
BigN 0.04637062 0.03045643 0.04186023 0.0492437 
BUSY 0.09277169 0.19431824 0.02386374 0.19004677** 
AUDOP 0.14244288*** 0.13841679 0.12521718 0.21541783*** 
SPECZ -0.17421606*** -0.20427493** -0.18855521*** -0.22896547*** 
TOURISM -0.03259732 -0.17150953 -0.00145382 -0.09073099 
dum2008 -0.07350435    
dum2009 -0.117958***    
dum2011 -0.03678435    
dum2012 -0.04238604    
dum2013 -0.01065371    
_cons 2.5865926*** 2.9021321*** 2.4507509*** 2.8124664*** 
     
N 659 195 354 305 
r2 0.7119875 0.51258782 0.69828298 0.54761732 
***, **, and *denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
LNTA is the natural log of total assets FORG is a dummy variable given the value 1 if 
the company has foreign subsidiaries, and 0 otherwise, LEV is the ratio of long-term debt 
to total assets,  Loss is a dummy variable given the value 1 if net income is negative, and 
0 otherwise, BODIND is the percentage of independent directors on the board, 
CEODUAL is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the CEO and Chairman of board 
is the same person, BigN is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is 
used, and 0 otherwise, SPECZ  is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the auditor is 
a specialized industry, 0 otherwise, AUDOP is a dummy variable given the value 1 when 
a company receives a non-standard unqualified audit opinion, and 0 otherwise, Tenure 
is the number of years the auditor has been performing the audit to the company, BUSY 
is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if fiscal year-end is December/January, 
TOURISM is a dummy variable given the value 1 when the company is in the tourism 
sector, and 0 otherwise, dum2008, dum2009, dum2011, dum2012, dum2013 are dummy 
variables for years 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively 
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Log of total assets LNTA, as a proxy for client size, tend to cause a significant increase 
in report lag in Egypt because of the additional time and effort needed to audit larger 
companies than smaller ones. Similar results were obtained by Leventis et al. (2005) 
study on Greece stock market and Yan (2012) study on Chinese sample. However, it is 
inconsistent with previous Egyptian based sample study by Afify (2009) who reported 
a negative relationship between client size and report lag, it is also inconsistent with a 
study by  Khlif and Samaha (2014) who reported a non-significant relationship. These 
differences may be due to the short time span that was used by the study of Afify 
(2009) which was only one year and 3 years in the study of Khlif and Samaha (2014). 
Short time spans could not fully capture the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables. 
Consistent with a study on Indonesian stock Exchange by Mukhtaruddin et al. (2015), 
foreign subsidiaries existence (FORG) in Egypt has a negative non-significant effect on 
audit report lag. A shorter audit report lag may be required by the parent company to 
have enough time to translate different currencies of different subsidiaries’ financial 
statements before issuing consolidated ones. Another possible reason is that more 
complex and larger companies has stronger internal controls that give confidence to the 
auditor that the accounting information is more monitored and controlled and thus 
decreases the audit risk and the audit report delay. The Egyptian sample based study by 
Khlif and Samaha (2014) also reported a negative effect of foreign subsidiaries existence 
on audit report lag. However, we may notice that after the Egyptian revolution, the 
coefficient of FORG became positive, it is still non-significant, but the sign has changed. 
A good justification for this change may be because auditors became more cautious after 
164 
 
the revolution due to the losses realized by some Egyptian companies. As indicated by 
this study sample, companies with foreign subsidiaries realizing losses increased from 
3.8% before revolution to 11.8% after the revolution. That led auditors to increase their 
audit procedures and prolong their report lag. 
Consistent with Egyptian sample study by Afify (2009) and some prior US sample 
studies (Ettredge et al., 2006; Abbott et al., 2012; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Whitworth 
and Lambert, 2014), a positive relationship is found between leverage LEV and audit 
report timeliness in Egypt. A company with high leverage ratio may indicate the 
existence of financial problems that require more attention and time by the auditor and 
thus longer audit report delay. This is also observable after the Egyptian revolution, 
where losses for the companies increased, and the economy became riskier, the 
coefficient of leverage increased by 6% than before revolution. This reflects that auditors 
became more suspicious about the financial conditions of high leveraged companies in 
Egypt.  
Companies achieving loss do not have a significant effect on audit report lag in the 
Egyptian audit market. Despite that it is in contrary to our hypothesis, but it is consistent 
with other previous studies (Leventis et al., 2005; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Habib, 
2015; Shin et al., 2016). It is noticeable, that auditors in Egyptian market were more 
concerned about clients achieving loss during the global financial crisis because of the 
risky economic conditions affecting the world at that time. That is reflected in the 
positive significant coefficient of LOSS in global financial crisis subsample. Also, after 
Egyptian revolution, the LOSS coefficient, increased by around 7.5% due to the increase 
in number of companies realizing losses after the revolution. This may point out to the 
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professional scepticism acted by auditors in Egypt during non-stable economic and 
political conditions. Which also confirms that economic conditions could affect the 
auditing profession consistent with the political theory. 
Consistent with Khlif and Samaha (2014) study on Egyptian sample, CEO duality 
CEODUAL proxy does not significantly affect report delay in Egypt. However, board of 
directors’ independence BODIND in Egypt tend to increase audit report delay because 
more independent board of directors require higher quality audit services with more 
precise auditing tests which may increase audit process and thus audit delay.  
Consistent with prior studies (Leventis et al., 2005; Munsif et al., 2012; Habib, 2015; 
Shin et al., 2016), auditor tenure tends to not affect audit report delay in the Egyptian 
sample. Also, auditing firm size (Big N) is a non-significant determinant of audit report 
lag. Similarly, some previous Egyptian based studies (Afify, 2009; Khlif and Samaha, 
2014) and other Chinese based studies (Yan, 2012; Habib, 2015; Chan et al., 2016) found 
non-significant relationship between auditing firm size and audit report lag.  
Consistent with results of prior literature (Whitworth and Lambert, 2014), industry 
specialist auditors tend to have shorter audit report lag by nearly 17.4% than non-
specialist auditors. This is because industry specialist auditors possess more industry 
related knowledge and skills that enable them to finish the auditing procedures faster 
than their non-specialist counterparts.  
Because any auditor opinion other than standard audit report, is perceived to include bad 
news that may affect stock prices. Management may not prefer these kinds of reports and 
may negotiate with the auditors for the type and content of the audit opinion. Besides 
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that, non-standard audit report may give indication of the presence of financial problems 
that increase auditor litigation risk.  In turn, the auditor tries to reduce litigation risks by 
increasing audit tests and prolonging audit delay. That is why many previous literature 
reported a positive association between audit report lag and auditor opinion (Payne and 
Jensen, 2002; Ettredge et al., 2006; Blankley et al., 2014; Shin et al., 2016). Audit report 
timeliness model in Egypt document a significant increase by more than 14% in report 
delay for companies with non-standard audit report than other companies with standard 
report. Also, we may notice, that after the Egyptian revolution, the auditor opinion 
became more significant, and the coefficient increased from around 12.5% delay before 
the revolution to 21.5% after the revolution for companies with non-standard audit 
report. That may reflect how auditors became more suspicious after the revolution about 
risky companies in such an unstable environment, which led them to spend more time 
doing audit tests and consequently longer audit report. 
Because Egyptian audit market is competitive; at which many small and medium sized 
local auditing firms constitute a high share in the audit market. The work load in the busy 
season is divided on a larger number of auditing firms. This makes December/January 
relatively not so busy season for auditors and a not a significant determinant of audit 
report timeliness in Egypt. Some prior studies (Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Blankley et 
al., 2014) have  supported the non-significance of the busy season as a determinant of 
audit report timeliness. However, the researcher found that after Egyptian revolution, 
busy season became more significant variable. A good explanation is that auditors, after 
the revolution, tend to spend more time in auditing for those companies with high 
leverage ratio or those realizing losses or with non-standard audit reports, as previously 
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mentioned. This presents another confirmation of how economy changes and political 
instability could affect the auditing output. 
Tourism industry clients did not seem to have short or prolonged audit report lag than 
other industries. This is documented by a non-significant coefficient in the Egyptian 
audit report lag model. 
In Egypt, during the global financial crisis, especially year 2009, companies tend to have 
shorter audit report delay than other years. This may be because during global financial 
crisis, investors tend to be anxious about the performance of their companies during that 
economic recession, and management tend to make pressures on auditors to finish 
auditing as fast as possible to publish relative financial information to investors in a 
timely manner. Similarly, we can find that dummies for years 2011,2012 and 2013 for 
the revolution years have a negative coefficient, however, they are non-significant. 
 
6.5 Analysis and discussion of auditor choices 
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show combinations of different choices made by the auditor during 
the auditing process. The positive coefficients of most proxies of client size, risk and 
complexity in audit fees and delay models (LNTA, REC and LEV) support the auditor 
choice number 2 in table 3-1. At which the auditor tries to face any increase in client 
size, complexity or risk by increasing the audit delay which may indicate more effort and 
costs accompanied by higher audit fees. This supports the transaction theory which 
suggests that clients with larger number of transactions associated with increased 
complexity and risk, need higher audit effort. That increase in audit effort leads to higher 
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audit fees charged by the client and longer audit report lag accompanied. Similarly, the 
same choice has been selected by the auditor in cases where a non-standard audit opinion 
has been issued. A positive significant coefficient for audit opinion is reported in both 
audit fees and report delay models that indicated that those companies require more time 
and effort that result in longer audit delay accompanied with higher production costs that 
increase the audit fees charged to the client. 
Higher audit fees were charged to clients with weak corporate governance of no 
segregation of duties between CEO and Chairman. However, those clients did not suffer 
longer audit delay than other clients, which indicates that those clients did not need 
longer auditing time or effort. Thus, the audit fees premium charged to such clients can 
be considered a risk premium for weak corporate governance of those clients, which 
represent choice number 8 in table 3-1. On the other hand, in cases of clients with strong 
corporate governance with independent directors in the board, the auditor tends to be 
more conservative (choice number 3) spending more audit time leading to longer audit 
delay without charging higher audit fees. 
Big N auditing firms in Egypt tend to have audit fees premium without giving any 
advantage of shorter audit lag than non-big N auditing firms. This supports choice 
number 8, at which the potential legal liability cost is considered higher for big N than 
non-big N, and thus the increase in audit fees is only a risk premium. 
Industry specialized auditors tend to select choice 4, at which they offer lower audit fees 
and shorter audit report delay than non-specialized auditors. This indicates that 
specialized auditors can offer economies of scale and reduction in audit production costs 
that can be passed to the client in the form of audit fees discount. 
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Recession in audit market was obvious during the global financial crisis (2008-2009), at 
which there was a decline audit fees during this period and even audit delay was shorter 
(choice 4), especially clients with good liquidity ratio were offered audit fees discount 
with coefficient bigger than that of the full sample. 
The auditors’ choices were different during the Egyptian Revolution (2011-2013). As, 
during years (2012-2013) auditors tended to charge audit fees premium without 
increasing/decreasing audit delay (choice 8). This implies that the increase in audit fees 
during revolution was a risk premium due to the instability in economic and political 
conditions. This was also obvious in the change in coefficients of some variables before 
and after the revolution. Audit fees was higher for clients with high receivables ratio or 
with weak corporate governance (CEO duality) with no effect in audit effort or 
productions cost that was not reported in any change in audit report lag. Even initial 
discounts, that have been offered before the revolution, were not offered after the 
revolution, may be because new clients are more risky than old ones. Despite that the 
coefficient of tourism industry was not significant in either the audit fees nor the audit 
delay models, but the sign of the coefficient was negative (imply discount) and become 
positive (imply premium) due to the deterioration of such industry after the revolution. 
Moreover, auditors became more conservative (choice 3) by spending more time 
resulting in longer audit delay without increasing audit fees for clients issued non-
standard audit opinion or with high leverage ratio or during busy season after the 
revolution. 
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6.6 Additional analysis 
6.6.1 Auditing firm size effect 
Additional analysis is carried out to explore whether audit fees  and delay determinants 
differ between Big N and non-big N.  A re-estimation of the audit fees and audit delay 
models is done by dividing the sample to Big N and Non-Big N subsamples as shown in 
tables 6.12 and 6.13. 
It is noticeable that non-big N are more concerned with clients of higher leverage ratios, 
or poor corporate governance quality, or non-standard audit opinion. From tables 6.12 
and 6.13, non-big N charge audit fees premium and longer audit report lag to riskier 
clients (with higher receivables ratio, CEO duality, non-standard audit opinion) than Big 
N. Whereas, Big N are more concerned about client performance, and consider clients 
realizing loss are riskier and thus have longer audit report lag by around 20%. Non-big 
N offer higher audit fee discounts for clients with good quick ratio. Moreover, 
specialized non-big N tend to give discount to their clients while Big N do not. Whereas, 
during busy season, big N charge higher fees of around 33.5% for their clients, but non-
big N do not. 
It is also noticeable that global financial crisis has affected auditors in both big N and 
non-big N auditing firms. As auditors in big N and non-big N tried to offer audit fee 
discounts to clients during the global financial crisis due to the economic recession that 
most companies in the world have suffered. Moreover, auditors tried to speed up their 
auditing process and shorten audit report lag to publish financial statements in a timely 
manner so that investors can know the real performance of their investments.  
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It is also apparent that non-Big N tried to increase audit fees during the revolution period 
while Big N did not, but even as previously discussed, they decreased the premium they 
used to have before the revolution.  
Table 6-11 Audit firm size effect: audit fees- Egypt 
Variable BIG N NON BIG N 
LNTA 0.26141336*** 0.31117541*** 
QUICK -0.44242638 -0.55349609*** 
REC 0.3575482 0.42862524** 
INVENT -0.63868078* -0.40555529*** 
FORG 0.06788285 0.08452712 
ROA -0.45177525 0.47727785*** 
BODIND 0.2319683 0.19000033 
CEODUAL 0.11264187 0.08413484* 
SPECZ 0.07213134 -0.16929494*** 
INITIAL 0.13830075 -0.03531255 
AUDOP 0.04295577 0.07297101* 
BUSY 0.33570239*** -0.05581278 
TOURISM 0.4832783*** -0.26275447*** 
dum2008 -0.30744882*** -0.16557132** 
dum2009 -0.08688853* -0.09528542*** 
dum2011 0.0121467 0.04606371 
dum2012 0.07625612 0.09491837** 
dum2013 0.11505916 0.09402772* 
_cons 5.8226568*** 4.6455205*** 
N 255 404 
r2 0.98838913 0.99452505 
***, **, and *denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
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Table 6-12 Audit firm size effect: audit report lag 
Variable BIGN NONBIGN 
   
LNTA 0.03451359 0.07952582*** 
FORG -0.00968057 0.01811885 
LEV -0.00398855 0.24250274** 
LOSS 0.19976858** -0.0461832 
CEODUAL -0.10396124 0.12743084*** 
BODIND -0.10816405 0.44380467*** 
Tenure -0.01840587 0.01048558 
BUSY 0.12638928 0.1181503* 
AUDOP -0.07712098 0.24523321*** 
SPECZ -0.12214392 -0.26451167*** 
TOURISM -0.24452308 0.08545112 
dum2008 -0.09643559 -0.03545585 
dum2009 -0.15759615* -0.08691451* 
dum2011 -0.07744329 0.01742457 
dum2012 -0.04111573 -0.01432497 
dum2013 0.04532566 -0.03646992 
_cons 3.6946679*** 2.0295439*** 
   
N 255 404 
r2 0.71439594 0.75740283 
***, **, and *denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
6.6.2 Client size effect 
Following Lee et al. (2009), additional analysis is performed to capture whether 
determinants of audit fees and report lag are driven by client size or not. Using median 
of LNTA, tables 6.14 and table 6.15 summarize audit fees and report lag models for 
subsamples of large and small clients.  
It is apparent that auditors of large clients worry more about companies achieving loss. 
But for small clients, auditors worry more about highly leveraged companies, and those 
companies with CEO duality or with non-standard audit reports. Also, small clients are 
charged higher audit fees than larger clients if they were issued a non-standard audit 
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report. This indicates that auditors become more worried if a smaller client is issued a 
qualified or modified report and increase client associated risk and consequently audit 
fees.  This is consistent with previous sub-sample models of Big N and non-big N 
subsamples. This is because, 55% of large clients are audited by Big N auditing firms, 
while, 77% of small clients are audited by non-big N clients. 
It is also obvious that Big N auditing firms in Egypt strategy is to attract larger clients 
than smaller ones, as Big N premium is higher for small clients than large clients by 
around 14%. Moreover, Big N auditing firms try to shorten audit report lag and provide 
more timely audit report for large clients, this appears in the negative significant 
coefficient for the Big N in the large clients’ subsample model. On the contrary, a 
different result of a positive significant coefficient for Big N in the small clients is found 
in the subsample model. Which indicates that Big N auditing firms do not give much 
attention to the timeliness of audit report for small clients but even, they tend to increase 
report lag by around 33% than other non-big N auditing firms do. This is also reflected 
in the market share of Big N for small clients which is only 23%. 
The period of global financial crisis is characterized by a relatively short report lag for 
both large and small clients, especially for year 2009. Moreover, it is observed that large 
clients during global financial crisis were offered audit fees discount during that 
recession time.  
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Table 6-13 Client size effect: audit fees- Egypt 
Variable Large clients Small clients 
LNTA 0.28879211*** 0.34239057*** 
QUICK -0.51030285*** -0.48929143*** 
REC 0.67083716** 0.22803121 
INVENT -0.54182699** -0.45575771*** 
FORG 0.04188253 -0.06933893 
ROA 0.18032857 0.48221695** 
BODIND 0.16817452 0.14778618 
CEODUAL 0.11905318** 0.12659791** 
BigN 0.64549611*** 0.78683784*** 
SPECZ -0.10304926 -0.02273526 
INITIAL 0.07191386 -0.04472604 
AUDOP 0.14719343** 0.29551468*** 
BUSY 0.06576192 0.09261844 
TOURISM 0.24908653 -0.19198312 
dum2008 -0.31256176*** -0.08860219 
dum2009 -0.15020101*** -0.04165259 
dum2011 0.06444508 -0.00736653 
dum2012 0.08269387 0.06591479 
dum2013 0.0997826 0.07920632 
_cons 4.9633496*** 3.8795089*** 
N 329 330 
r2 0.99008946 0.99221343 
***, **, and *denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
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Table 6-14 Client size effect: audit report lag- Egypt 
Variable Large clients  Small clients  
LNTA 0.12338914*** 0.05932208* 
FORG 0.04377894 -0.41410844* 
LEV 0.09680261 0.26159114*** 
LOSS 0.17465207* -0.03397988 
CEODUAL -0.02531967 0.09891819** 
BODIND 0.22700307 0.48669535*** 
BigN -0.14898552* 0.33256792*** 
Tenure 0.00180082 -0.01670969 
BUSY 0.08463891 -0.02071799 
AUDOP 0.10321568 0.17356445*** 
SPECZ -0.12284138* -0.32202178*** 
TOURISM -0.11315582 0.07369858 
dum2008 -0.04957739 -0.1001248 
dum2009 -0.12718063* -0.1218809** 
dum2011 -0.07813613 0.0260065 
dum2012 -0.04025315 0.00170602 
dum2013 0.05429694 -0.01786055 
_cons 1.3921658* 2.5950213*** 
N 329 330 
r2 0.72305514 0.78475884 
***, **, and *denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter reports the results of empirical findings of the audit fees and report lag 
determinants in Egypt context over the six-year period from 2008 to 2013. Descriptive 
statistics are first presented followed by correlation matrices. Audit fees and report lag 
models’ regression results are then discussed within the Egyptian sample. Egyptian 
auditors’ choices of determining audit fees and prolonging audit process towards various 
determinants are then analysed. Several further analyses are conducted later in the 
chapter. 
The next chapter will discuss the results of the two models of audit fees and audit report 
lag in the UK context.  
176 
 
Chapter 7 Empirical analysis and Discussions- UK 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the data analysis based on the research methods 
previously discussed. Hypotheses outlined in the chapter 5, concerning audit fees and 
report timeliness, are tested throughout this chapter in the UK context. Related 
correlation coefficients are presented. Then a discussion of the results of the testing of 
hypothesis are illustrated in the UK context. An analysis of UK auditor choices (related 
to audit fees and report lag) towards different attributes are then presented. Additional 
analysis of the effect of client size on audit fees and lag models are illustrated. Finally, a 
summary of the analysis is presented. 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7-1 presents the descriptive statistics of main variables used in audit fees model 
and audit report lag model for the full period of the study (2008–2013), for the global 
financial crisis (2008-2009) periods in UK.  
Audit fees Log LNAF mean in UK is 14.124 and the audit report lag log LNRE_Lag is 
4.1. The mean of LNTA is 14.939, where 13.9% of it is receivables and 11.1% of it is 
inventory. Receivables and inventory ratios were higher during GFC of around 14.5% 
and 11.9% respectively which gives indication of the existence of relative recession.  The 
mean of the quick ratio in the UK sample is 28.7% which was also relatively higher 
(29.5%) during the GFC. 
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Regarding the firm’s complexity, 88.79% of the companies in our UK sample have 
foreign subsidiaries. In terms of firms’ performance, the mean of ROA and LOSS were 
10.6% and 8.45% respectively. It is observable that LOSS was very high during the GFC 
of around 11% and decreased to nearly 5% during 2011-2013. 
For board of director’s variables, the average proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on board of directors in UK is 67.9%, and around 3.5% of the companies in the 
UK sample have CEO duality. 
In terms of auditor and engagement attributes, Big 4 tend to have a very high share of 
audit market of around 98.5%, moreover, 35.64% of UK sample companies tend to 
appoint industry specialist auditors. 
18.7% of the UK sample are initial engagement for auditors and 55.6% of the companies 
are audited during year end December/January which is considered the busy season for 
auditors. 
On average, auditors’ tenure for UK companies is 3 years. All UK companies in the 
sample are issued a standard unqualified audit report. Tourism industry constitutes 
7.37% of the UK sample. 
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Table 7-1 Descriptive statistics- UK 
Panel A: Continuous variables           
 FULL SAMPLE 2008-2009 2008-2010 2011-2013 
Variable N Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
N Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
N Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
N Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
LNAF 651 14.124 1.267 210 14.090 1.152 321 14.095 1.174 330 14.153 1.353 
LNRE_Lag  651 4.095 0.220 210 4.109 0.221 321 4.102 0.219 330 4.088 0.222 
LNTA 651 14.939 1.615 210 14.886 1.634 321 14.881 1.623 330 14.996 1.608 
QUICK 651 0.287 0.179 210 0.295 0.186 321 0.295 0.187 330 0.279 0.171 
REC 651 0.139 0.103 210 0.145 0.107 321 0.143 0.107 330 0.136 0.098 
INVENT 651 0.111 0.158 210 0.119 0.165 321 0.117 0.162 330 0.106 0.154 
ROA 651 0.106 0.196 210 0.103 0.234 321 0.108 0.254 330 0.104 0.116 
BODIND 651 0.679 0.114 210 0.658 0.124 321 0.664 0.121 330 0.694 0.106 
Tenure 651 3.073 1.609 210 1.457 0.499 321 1.887 0.806 330 4.227 1.332 
(continued) 
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Panel B: Dummy variables           
 FULL SAMPLE 2008-2009 2008-2010 2011-2013 
Variable N % N % N % N % 
FORG 651 88.79 210 88.57 321 88.47 330 89.1 
LOSS 651 8.45 210 11 321 11.84 330 5.15 
CEODUAL 651 3.5 210 5.71 321 4.3 330 2.7 
BigN 651 98.46 210 98.1 321 98.13 330 98.79 
SPECZ 651 35.64 210 35.71 321 35.51 330 35.76 
INITIAL 651 18.7 210 50.95 321 34.9 330 3 
BUSY 651 55.6 210 56.2 321 57 330 54.24 
TOURISM 651 7.37 210 7.14% 321 7.16 330 7.58 
LNAF is the natural log of external audit fees, LNRE_lag is the natural log of audit report lag in days, LNTA is the natural log of total 
assets, QUICK is the ratio of current assets less inventory to current liabilities, REC is the percentage of receivables over total assets, 
INVENT is the percentage of inventories over total assets, LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, FORG is a dummy variable 
given the value 1 if the company has foreign subsidiaries, and 0 otherwise, ROA is the ratio of net income before tax divided by total 
assets, Loss is a dummy variable given the value 1 if net income is negative, and 0 otherwise, BODIND is the percentage of independent 
directors on the board, CEODUAL is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the CEO and Chairman of board is the same person, BigN 
is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is used, and 0 otherwise, SPECZ 1 is a dummy variable given the value of 1 
if the auditor is a specialized industry, 0 otherwise, INITIAL is a dummy variable given the value 1 if this is the first year the auditor is 
appointed with the client, and 0 otherwise, Tenure is the number of years the auditor has been performing the audit to the company, BUSY 
is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if fiscal year-end is December/January, TOURISM is a dummy variable given the value 1 when 
the company is in the tourism sector, and 0 otherwise 
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7.3 Correlation matrix 
The correlation coefficients have been checked for the presence of high collinearity 
among independent variables. Table 7-2 presents correlations for the audit fees model in 
the UK, and table 7-3 presents correlations for the audit report lag model in UK. 
From the correlation coefficients for table 7-2 and table 7-3, no high correlation is found 
among the variables. As a result, collinearity does not appear to create a threat to the 
interpretation of regression coefficients of the independent variables in both models.  
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Table 7-2 Correlation matrix- Audit fees model: UK 
 LNTA QUIC
K 
REC INVE
NT 
FORG ROA BODI
ND 
CEOD
UAL 
BigN SPECZ INITIAL BUSY Touris
m 
              
LNTA 1.0000             
QUICK -0.3353 1.0000            
REC -0.3125 0.6344 1.0000           
INVENT -0.0882 -0.2323 -0.1331 1.0000          
FORG 0.1181 0.1785 0.2593 -0.4107 1.0000         
ROA -0.2986 0.3120 0.3029 -0.0678 -0.0920 1.0000        
BODIND 0.0612 -0.0848 -0.1185 -0.0180 0.0909 -0.0057 1.0000       
CEODUAL 0.0184 -0.0304 -0.0045 -0.0052 0.0416 -0.0549 0.0088 1.0000      
BigN 0.0122 0.0685 0.0415 -0.0354 -0.0444 -0.0226 0.0372 0.0239 1.0000     
SPECZ 0.1755 -0.1431 -0.0673 -0.1346 -0.0303 0.0531 -0.0641 0.0487 0.0929 1.0000    
INITIAL -0.0122 0.0104 0.0244 0.0213 0.0085 -0.0379 -0.0922 0.0360 -0.0360 -0.0204 1.0000   
BUSY -0.1338 0.0642 0.0712 -0.0178 0.0254 0.0421 0.0312 -0.0635 0.0141 0.0580 -0.0146 1.0000  
Tourism 0.0377 -0.0550 0.0111 -0.0922 0.0258 0.0182 0.1104 0.1052 0.0352 -0.0995 0.0001 -0.1738 1.0000 
LNTA is the natural log of total assets, QUICK is the ratio of current assets less inventory to current liabilities, REC is the percentage of receivables over 
total assets, INVENT is the percentage of inventories over total assets, LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, FORG is a dummy variable given 
the value 1 if the company has foreign subsidiaries, and 0 otherwise, ROA is the ratio of net income before tax divided by total assets, BODIND is the 
percentage of independent directors on the board, CEODUAL is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the CEO and Chairman of board is the same person, 
BigN is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is used, and 0 otherwise, SPECZ  is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the auditor 
is a specialized industry, 0 otherwise, INITIAL is a dummy variable given the value 1 if this is the first year the auditor is appointed with the client, and 0 
otherwise, AUDOP is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a company receives a non-standard unqualified audit opinion, and 0 otherwise, BUSY is a 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if fiscal year-end is December/January, TOURISM is a dummy variable given the value 1 when the company is in the 
tourism sector, and 0 otherwise, dum2008, dum2009, dum2011, dum2012, dum2013 are dummy variables for years 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013, 
respectively  
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Table 7-3 Correlation matrix- audit report lag model: UK 
 LNTA FORG LEV LOSS CEODUAL BODIND Tenure BigN BUSY SPECZ Tourism 
            
LNTA 1.0000           
FORG 0.1181 1.0000          
LEV 0.1671 0.1495 1.0000         
LOSS 0.0146 -0.0146 0.0037 1.0000        
CEODUAL 0.0184 0.0416 0.0511 0.0017 1.0000       
BODIND 0.0612 0.0909 -0.0284 -0.0343 0.0088 1.0000      
Tenure 0.0498 0.0405 0.0495 -0.1101 -0.0088 0.1340 1.0000     
BigN 0.0122 -0.0444 -0.0340 0.0379 0.0239 0.0372 0.0368 1.0000    
BUSY -0.1338 0.0254 -0.0494 0.0602 -0.0635 0.0312 -0.0398 0.0141 1.0000   
SPECZ 0.1755 -0.0303 -0.0372 -0.0415 0.0487 -0.0641 -0.0641 0.0929 0.0580 1.0000  
Tourism 0.0377 0.0258 -0.0993 -0.0434 0.1052 0.1104 -0.0020 0.0352 -0.1738 -0.0995 1.0000 
LNTA is the natural log of total assets FORG is a dummy variable given the value 1 if the company has foreign subsidiaries, and 0 
otherwise, LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets,  Loss is a dummy variable given the value 1 if net income is negative, and 0 
otherwise, BODIND is the percentage of independent directors on the board, CEODUAL is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the 
CEO and Chairman of board is the same person, BigN is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is used, and 0 otherwise, 
SPECZ  is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the auditor is a specialized industry, 0 otherwise, Tenure is the number of years the 
auditor has been performing the audit to the company, BUSY is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if fiscal year-end is 
December/January, TOURISM is a dummy variable given the value 1 when the company is in the tourism sector, and 0 otherwise 
183 
 
7.4 Findings and discussions 
7.4.1 Audit fees model: Findings and discussion 
Following most prior literature, multiple regression model is used to analyse 
determinants of audit fees in the UK during the sample period. Due to the advantages of 
panel data over OLS as discussed in the methodology chapter, panel data analysis will 
be used in our testing of hypothesis. 
Different types of panel data models could be applied, we begin with the two most 
common models: fixed-effects regression and random-effects regression, besides 
estimating the ordinary OLS model as shown below in table 7-4. 
Table 7-4 OLS vs Random vs Fixed data analysis 
Variable OLS Random Fixed 
    
LNTA 0.05469113 0.02342486 0.02119883 
QUICK -0.31565368 -0.32425256 -0.31252493 
REC 1.7261323** -0.01438185 -0.12212391 
INVENT 0.00223983 0.25932475 0.3087119 
FORG 0.38234165* 0.1422097 0.10288803 
ROA 0.18343796 -0.00117457 -0.00731038 
BODIND 3.4553408*** 0.35285824 0.24461876 
CEODUAL -0.27630265 0.09967333 0.10987617 
BigN 0.65841012 0.12905901 0.06909819 
SPECZ 0.09342042 -0.1499375** -
0.15629934** 
INITIAL -0.40478711 -0.1951225* -0.18221176* 
BUSY 0.50511741*** 0.2873056 -0.08136098 
Tourism -0.1849635 -0.12150279 (omitted) 
dum2008 0.40430506 0.19179929* 0.17487262* 
dum2009 0.1065982 0.04310235 0.04160622 
_cons 9.5079113*** 13.208179*** 13.652129*** 
    
N 651 651 651 
r2 0.18669957  0.06262905 
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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To determine which analysis best fits our data, several tests have been done. First, 
Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, with results indicate that there is difference 
across units, or in other words, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative one is 
accepted. Therefore, the random-effects is more appropriate than ordinary OLS.  
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
        LNAF[ID,t] = Xb + u[ID] + e[ID,t] 
        Estimated results: 
 Var sd = sqrt(Var) 
LNAF 1.605509 1.267087 
e .0769825 .2774573 
u 1.626615 1.275388 
        Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                             chibar2(01) =   885.43 
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 
 
When N is large while T is small (as in our case), the estimates by fixed effect regression 
and random effects regression can significantly differ (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). To 
decide between fixed or random effects, a Hausman test can be ran. Results of the test 
rejected the null hypothesis and hence the fixed-effects model is more appropriate than 
using the random model. 
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Table 7-5 Hausman test: Fixed vs Random 
 Coefficients   
 (b) 
Fixed 
(B) 
Random 
(b-B) 
Difference 
sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
S.E. 
     
LNTA .0211988 .0234249 -.002226 .007695 
QUICK -.3125249 -.3242526 .0117276 .0579432 
REC -.1221239 -.0143819 -.1077421 .0958404 
INVENT .3087119 .2593248 .0493871 .08644 
FORG .102888 .1422097 -.0393217 .0284569 
ROA -.0073104 -.0011746 -.0061358 .0221422 
BODIND .2446188 .3528582 -.1082395 .0464365 
CEODUAL .1098762 .0996733 .0102028 .0119284 
BigN .0690982 .129059 -.0599608 .1123955 
SPECZ -.1562993 -.1499375 -.0063618 .012636 
INITIAL -.1822118 -.1951225 .0129107 .0116337 
BUSY -.081361 .2873056 -.3686666 .1348485 
dum2008 .1748726 .1917993 -.0169267 .0129109 
dum2009 .0416062 .0431024 -.0014961 .0019942 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                 chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       39.69 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0003      
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The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) has been calculated to check for multicollinearity 
problem. The mean values of VIF tests in UK is 1.81, as shown in table 7.6, which 
indicate that there is no concern about this problem. 
Table 7-6 VIF: checking for multi-collinearity 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
dum2008 5.30 0.188666 
INITIAL 5.21 0.191862 
QUICK 1.94 0.516049 
REC 1.90 0.526167 
FORG 1.41 0.709314 
INVENT 1.35 0.739852 
LNTA 1.32 0.759643 
ROA 1.26 0.796010 
SPECZ 1.15 0.870971 
Tourism 1.10 0.910999 
BODIND 1.08 0.928320 
BUSY 1.07 0.938787 
dum2009 1.05 0.949213 
BigN 1.04 0.965011 
CEODUAL 1.03 0.968749 
   
Mean VIF 1.81  
 
In order to check heteroscedasticity in the model, Wald test for panel-level 
heteroscedasticity is rum. The test suggests that the existence of heteroscedasticity. 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity in fixed effect regression model  
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
chi2 (140)  =   1.1e+31 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
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Wooldridge test for autocorrelation is also run. Results suggests the existence of 
autocorrelation. 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,     117) =    127.682 
           Prob > F =      0.0000 
Thus, we need a panel data model that can account for both heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Since, in this case, fixed and random-effects estimators are inefficient 
and biased, we need a methodology which corrects the standard errors for autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity. The panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) technique suggested 
by (Beck and Katz, 1995) is often used as an alternative method in studies focusing on 
relatively “short and wide” panels like this study.  
Following (Lapré and Tsikriktsis, 2006; Mehic et al., 2013; Onder and Karal, 2013; 
Thomas et al., 2014) we used the Prais- Winsten regression method to account for both 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation between units in the model (Stata command: 
xtpcse). Using Prais-Winsten analysis, Table 7-7 summarizes audit fees regression 
results in UK: 
 
 
 
188 
 
Table 7-7 Audit fees regression results- UK 
Variable UK_FULL 
(2008-2013) 
DURING_GFC 
(2008-2009) 
AFTER_GFC 
(2010-2013) 
    
LNTA 0.0776237** 0.07589622 0.09881602** 
QUICK -0.11430318 -0.40403149 -0.10717708 
REC 1.6763754** 1.2015818* 1.9537485** 
INVENT -0.29475732 -0.11313535 -0.27198969 
FORG 0.35484751** 0.27679449 0.59306777*** 
ROA 0.02312088 0.27912257 -0.00903432 
BODIND 2.3670282*** 2.3801831*** 2.4309574*** 
CEODUAL -0.15431328 -0.3334979* -0.10317728 
BigN 0.28211035 0.57690023 1.1571155*** 
SPECZ -0.06248806 -0.05080098 -0.07606515 
INITIAL -0.21625478 -0.05920758 -0.45584893** 
BUSY 0.64877946*** 0.50234578*** 0.53269328*** 
Tourism -0.22539493 -0.10539086 -0.396239** 
dum2008 0.21493146   
dum2009 0.06113283   
_cons 10.214525*** 10.311087*** 8.8328623*** 
    
N 651 210 441 
r2 0.97760663 0.93699007 0.97026236 
***, **, and *denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
LNTA is the natural log of total assets, QUICK is the ratio of current assets less inventory to current 
liabilities, REC is the percentage of receivables over total assets, INVENT is the percentage of 
inventories over total assets, LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, FORG is a dummy 
variable given the value 1 if the company has foreign subsidiaries, and 0 otherwise, ROA is the ratio 
of net income before tax divided by total assets, BODIND is the percentage of independent directors 
on the board, CEODUAL is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the CEO and Chairman of 
board is the same person, BigN is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is used, 
and 0 otherwise, SPECZ 1 is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the auditor is a specialized 
industry, 0 otherwise, INITIAL is a dummy variable given the value 1 if this is the first year the 
auditor is appointed with the client, and 0 otherwise, AUDOP is a dummy variable given the value 1 
when a company receives a non-standard unqualified audit opinion, and 0 otherwise, BUSY is a 
dummy variable given the value of 1 if fiscal year-end is December/January, TOURISM is a dummy 
variable given the value 1 when the company is in the tourism sector, and 0 otherwise, dum2008, 
dum2009, dum2011, dum2012, dum2013 are dummy variables for years 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012 
and 2013, respectively 
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From table 7-7, it is observable that there is a positive significant relationship between 
audit fees and client size. This is consistent with (H1) and previous literature that greater 
effort and time are needed for auditing larger clients, which results in higher audit fees 
of around 7.8% charged to larger clients than smaller ones in the UK sample.  
Due to the higher risk associated with evaluating receivables ratio REC and the more 
complex auditing tests receivables need to be audited. Receivables ratio has a strong 
positive coefficient indicating an increase in audit fees for those companies with higher 
receivable ratios. Whereas, a non-significant relationship between inventory ratio is 
reported by results in the UK sample. Despite it is in contrast with our hypothesis, a non-
significant inventory ratio coefficient was also reported by a Chinese study by (Chen et 
al., 2007) and an Australian study by (Goodwin-stewart and Kent, 2006). This can be 
interpreted to the change in business world where just-in-time manufacturing is now used 
at which inventory hold are not in large quantities. Moreover, inventory control systems 
and barcode systems used in most companies nowadays make continuous control over 
inventory levels and facilitate auditor’s task in verifying the accuracy of inventory 
account.   
Quick ratio (QUICK) effect on audit fees in the UK sample, tend to be non-significant. 
This is consistent with results of Wang and Zhou (2012), but is in contrary to our 
expectation of a significant relationship.  
The more complex a client is, the harder it is to audit and the more time-consuming the 
audit is likely to be and consequently the higher audit fees to be charged (Simunic, 1980; 
Matthews and Peel, 2003; Hay et al., 2006; Naser and Nuseibeh, 2007; Dickins et al., 
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2008; Hay, 2013; Bryan and Mason, 2016). Consistent with our (H3) and most previous 
studies, the existence of foreign subsidiaries increases audit fees in UK by around 35%. 
Mixed results surround the relationship between client profitability and audit fees. Some 
studies proved a positive relationship, some found a negative one, and others found it a 
non-significant determinant. In line with a Swedish study by Zerni (2012) and a U.S 
study by Scott and Gist (2013), audit fees model in UK sample suggests that ROA -as a 
proxy for client profitability- has no effect on audit fees. 
Consistent with prior studies (Carcello et al., 2002; Goodwin-stewart and Kent, 2006; 
Mitra et al., 2007; Singh et al., 2014), results indicate that independence of board of 
directors BODIND has a positive effect on audit fees. In other words, clients with 
independent board of directors pay higher audit fees in the UK. This is because, higher 
quality board of directors requires higher quality audit which needs more qualified 
auditors with higher audit fees. However, CEO duality tend to have non-significant effect 
on audit fees model.  
Big N coefficient tended to be a non-significant coefficient in UK audit fees model. This 
support the results of some prior studies on UK audits such as: (Seetharaman et al., 2002; 
Matthews and Peel, 2003; Chaney et al., 2004; Giroux and Jones, 2007) that failed to 
show Big N premium. However, it is obvious in the subsample, after GFC (2011-2013), 
that Big N in UK began to highly increase their audit fees than non-big N. 
Auditor specialization is insignificant variable in audit fees model in UK sample, this is 
still consistent with some previous literature (Ferguson and Stokes, 2002; Lowensohn et 
al., 2007), however, it is inconsistent with our expectation. 
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Despite continuous claims that low balling practice may affect auditor independence, 
auditors still offer initial audit discounts in most audit fees studies in different countries. 
Results indicate that during 2010-2013, subsample of UK audit fees model, auditors offer 
nearly 4.6% audit fee discount for initial audit engagements. However, for the full sample 
model, it is a non-significant negative coefficient. 
Busy season tends to be a significant variable resulting in higher audit fees in UK sample 
by 65% for audit engagement performed by year end December/January which is 
consistent with our expectation. A positive coefficient for busy season is also reported 
by other prior studies on audit fees of UK firms (Chaney et al., 2004; McMeeking et al., 
2006; Clatworthy and Peel, 2007). For tourism industry, it seems to be a non-significant 
industry in the UK audit fees model. 
Mixed results surround the response of auditors to GFC. It seems that it depends on the 
context of the study, where evidence from China (Zhang and Huang, 2013) and Australia 
(Xu et al., 2013) show audit fees premium during the GFC, however evidence from the 
USA (Krishnan and Zhang, 2014) report a cut in audit fees which is also reported in 
Egyptian audit fees model previously discussed. In UK, it seems that audit fees were not 
affected by the GFC, and even the determinants of audit fees have not changed much 
during the global financial crisis period. 
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7.4.2 Audit report lag model: Findings and discussion 
This study examines the effect of different independent variables on audit report lag as a 
dependent variable, thus a multiple regression analysis is considered to be used in this 
study following most previous literature. Different types of panel data models could be 
applied, we begin with the two most common models: fixed-effects regression and 
random-effects regression, besides that we estimated the ordinary OLS model as shown 
below.  
Table 7-8 OLS vs Random vs Fixed data analysis 
Variable OLS Random Fixed 
LNTA -0.00581702 -0.00292156 -0.0022261 
FORG -0.09855717*** -0.02708697 0.00883537 
LEV -0.08080351* -0.03881226 -0.02901172 
LOSS 0.02611395 0.03192987 0.02907082 
CEODUAL -0.00513019 -0.0243665 -0.01303917 
BODIND 0.12734883 0.08378169 0.03329733 
BigN -0.28828209*** -0.15500152 -0.05460182 
Tenure -0.02055051** -0.0091203 -0.00647562 
BUSY 0.05119362** 0.04001002 0.02249992 
SPECZ -0.01261552 -0.01482309 -0.01503098 
Tourism -0.07094576* -0.07716216 (omitted) 
dum2008 -0.02881959 0.02920723 0.03902888 
dum2009 -0.02814414 0.01394554 0.02286217 
_cons 4.5662138*** 4.2960564*** 4.1697257*** 
N 651 651 651 
r2 0.10436163  0.06028529 
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
To decide which data analysis type is better, some tests can be done. First, a Breusch–
Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test has been performed with results indicating that the 
random-effects is appropriate.  
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Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
        LNRE_Lag[ID,t] = Xb + u[ID] + e[ID,t] 
        Estimated results: 
 Var sd = sqrt(Var) 
LNRE_Lag .0484375 .2200852 
e .0118915 .1090483 
u .0430374 .2074545 
        Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                             chibar2(01) =   514.14 
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 
Then, a Hausman test has been performed to decide between fixed effects model and 
random effects model. The results of the test accepted the null hypothesis and hence the 
random-effects model is applicable for the UK sample.  
Table 7-9 Hausman test: fixed vs random 
 Coefficient   
 (b) 
Fixed 
(B) 
Random 
(b-B) 
Difference 
sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
S.E. 
     
LNTA -.0022261 -.0029216 .0006955 .0033729 
FORG .0088354 -.027087 .0359223 .0215469 
LEV -.0290117 -.0388123 .0098005 .0198209 
LOSS .0290708 .0319299 -.002859 .0042095 
CEODUAL -.0130392 -.0243665 .0113273 .0101328 
BODIND .0332973 .0837817 -.0504844 .037067 
BigN -.0546018 -.1550015 .1003997 .0801273 
Tenure -.0064756 -.0091203 .0026447 .001298 
BUSY .0224999 .04001 -.0175101 .0705521 
SPECZ -.015031 -.0148231 -.0002079 .0098819 
dum2008 .0390289 .0292072 .0098217 .004758 
dum2009 .0228622 .0139455 .0089166 .003308 
    b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
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            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                 chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       15.29 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.2260  
As shown in table 7-10, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) has been calculated to check 
for multicollinearity problem. The mean value of VIF tests in UK is 1.24 which indicates 
that there is no concern about this problem. 
Table 7-10 VIF: checking for multi-collinearity 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
Tenure 2.11 0.473006 
dum2008 1.93 0.517897 
dum2009 1.47 0.679836 
LNTA 1.11 0.898679 
SPECZ 1.10 0.912239 
Tourism 1.09 0.920109 
LEV 1.08 0.928058 
BUSY 1.07 0.933992 
BODIND 1.05 0.947961 
FORG 1.05 0.949661 
CEODUAL 1.04 0.965733 
LOSS 1.03 0.974179 
BigN 1.02 0.980219 
   
Mean VIF 1.24   
 
To test the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation in the residuals we use the 
test for autocorrelation setup by Wooldridge. As indicated below, rejection of the null 
hypothesis indicates the need to correct the standard errors for serial correlation.  
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Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,     117) =     10.545 
           Prob > F =      0.0015 
 
Finally, in order to check heteroscedasticity in the model we perform Wald test for panel-
level heteroscedasticity. The test suggests the existence of heteroscedasticity. 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
chi2 (140)  =   2.0e+30 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
Since the error terms exhibit heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, the appropriate panel 
data regression model to be used is Prais-Winsten regression.  
Table 7-11 summarizes the results of determinants of audit report lag in the UK context 
using Prais- Winsten analysis. 
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Table 7-11 Audit report lag regression results – UK 
Variable Full sample 
(2008-2013) 
During GFC 
(2008-2009) 
After GFC 
(2010-2013) 
    
LNTA -0.00495508 -0.00907523 -0.00133718 
FORG -0.07959169** -0.03649615 -0.11355911*** 
LEV -0.06836544* -0.06512519 -0.06929355 
LOSS 0.02554569 0.0220238 0.02709312 
CEODUAL -0.00900265 -0.11318387 0.06779469 
BODIND 0.1178486 0.06252778 0.11695629 
BigN -0.27048747*** -0.25760644*** -0.30397015*** 
Tenure -0.0152799** -0.01858578 -0.01716963** 
BUSY 0.04579228** 0.02657636 0.0503444* 
SPECZ -0.01165647 -0.01686199 -0.00569232 
Tourism -0.05528049 -0.05958372 -0.08588715** 
dum2008 -0.00340046   
dum2009 -0.00587041   
_cons 4.499096*** 4.5522004*** 4.5139835*** 
    
N 651 210 441 
r2 0.95542058 0.90521005 0.95704953 
***, **, and *denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
LNTA is the natural log of total assets FORG is a dummy variable given the value 1 if the company 
has foreign subsidiaries, and 0 otherwise, LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets,  Loss is 
a dummy variable given the value 1 if net income is negative, and 0 otherwise, BODIND is the 
percentage of independent directors on the board, CEODUAL is a dummy variable given the value 
of 1 if the CEO and Chairman of board is the same person, BigN is a dummy variable given the value 
1 when a Big 4 auditor is used, and 0 otherwise, SPECZ  is a dummy variable given the value of 1 
if the auditor is a specialized industry, 0 otherwise, Tenure is the number of years the auditor has 
been performing the audit to the company, BUSY is a dummy variable given the value of 1 if fiscal 
year-end is December/January, TOURISM is a dummy variable given the value 1 when the company 
is in the tourism sector, and 0 otherwise, dum2008, dum2009, dum2011, dum2012, dum2013 are 
dummy variables for years 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively 
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As shown in table 7-11, the log of total assets LNTA used as a proxy for client size, tend 
to have a non-significant effect on audit report lag in UK sample, which is consistent 
with most US sample based studies (Ettredge et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2009; Abbott et al., 
2012; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Munsif et al., 2012; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014). 
This can be because of the accurate planning by UK and US auditors to allocate 
appropriate human resources required to finish auditing large companies timely, or 
because of the high audit fees earned by auditing firms in the UK that allow them to 
appoint qualified auditors to finish the auditing process in a timely manner. 
FORG has a negative significant effect on audit report lag in the UK context. Despite it 
is inconsistent with our hypothesis and most previous literature, but it is still consistent 
with the results of a study by Khlif and Samaha (2014). This negative relationship can 
be justified for two reasons. First, the need of the parent company to have the financial 
statements of the subsidiaries finished as soon as possible to have enough time to make 
necessary currency translations and issue consolidated financial statements. Second, 
larger multinational companies with foreign subsidiaries have strong internal controls 
that auditors can trust and therefore lead to a shorter auditing process and a faster 
issuance of audit report.  
A significant negative relationship exists between leverage LEV and audit report 
timeliness in the UK, this negative relationship is consistent with Chinese-sample 
previous studies (Habib, 2015; Chan et al., 2016). An appropriate justification for this 
relationship is that, when a company credit from banks or any other institution, creditors 
usually study the financial condition of the company and its creditability rank before 
giving any loans and tend to monitor the performance of the company. These monitoring 
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tasks done by creditors decrease audit risk and therefore the audit report lag tends to be 
shorter.  
LOSS as a proxy of client performance tend to not affect audit report lag in the UK 
context. This is in contrary to the argument of some studies (Afify, 2009; Habib and 
Bhuiyan, 2011) that management of companies realizing losses may wish to delay this 
bad news from investors. But these results are consistent with results of some other prior 
studies (Leventis et al., 2005; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Habib, 2015; Shin et al., 2016) 
that also has reported a non-significant relationship between LOSS and audit report lag. 
Board of directors’ independence (BODIND) and CEO duality (CEODUAL) as tools of 
corporate governance tend to be non-significant variables in the audit report lag model 
in the UK sample. This is in contrary to Afify (2009) argument that stronger board of 
directors’ characteristics implies higher monitor by management and gives higher trust 
of auditors on controls and thus decreases the level of substantive tests and therefore 
shorten report lag. Non-significance of board of directors independence and CEO duality 
was reported by prior Chinese-sample studies by (Habib, 2015; Chan et al., 2016) and 
also by (Apadore and Noor, 2013) study on Malaysian audit market. 
Similar to Leventis et al. (2005) results on Athens stock exchange, auditing firm size in 
the UK  has a negative effect on audit report lag model. That could be justified by the 
reason that larger auditing firms hire higher quality staff and employ more efficient audit 
plan that enable them to finish the auditing process faster. Shorter audit report lag offered 
by big N could be a competitive advantage over non-big N counterparts. This is reflected 
in the domination of big N for around 98.5% of the UK audit market. On the other side, 
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auditor specialization is not a significant determinant in the audit report lag in the UK 
sample.  
Learning time spent by auditors for client’s industry and processes decrease as auditor 
tenure increase and therefore audit delay decrease, prior studies supported this negative 
relationship (Lee et al., 2009; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014; Chan et al., 2016). 
Similarly, a negative significant coefficient of tenure in the UK sample is reported. 
Since, in the UK sample, around 98.5% of the companies are audited by the Big N 
auditing firms that dominate the audit market. This increases work load on Big N auditing 
firms and therefore lead to a longer report delay during busy season, that is why BUSY 
has a positive significant coefficient in the audit report lag model in the UK sample. As 
companies being audited during the busy season tend to have a longer audit delay by 
around 4.5% than other companies not audited during busy season. This consistent with 
results of (Payne and Jensen, 2002; Lee et al., 2009; Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011; Enofe et 
al., 2013). 
Tourism industry clients did not seem to have short or prolong audit report lag than other 
industries. This is documented by a non-significant coefficient in the UK audit report lag 
model. 
Year dummies (2008,2009) for global financial crisis effect on audit report lag were 
tested. Results reported that the global financial crisis did not significantly affect audit 
report delay in UK. However, negative coefficients are observed for these dummies. 
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7.5 Analysis and discussion of auditor choices 
Tables 7-7 and 7-11 show combinations of different choices made by the auditor during 
the auditing process. 
The positive coefficients of most proxies of client size, risk, complexity and strong 
corporate governance in audit fees model (LNTA, REC and FORG, BODIND) support 
the increase in audit fees in response to higher transactions, risk or complexity for the 
client. However, the report lag tends to be not affected (as in LNTA, BODIND) or even 
shorter (as in FORG and LEV) for proxies of client size, risk and complexity. This is can 
be interpreted in choice 8, at which the auditor may need more audit staff with higher 
effort and costs to issue a timely audit report, these higher cost is passed to the client in 
the form of higher audit fees. This is consistent to client service theory, at which auditing 
firms give priority to larger clients due to the higher fees paid by those clients, and 
therefore, audit reports are issued as timely as possible.  
Choices and decisions of auditors in the UK are not affected during determining audit 
fees or timing of audit report by client profitability, financial performance and industry 
(Tourism), CEO duality or auditor specialization (Choice 9). 
More efficient auditing process (choice 6) has been realized in audit engagements with 
Big N or for auditors with longer tenure with the client, at which audit delay is shorter 
without any effect in audit fees. This efficiency may be realized because of the 
employment of higher quality auditors in Big N or because long tenure make the auditor 
more oriented with the client’s business. However, during busy season, audit efficiency 
cannot be realized, as report delay tend to be longer associated with audit fees premium 
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(choice 2). As audit time is limited during busy season and any increase in the audit effort 
is associated with higher costs either by overtime work by auditors or by the engagement 
of more audit staff, these costs are passed to the client in the form of higher audit fees.  
Global financial crisis tends to not affect auditors in the UK neither when pricing audit 
services nor in the timeliness of audit opinion (choice 9). 
 
7.6 Additional analysis 
7.6.1 Client size effect  
Additional analysis is performed to capture whether determinants of audit fees are driven 
by client size or not. Using median of LNTA, tables 7-12 and 7-13 summarize audit fees 
model and audit report lag model for subsamples of large and small clients.  
It is apparent that Big N auditing firms offer audit fee discounts for smaller clients, while 
charging audit fee premium to larger clients. This indicates that Big N pricing decisions 
are very affected by client size. It is also observed that large clients tend to have relatively 
shorter audit report lag than that of smaller clients. This is apparent in the negative 
coefficient of LNTA for larger clients than that of the smaller clients in the audit report 
lag analysis. 
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Table 7-12 Client size effect: audit report lag- UK 
Variable Large clients Small clients 
LNTA -0.04373755*** 0.01260264 
FORG -0.03866088 -0.09114929*** 
LEV -0.16093676* -0.08497565* 
LOSS 0.03929809 0.01262746 
CEODUAL -0.07932094 0.08110432 
BODIND 0.15044681 0.08507104 
BigN -0.2126494*** -0.32264302*** 
Tenure -0.02754212*** -0.01045145 
BUSY 0.05476034* 0.02017543 
SPECZ 0.01134558 0.00016812 
Tourism -0.07772882 -0.1193651*** 
dum2008 -0.02326088 -0.0039754 
dum2009 -0.03244843 0.01029899 
_cons 5.1112053*** 4.3355252*** 
N 325 326 
r2 0.93583194 0.9641194 
***, **, and *denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 
Table 7-13 Client size effect: audit fees- UK 
Variable Large clients Small clients 
LNTA 0.14752704** -0.10569456 
QUICK -0.76083157** -0.11916302 
REC 1.0385136 2.4382975** 
INVENT -1.0644219*** 0.8012826** 
FORG 0.139217 0.5442441*** 
ROA -0.54449731 -0.05788514 
BODIND 2.0183801*** 3.0320624*** 
CEODUAL -0.16746579 -0.12683893 
BigN 0.89177737** -0.33860758** 
SPECZ -0.05362271 -0.068068 
INITIAL 0.01661194 -0.33212445** 
BUSY 0.5196669*** 1.0493227*** 
Tourism -0.29412177 -0.03935608 
dum2008 -0.11602219 0.39811276 
dum2009 -0.01094242 0.17259583 
_cons 9.4241527*** 12.163798*** 
N 325 326 
r2 0.97657622 0.97767721 
***, **, and *denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
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7.7 Summary 
This chapter reports the results of empirical findings of the audit fees and audit report 
lag determinants in the UK context over the six-year period from 2008 to 2013. First, 
analysis of determinants of audit fees model in the UK has been discussed. Then, the 
analysis of determinants of audit report lag have been illustrated. 
Analysis of auditor choices of audit fees and report lag towards various attributes and 
events are summarized. Finally, additional analysis has been summarized for client size 
effect on audit fees and report lag using subsamples by client size median. 
The next chapter will provide a comparison of audit fees and report lag determinants 
differences between the Egyptian and UK samples.  
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Chapter 8 Findings and conclusion-Country comparison 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a comparison of drivers of audit fees between the Egyptian and UK 
contexts. After that, another comparison of drivers of audit report lag between the 
Egyptian and UK contexts is presented. Finally, comparison of auditors’  decisions and 
choices in both contexts are briefly discussed. 
8.2 Audit fees model: Results and discussion- Comparison 
Egypt and the UK 
Table 8-1 summarizes audit fees regression results in Egypt and UK context. 
Client size is a core significant determinant of audit fees whatever the country or the 
audit market or the economic and political conditions or regulations. To the best of 
researcher’s knowledge, no study has reported a negative or a non-significant coefficient 
of client size in the audit fees model. It is clear that an auditor will spend more effort, 
time and resources in auditing a firm with larger total assets than a smaller one. Results 
reported a significant positive coefficient for log of total assets LNTA (as a proxy of 
client size) and audit fees in both Egypt and the UK. However, the coefficient of client 
size in Egypt is much higher than that in the UK sample. As the coefficient of the client 
size in Egypt is 28.5% compared to only 7% in UK sample, that implies that client size 
is more effective during pricing audit services in Egypt than in the UK. 
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Client risk is another core dominant variable proved by previous literature to be a 
significant determinant during pricing decisions of audit services. Receivables ratio tend 
to be positively significant in both the Egyptian and UK samples. For inventory ratio, a 
negative coefficient is reported in both Egypt and the UK, however the coefficient in 
Egypt is significant while in UK, it is non-significant. This support the mixed results 
obtained by previous literature for the effect of inventory ratio on audit fees model.  
Despite that QUICK ratio is not significant in UK sample, but it has a negative coefficient 
similar to the Egyptian sample. Also during GFC, quick ratio coefficient tended to be 
higher in Egypt and UK than in any other period. This gives indication that global 
financial crisis affected auditors’ attitude in audit pricing decisions and led them to offer 
audit fee discounts for those companies with better financial conditions. 
Client’s complexity represented by whether client owns foreign subsidiary or not 
(FORG) has a positive coefficient but differs in significance between Egypt and UK. 
This difference may be because of the significance of foreign subsidiaries in the UK 
sample which constitutes around 88% of the sample versus only 15% in the Egyptian 
sample. This confirms how differences between countries and market characteristics 
affect core variables in audit pricing model. Also, a positive coefficient of ROA is found 
in both Egyptian and UK samples, however, it has a non-significant coefficient in the 
UK sample.  
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Table 8-1 Summary of audit fees model results 
Hypothesis Variable Expected Actual results 
Egypt UK 
H1: There is a significant positive relationship 
between client size and audit fees 
Client size 
(LNTA) 
+ + sig + sig 
H2a: There is a significant positive relationship 
between receivables ratio and audit fees 
Client risk 
(REC) 
+ + sig + sig 
H2b: There is a significant positive relationship 
between inventory ratio and audit fees 
Client risk 
(INV) 
+ - sig - n.s 
H2c: There is a significant negative relationship 
between quick ratio and audit fees 
Client risk 
(QUICK) 
- - sig - n.s 
H3: There is a significant positive relationship 
between client complexity and audit fees 
Client 
complexity 
(FORG) 
+ + n.s + sig 
H4: There is a significant positive relationship 
between client profitability and audit fees 
Client 
Profitability 
(ROA) 
+ + sig + n.s 
H5: There is a significant relationship between 
clients in tourism industry and audit fees  
Tourism 
Industry 
? + n.s - n.s 
H6a: There is a significant positive relationship 
between CEO duality and audit fees 
Corporate 
governance -
CEO duality 
+ + sig - n.s 
H6b: There is a significant positive relationship 
between board of directors’ independence and 
audit fees. 
Corporate 
governance -
BOD 
independence 
+ + n.s + sig 
H7: There is a significant positive relationship 
between audit firm size and audit fees 
Audit firm 
size 
+ + sig + n.s 
H8: There is a significant negative relationship 
between auditor specialization and audit fees. 
Auditor 
specialization 
- - sig - n.s 
H9: There is a significant negative relationship 
between initial engagements and audit fees 
Initial 
engagement 
- - n.s - n.s 
H10: There is a significant positive relationship 
between busy season and audit fees 
Busy season + - n.s + sig 
H11: There is a significant positive relationship 
between auditor opinion and audit fees 
Audit 
opinion 
+  + sig n.a 
H12a: There is a significant effect of global 
financial crisis on audit fees 
Global 
financial 
crisis 
? - sig + n.s 
H12b: There is a significant effect of Egyptian 
revolution on audit fees 
Egyptian 
Revolution 
? + sig n.a 
- “sig” is for significant relationship 
- “n.s” is for non-significant relationship  
- “n.a” is for non-applicable  
207 
 
Board of director’s characteristics tend to increase audit fees whether it is strong or weak 
corporate governance tool. As we can find that weak corporate governance mechanism 
represented in Egypt by CEO duality constitutes more than 37% of the Egyptian sample. 
Consequently, this weak governance characteristic increase audit risk assessed by the 
auditor and tend to increase associated audit fees. However, in UK sample, where CEO 
duality constitutes only 3.5%, while non-executive directors constitutes 68% of the board 
of directors on average. This higher quality characteristic of corporate governance in the 
UK require higher quality auditors with higher audit fees. That is why corporate 
governance is a significant determinant of audit fees in Egypt and UK despite differences 
in the strength of governance mechanisms. 
The difference between Big N coefficient in Egypt and UK, confirms the differences in 
pricing decisions that vary between audit market characteristics in different countries. 
The difference in pricing attitude by Big N in Egypt and UK affect their market 
domination, as shown on the descriptive statistics in tables 6.1 and 7.1, Big N market 
share in Egypt is less than 39% while in UK is about 98.5 %. As due to the high Big N 
premium in Egypt, it is easy for small and medium sized audit firms to penetrate and 
compete by much lower audit fees. However, results indicate that Big N in UK do not 
charge higher premium than non-big N which led to the difficulty of non-big N 
penetration in the UK audit market. This implies how Big N audit fees premium affects 
competitiveness and dominance in audit markets. 
Despite its insignificance in UK audit fees model, auditor specialization coefficient tends 
to have a negative sign in both Egypt and UK. This supports the claim by some prior 
literature that auditing firms’ investment in developing industry-specific-skills of 
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auditors are spread over a large number of clients, leading to cost savings passed to the 
client in the form of audit fee discount. 
Initial engagement tends to be a non-significant variable in audit fees model in the 
Egyptian and UK samples. However, both coefficients have negative signs implying 
probability of some audit fee discount given to new clients. 
Busy season is a non-significant variable in audit fees model in Egypt despite that more 
than 82% of Egyptian companies are audited in the busy season versus only 55.6% of 
UK firms. But the busy season tends to be a significant variable resulting in higher audit 
fees by 65% for audit engagement in UK. A proper explanation for this difference in 
results of BUSY between Egypt and the UK is the market share of Big N. As nearly 98.5% 
of the UK firms appoint only four auditing firms (Big4), and logically, year-end 
December/January will be a very busy season, and auditors would charge higher audit 
fees. While the case in Egypt is very different where dominance of Big N is not very 
high (nearly 38%) and the market is very competitive with many medium and small sized 
audit firms. So, the year end is relatively not so busy season for auditors in Egypt as it is 
in the UK. 
Tourism industry was a non-significant variable in the audit fees model in both Egypt 
and UK. The global financial crisis effect on audit fees differed between the two contexts 
in Egypt and UK. As results indicate a significant cut in audit fees in Egypt, and non-
significant effect on UK audit fees.  
In sum, results revealed consistency between Egypt and UK in most signs of coefficients 
of audit fees determinants. They may differ in significance of the variables due to 
209 
 
different audit market characteristics, but they generally agree in the direction of the 
relationship of whether it is a positive or a negative sign for most of the audit fees 
determinants. 
 
8.3 Audit report lag model: Results and discussion- Comparison 
Egypt and UK 
Table 8-2 summarizes audit report lag regression results in Egypt and UK context. 
There are differences in results of the effect of company size LNTA on audit report lag 
between Egypt and UK, at which Egyptian sample reported a positive significant 
coefficient and the UK sample reported a non-significant negative coefficient. A possible 
reason for this difference is that UK companies pay higher audit fees that enable audit 
firms to hire more auditors and offer the required human resources to finish the auditing 
process timely and that is why larger UK clients do not suffer from longer report lag in 
contrast to larger Egyptian clients. 
Existence of foreign subsidiaries FORG as a proxy of client complexity differs in its 
significance on audit report lag between Egypt and UK, but they are consistent in the 
negative sign of the coefficient. The difference in coefficient significance between Egypt 
and UK may be due to the difference of foreign subsidiaries descriptive that constitutes 
only 15% of the Egyptian sample while constitutes 88% of the UK sample. 
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Table 8-2 Summary of audit report lag model results 
-  “sig” is for significant relationship 
- “n.s” is for non-significant relationship, “n.a” is for non-applicable 
Hypothesis Variable Expected Actual results 
Egypt UK 
H1: There is a significant relationship 
between client size and audit report lag 
Client size ? + sig - n.s 
H2: There is a significant positive 
relationship between client complexity 
and audit report lag 
Client 
complexity 
+ - n.s - sig 
H3: There is a significant positive 
relationship between client leverage and 
audit report lag 
Client 
financial 
condition 
+ + sig - sig 
H4: There is a significant positive 
relationship between client loss and audit 
report lag 
Client 
performance 
+ + n.s + n.s 
H5: There is a significant positive 
relationship between clients in tourism 
industry and audit report lag  
Tourism 
Industry 
+ - n.s - n.s 
H6a: There is a significant positive 
relationship between CEO duality and 
audit report lag 
CEO duality + + n.s - n.s 
H6b: There is a significant positive 
relationship between board of directors’ 
independence and audit report lag. 
BOD 
independence 
+ + sig + n.s 
H7: There is a significant negative 
relationship between audit firm size and 
audit report lag 
Audit firm size - + n.s - n.s 
H8: There is a significant negative 
relationship between auditor 
specialization and audit report lag. 
Auditor 
specialization 
- - sig - n.s 
H9: There is a significant negative 
relationship between auditor tenure and 
audit report lag 
Auditor tenure - - n.s - sig 
H10: There is a significant positive 
relationship between busy season and 
audit report lag 
Busy season + + n.s + sig 
H11: There is a significant positive 
relationship between auditor opinion and 
audit report lag 
Audit opinion +  + sig n.a 
H12a: There is a significant effect of global 
financial crisis on audit report lag 
Global 
financial crisis 
? - sig - n.s 
H12b: There is a significant effect of 
Egyptian revolution on audit report lag 
Egyptian 
Revolution 
? - n.s n.a 
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Different results exist between Egypt and the UK concerning the effect of client’s 
financial condition on audit report lag. A positive coefficient of leverage LEV is reported 
in the Egyptian model, while a negative one is obtained from the UK model. This could 
highlight a matter of overconfidence of the UK auditors in their clients and related 
creditors. While auditors in Egypt tend to be more cautious about clients with higher 
leverage ratio especially after the instability, economy recessions, decrease in realized 
profits that companies have suffered after the Egyptian revolution. This confirms how 
differences between countries economic stability and even professional scepticism 
attitude by auditors may affect the auditing outputs. 
Consistent with prior literature (Leventis et al., 2005; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Habib, 
2015; Shin et al., 2016), results indicate that both audit report lag models in Egypt and 
the UK report a non-significant relationship of audit delay and companies realizing 
losses.  
Despite that tourism is a very risky industry that easily affected by political instability or 
financial crisis. But it is proved by the audit report delay model in Egypt and UK that 
audit time spent in this industry does not differ from other industries. 
Board of directors’ independence tend to be more significant in the Egyptian context 
than the UK. However, CEO duality tend to be non-significant determinant in both 
countries. 
Differences between audit markets in Big N domination are reflected in the audit report 
lag model. This is obvious in results of the effect of audit firm size on audit report 
timeliness in the Egyptian and UK samples. In the Egyptian sample where Big N 
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dominance is only 38.7%, Big N do not differ from non-big N in report timeliness, so 
they do not have a competitive advantage of shorter report lag than non-big N 
counterparts that could help them to differentiate their services. On the contrary, in the 
UK sample where Big N dominate nearly 98.5%, it is obvious that big N have a relatively 
competitive advantage in issuing audit reports faster than non-big N. This may reflect 
that competitive advantages and differentiation strategy adopted by auditing firms could 
help in increasing their market share and dominating the audit market as in the case of 
the UK audit market. 
Despite the difference in significance of the auditor specialization coefficient in Egypt 
and the UK, they are consistent in the negative sign of the coefficient. There is also a 
difference in the significance of auditor tenure effect on audit delay in both Egypt and 
UK, but it has a negative coefficient in both countries. 
Another confirmation of how the differences between audit markets in Big N domination 
are reflected in the audit report lag model appear in the busy season variable. As due to 
the domination of Big N in UK sample, this makes the busy season full of workload 
concentrated on only four auditing companies, which lead to a longer audit report lag. 
However, in Egyptian sample, where small and medium sized auditing firms are 
competing with Big N, this make work load in busy season is divided by a large number 
of auditing firms, leading to non-significant coefficient of busy season in audit report lag 
model in Egyptian sample. This presents another confirmation of how audit market 
domination and characteristics make determinants of audit report timeliness differ from 
one country to another. 
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In the Egyptian context, during the global financial crisis, auditors tended to finish the 
auditing process faster in order to publish relative financial information to investors in a 
timely manner. However, in the UK context, it is a non-significant variable but still has 
a negative coefficient. 
8.4 Auditor decisions and choices: Comparison Egypt and UK 
Differences between auditors’ decisions in the two countries appear regarding their 
response to different risks, characteristics and events by choosing to adjust audit effort, 
delay or fees. 
For example, auditors’ decisions concerning client size, risk and complexity variables is 
different in the two countries. Despite that auditors in both countries tend to increase 
audit fees for large, risky or more complex clients, auditors in Egypt tend to increase 
audit delay, while UK auditors do not prolong audit delay for those clients and even they 
may shorten the audit process. This indicates that auditors in Egypt follow the 
transactions theory that suggests that when the transactions increase, the effort and time 
exerted by the auditor increase. The increase in audit effort will lead to higher audit fees 
charged by the client and longer audit report lag accompanied because of the longer audit 
completion time component of the audit lag. However, auditors in the UK follow the 
client service theory that suggests that due to the higher audit fees large clients pay, those 
clients enjoy priority by the auditing firms in the form of shorter audit delay. 
Client with strong corporate governance are also treated differently by auditors in the 
two countries. In Egypt, auditors tend to be more conservative for companies with highly 
independent board of directors, as they take longer time to finish the audit process. On 
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the other side, auditor in the UK, tend to not take longer time for those clients but they 
compensate the increase in audit effort asked by the board by charging them with higher 
audit fees. 
The decisions and marketing strategies used by Big N in Egypt and UK are highly 
different. In Egypt, Big N auditors do not create a competitive advantage related to 
shorter audit report lag or even competitive audit fees, on the contrary, they charge clients 
with higher audit fees than non-big N. May be Big N firms in Egypt charge higher fees 
to compensate risk premium of potential legal liability cost that may be charged to them 
and consider that their reputation internationally is a good competitive advantage to 
attract clients. On the contrary, Big N auditing firms in the UK attract clients by offering 
more efficient auditing services with shorter audit report lag with no mark-up fees than 
their counterparts of non-big N. According to the sample of this study, the results of this 
different marketing strategies and decisions is that Big N auditing firms in Egypt 
constitutes only 39% of the sample Egyptian companies, while in UK Big N share is 
more than 98% of the UK audit market. 
Industry specialized auditors in Egypt offer efficient auditing processes of lower audit 
fees and shorter audit report lag than non-specialized auditors. On the other side, in the 
UK, industry-specialized auditors do not offer neither lower audit fees nor shorter audit 
report lag for their clients. 
Moreover, during the global financial crisis, decisions of auditors in the UK regarding 
pricing audit services or adjusting audit effort or lag have not been affected. However, 
in Egypt, the audit market suffered recession which in response made the auditors shorten 
audit lag and offer audit fees discount for clients.  
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In sum, differences in auditors’ responses, decisions and choices in the two countries 
towards different variables and events could highlight why there are mixed results 
concerning audit fees and report lag models in the literature. Market characteristics, 
culture, economy, political events and even legal strength difference between countries 
present different combinations of decisions and responses in the auditing process. 
8.5 Summary 
In general, client size, risk, complexity and corporate governance increase audit fees 
charged by the client. However, audit firm size effect on audit fees differ between Egypt 
and UK, and affect the domination of Big N auditing firms in these audit markets. 
Auditor specialization decrease auditing fees for clients. Global financial crisis effect on 
audit fees differs from one country to another, as auditors in Egypt offered discount 
during this recession period, while in UK it has no effect on audit fees.  
Audit report timeliness depend on the procedures and risk assessments made by auditors 
during the auditing process. Differences between Egypt and the UK in determinants of 
audit report lag may exist because of audit market domination and characteristics, and 
professional scepticism attitude of the auditors especially in cases of instability in the 
political and economic environment.  That explains why results of prior literature for 
most determinants of audit report lag are mixed. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion, implications and future research 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes this research study and its major findings and conclusion. It 
will be organised as follows: 
• Research findings summary and conclusion 
• Significance and contribution of the study 
• Implications of this research 
• Potential research limitation and directions for future research 
9.2 Research findings summary and conclusion 
Using Prais-Winsten panel data analysis for samples from the Egyptian and UK contexts 
during the sample period from 2008 to 2013, empirical results have been concluded. The 
results of this study have answered the research questions and fulfilled the research 
objectives previously mentioned in chapter one in section 1.3. A summary of the results 
of hypotheses of audit fees and report lag models in both the Egyptian and UK contexts 
will be summarized in the next few sub-sections. Then the conclusion will be briefly 
discussed. 
9.2.1 Research findings summary -audit fees determinants 
Consistent with hypothesis (H1) audit fees are higher for larger clients than smaller ones. 
Results show a significant positive coefficient for log of total assets (as a proxy of client 
size) and audit fees in Egypt and UK. This is because more accounts and transactions 
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compromising financial information of larger clients, require more time and effort by 
auditors. Thus, larger clients are expected to be charged higher audit fees. 
Consistent with hypothesis (H2a), there is a positive relationship between receivables 
ratio and audit fees in both samples Egypt and UK. As expected, clients with more 
complex and risky balance sheet components are expected to be charged a premium to 
compensate auditors for the increased effort and audit risk assumed.  
Inconsistent with hypothesis (H2b), the coefficient of the inventory ratio is negatively 
associated with audit fees in both samples. A possible explanation for this result is that 
an increased inventory ratio is an indicator of economic recession affecting the client, 
and auditors may offer discount in audit fees when recession consequences are affecting 
the client. 
Consistent with hypothesis (H2c) quick ratio has a negative effect on audit fees in both 
samples. The better the client’s liquidity position, the less risk the client is and the less 
audit risk assumed and so the audit fees are less.  
Because the more complex a client is, the harder it is to audit and the more time-
consuming the audit is likely to be. Results document audit fees premium for companies 
with foreign subsidiaries, which supports hypothesis (H3) of a positive effect of client 
complexity on audit fees in both countries, however, it is a non-significant positive 
coefficient in Egypt.  
Auditors charge higher audit fees to clients when they seem more wealthy. Consistent 
with hypothesis (H4), a positive coefficient for client profitability is reported in both 
countries despite that the UK sample report a non-significant positive coefficient. 
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Inconsistent with hypothesis (H4), tourism industry was not reported to have a significant 
effect on audit fees in both countries. 
Consistent with hypothesis (H6a), CEO duality tend to positively affect audit fees in 
Egypt, however in the UK, it has a non-significant negative coefficient. While, board of 
directors’ independence tend to have a positive insignificant effect in the Egyptian 
sample, and positive significant one in the UK sample. This is consistent with hypothesis 
(H6b). This confirms that corporate governance is a significant determinant of audit fees. 
A significant big N audit fee premium is reported in the Egyptian sample, consistent with 
our hypothesis (H7), however, it is a non-significant positive coefficient in the UK 
sample. This premium could be justified because of the more audit hours and effort 
invested by big N, or because of the higher rate per hour charged. 
A significant industry specialist audit fee discount is reported in the Egyptian sample, 
consistent with hypothesis (H8), however, it is a non-significant negative coefficient in 
the UK sample. An advantage of decreased audit costs due to economies of scale could 
be realized when auditors specialize in a certain industry. These decreased audit costs 
are passed to the client in the form of audit fees discount. 
Despite the insignificance of initial engagements coefficient in both countries, but the 
coefficients still have a negative sign consistent with hypothesis (H9).  
Busy season tend to differ in its effect on audit fees between both countries. As in Egypt, 
it is a non-significant negative coefficient, while in the UK it is a significant positive 
coefficient. This difference between the two countries on the effect of busy season on 
audit fees is due to the difference in big N domination between the two countries. 
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Consistent with hypothesis (H11), audit opinion other than standard opinion tend to have 
a positive effect on audit fees in the Egyptian sample. Because a non-standard audit 
opinion may indicate potential problems raised during the auditing process that required 
more effort and time exerted by the auditors. 
Global financial crisis has no effect on pricing auditing services in the UK sample, 
however it led to a decrease in audit fees in the Egyptian context. Auditors in Egypt tend 
to cut their fees due to the recession and bad financial conditions influencing the world, 
this is consistent with our hypothesis and with prior literature in the US auditing market. 
This is also observable on quick ratio and busy season coefficients that indicated audit 
fee discount offered to clients during this period. 
Consistent with our hypothesis (H12b), during the Egyptian revolution, audit fees in the 
Egyptian audit market tend to increase. Higher audit fees are reported after the 
revolution, especially for clients that are considered risky with higher receivables ratio 
or bad corporate governance mechanisms, or in the tourism industry that was highly 
affected after the revolution. 
9.2.2 Research findings summary -audit report lag  
Mixed results for hypothesis H1, as we can find client size increase audit report lag in 
Egypt while it does not have any effect on audit report lag in UK. This could be explained 
that auditing firms in UK hire more auditors and therefore the required human resources 
are always adequate during auditing large companies in the UK. 
Inconsistent with hypothesis H2, we can notice a non-significant negative effect of client 
complexity on audit report lag in Egypt and a significant negative coefficient in the UK. 
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This means that lower audit delay is observed for companies with foreign subsidiaries. 
This may be because of the strong internal controls of companies with foreign 
subsidiaries or because they need their financial statements to be audited in a timely 
manner to give time for consolidated financial statements to be prepared and issued.  
Consistent with our hypothesis H3, companies with high leverage ratio tend to take 
longer time to be audited by Egyptian auditors due to the higher risk associated with 
these companies. However, different results are observed from UK results, as we can 
find that higher leverage clients enjoy shorter report lag. This could be justified by the 
trust of auditors in the UK in the monitoring procedures of creditors and banks on the 
client which lead them to lower the audit risk and finish auditing as soon as possible. 
Companies achieving loss tend to positively affect audit report lag model as expected in 
H4 in Egypt and UK. Despite the non-significance of the coefficients, it may give 
indication that client achieving loss may be considered risky clients that auditors doubt 
and increase their auditing procedures and thus audit delay. 
Inconsistent with hypothesis H5, tourism industry seems to not differ from other 
industries in the time of auditing and procedures needed in both countries Egypt and UK. 
Board of directors’ independence tend to increase audit procedures needed and audit 
delay. This is noticeable in the positive coefficients in the results of audit report 
timeliness in Egypt and UK. However, it seems that CEO duality does not much affect 
audit report timeliness in both countries. 
Big auditing firms tend to offer a good competitive advantage of quicker and timely 
auditing procedures in UK than in Egypt. That also affected their high dominance in the 
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UK audit market than in Egypt. However, specialized auditors in Egypt offer this 
timeliness advantage to clients than in the UK.  
Despite its non-significant coefficient in Egypt, but still auditor tenure has a negative 
coefficient in both Egypt and UK. This indicates that when auditors spend more years 
with the company, they became more knowledgeable about its processes and controls 
which lead to shorter report lag. 
In UK sample at which work load is divided between only four auditing firms, busy 
season is characterized by a longer audit report lag. However, in Egyptian sample, where 
small and medium sized auditing firms are competing with Big N, this makes work load 
in busy season is divided by a large number of auditing firms, leading to non-significant 
coefficient of busy season in audit report lag model in Egyptian sample. 
Consistent with our hypothesis H11, in the Egyptian sample, non-standard audit opinion 
gives a signal of problems associated with more audit procedures and longer audit report 
lag. 
In Egyptian context, during the global financial crisis, auditors tended to finish the 
auditing process faster in order to publish relative financial information to investors in a 
timely manner. However, in the UK context, it is a non-significant variable but still has 
a negative coefficient. Also, the Egyptian revolution tend to have a non-significant effect 
on audit report lag. 
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9.2.3 Conclusion 
Concerning pricing of audit services. Results document that client size, risk and 
corporate governance tend to significantly increase audit fees in the Egyptian and UK 
context. Also, client complexity and profitability have positive coefficients in both 
contexts.  
Big N auditing firms tend to charge their clients with audit fee premium in Egypt, that 
have enabled medium sized and small auditing firms to penetrate the Egyptian auditing 
market and increase their market share. On the other side, in the UK context, Big N 
auditing firms do not charge such premium, which helped them in dominating the UK 
auditing market. However, dominance increase work load during busy season, which put 
pressures on UK Big N auditing firms to charge higher audit fees during the busy season. 
Different auditor responses to global financial crisis have been documented in both 
countries, as auditors in Egypt decreased their audit fees to face the economic recession 
accompanied with the GFC. However, pricing of auditing services was not affected in 
the UK audit market. 
During the Egyptian revolution, auditors increased their audit fees to face higher risk of 
audit failure during this political and economic instability. This is also apparent in the 
effect of some variables on pricing decision during the revolution period. As we can find 
that clients working in the tourism sector, or clients with higher receivable ratio, or those 
of weak corporate governance seem to alert the auditors of potential risks during the 
revolution period and lead them to pay special attention and may charge these clients 
higher audit fees. 
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A one-size-fits-all approach cannot be generalized in audit report lag determinants. As a 
lot of differences exist between the audit report lag determinants in the Egyptian and UK 
context. Efficient planning and allocation of audit staff by auditing firms in the UK result 
in timely audit reports for larger and more complex clients, while in Egypt client size 
tend to increase audit report lag. Higher professional scepticism attitude by Egyptian 
auditors result in more detailed audit procedures for clients with higher leverage ratio. 
This may reflect that the more cautious Egyptian auditors are or the culture effects of not 
trusting the clients with higher liabilities and loans from banks and creditors due to the 
non-efficiency of the Egyptian banking system. This is completely different for UK 
auditors who tend to decrease audit tests and shorten report lag for companies with higher 
leverage ratio because of the monitor of creditors to the client that mitigates the audit 
risk. 
Big N auditing firms in the UK have a competitive advantage of a shorter audit report 
lag and therefore a more timely audit report than non-big N. This increase the demand 
of Big N in the UK and increase their dominance, however during the busy season, due 
to the higher work load on them, that may increase audit report lag. On the other side, in 
Egypt, Big N auditing firms do not offer the advantage of timely audit reports more than 
non-big N, and thus their dominance is not high. 
Again, another example of different responses of auditors to the global financial crisis, 
in the UK context, audit report lag did not differ during the GFC. However, in Egypt, 
auditors tend to have shorter audit report delay than other years. This may be because 
during global financial crisis, investors in Egypt tend to be anxious about the 
performance of their companies during that economic recession, and management tend 
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to make pressures on auditors to finish auditing as fast as possible to publish relative 
financial information to investors in a timely manner. 
 
9.3 Significance of the study 
This study provides a novel contribution to the auditing literature in a number of ways:  
• Prior literature focuses mainly on the pricing of audit services and audit delay in 
the developed countries, scarcity in previous research exists in the developing 
countries especially the Middle East. Even if some literature exists concerning 
the Middle East, it includes short sample period that does not fully capture the 
full behaviour of determinants of audit fees and report timeliness. This research 
explores the determinants of audit fees and audit delay in Egypt in a period of six 
years (2008-2013). No previous study has tried to examine the determinants of 
audit fees and audit delay in Egypt during that period.  This study contributes to 
the literature by investigating auditors’ reaction in the Middle East context where 
very little literature has explored. 
• There is no single published research that addressed the effect of Arab Spring or 
revolutions happened in the Middle East on the auditing profession. In this regard, 
this study makes a significant contribution towards understanding how political 
changes could affect auditors’ attitude in assessing client risks, pricing audit 
services and in performing audit procedures and the possible audit delay. As this 
study is the first to apply political theory besides the agency theory to examine 
the effect of unstable political and economic conditions on the auditing 
profession. Consistent with political theory and agency theory, this study offers 
evidence that auditors tend to increase their fees in periods of severe political 
instability after the revolution which is another contribution for this study. This 
can be interpreted by the more professional skepticism acted by the auditors and 
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the higher assessed litigation risk they try to mitigate in such instable conditions 
by increasing their fees. 
• Very limited literature has investigated the effect of global financial crisis on 
pricing audit services and audit delay. To the best of researcher’s knowledge, no 
study published has investigated the effect of global financial crisis on the pricing 
of audit services and the audit report timeliness in Egypt or in UK. Therefore, this 
study is considered the first study to capture its effects on determinants of audit 
fees and audit delay. 
• Tourism industry is one of the very important industries in both Egypt and the 
UK. Economic and political interruptions have severe effects on this industry and 
the companies working in this sector and therefore the auditing process 
concerning the clients in this industry can be affected. No study was interested in 
this sector, despite its importance and sensitivity. This study is the first study to 
investigate whether or not the auditing of this industry differs from other 
industries especially during the instability in political and economic events. 
• This study also contributes to the literature by presenting a comparison between 
determinants of audit fees and audit delay in Egypt and the UK. To argue that 
one-size-fits-all approach used by researchers in generalizing determinants of 
auditing pricing and delay is considered inappropriate. As according to the 
political theory, political and social environment affects companies, and the 
nature of agency costs depends on the political and social pressures in a country. 
Therefore, auditing as an agency cost will differ from one country to another. 
Also, political changes add more riskiness to companies that lead auditors to act 
differently in assessing risks and in not trusting managers and in doubting the 
going concern of some clients.  
• Audit market characteristics and dominance affects the determinants of audit fees 
and audit report lag. The study presents a comparison between a competitive 
market at which medium and small sized auditing firms have large market share 
in Egypt and UK market at which the Big 4 dominant more than 95% of the audit 
market. This comparison highlights how Big 4 dominance could affect some 
determinants of audit fees and audit report timeliness. 
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• Most previous literature used cross-section analysis in exploring the audit pricing 
and audit delay models. This study contributes to the literature by applying panel 
data analysis. Panel data analysis can better detect certain effects that could not 
be measured by cross-section analysis only or time series analysis only. It gives 
more informative data with lower collinearity among variables and more 
efficiency. 
9.4 Implications of the research 
In spite of the research limitations, these results have implications for regulators, 
investors and shareholders. They are also relevant to policy-makers and companies in 
the Arab countries, as they attempt to show the consequences political and economic 
interruptions on companies and auditing profession.  
This study is relevant for auditing firms in analysing how the effect of different decisions 
and choices by the auditor can affect the auditing firm dominance in the audit market. 
These results also have implications for audit researchers that adopt a one-size-fits-all 
approach on determinants of auditing pricing and delay. As these determinants is affected 
by other perspectives associated with the nature of the environment and the related macro 
variables concerning the political stability, the economic conditions and even the 
dominance and characteristics of audit markets. 
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9.5 Potential research limitation and directions for future 
research 
Despite the efforts undertaken in this thesis, a number of research limitations will be 
discussed with recommendations for future research. 
As previously discussed in section 5.5, the study only used quantitative data, due to 
difficulty in collecting qualitative data concerning auditors opinion regarding the various 
determinants and decisions concerning audit timeliness and pricing decisions. Mixing 
qualitative and quantitative data analysis could have enriched the results, and this can be 
addressed by future researchers. 
Similar to most multivariate analysis, results reported in the thesis are constrained by 
research design and variables used in this study. This thesis is also constrained by data 
availability. Ownership, internal control and non-audit fees data were not available to be 
collected especially for the Egyptian companies. Moreover, data about initial audit fees 
agreed upon before the beginning of the audit engagement, and whether this agreement 
change by the end of the engagement, is data never available in reports and therefore, 
could not be reached by the researcher. So, future studies could add these variables and 
data, in cases they are available, to find out its effect in the Egyptian and UK context.  
This study sample consisted of non-financial institutions, therefore, future researchers 
could address how economic and political events could affect auditing pricing and delay 
for the financial sector.  
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This study has been interested in investigating tourism industry because it is easily 
affected by political and economic changes which can make it differs from other 
industries in the audit delay or during pricing auditing services. Other industries could 
be explored by future studies. For example, to the best of researcher’s knowledge, no 
study other than Leventis et al. (2013), has addressed audit fees for industries that are 
considered against social norms (such as: alcohol, firearms, gambling, tobacco and 
nuclear power). Special interest by researchers could be given to explore auditors’ 
response to industries in countries where religion beliefs are against these sectors, e.g. 
alcohol and gambling industries in Islamic countries. 
Research on the effect of political changes of revolutions and Arab spring could be 
extended in a number of directions. A good extension is the study of their effect on the 
performance of the companies and stock prices. Also, a possible area for future research 
is to replicate the tests of the thesis to other countries especially Arab countries where 
revolutions affected their stability and economic conditions to check whether revolution 
effect on auditing is sensitive to the Egyptian setting.  
Concerning the sample time period, this thesis has depended on data from 2008 to 2013. 
This period covers three years before and after the Egyptian revolution. Additional 
research could be extended when new data becomes available to cover recent years after 
the revolution.  
Macro-economic events across the world affect the companies and the auditing 
profession. Global financial crisis has not taken much of the attention of researches, and 
thus more research could be extended on its effect in different countries. A possible area 
for future research could be extended in other countries with different economic events 
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like the withdrawal of some European countries from the European union. Consequences 
of such events on the stock exchange market, company performance and how auditors 
respond to such events could be explored by future researchers. 
This study aimed to compare auditors’ response to events changes in one of the countries 
that is considered developed with stable economy (UK) with another country considered 
developing with non-stable economic and political events (Egypt). Future research could 
address comparison of similar countries in the assessment of auditors for fraud risk.  
Individual characteristics of auditors might be a core determinant in the whole 
engagement process between the client and audit firm, as it could affect engagement 
planning, negotiation skills, risk preference. Very few literature has explored this issue, 
and therefore more research in this area may be needed to uncover its effects. That is 
why further investigation could be addressed on how auditing process is affected by audit 
partner individual attributes; i.e. gender (especially in highly discriminated countries), 
years of experience, post graduate degrees obtained, CPA certificate obtained. 
There is also another good research question could be addressed by future researchers 
about the use of developed accounting systems and programs, as well as the good 
presentation of financial data using XBRL. Whether such developments have facilitated 
the auditing process and therefore reduced audit time and costs? Or have that increased 
audit time costs due to training and learning required by auditors to cope with such 
progress? Not much literature was interested in this issue, which is considered a new 
research opportunity for future researchers. 
 
230 
 
9.6 Summary 
This chapter presents a summary and the conclusions of this research. The main findings 
of the research are summarized, conclusion is presented. Significance and implication of 
the study is highlighted.  The potential limitations of this research and potential avenues 
for future research are discussed. 
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Appendix I Summary of prior studies 
 
Table I-1 Summary of main audit fees literature 
Study Objectives Results Sample Country 
(Abidin et al., 
2010) 
The paper objective is to find 
evidence on audit market 
concentration and auditor fee 
levels in the UK market in the 
period following PwC merger 
and demise of Andersen 
There is an evidence that audit fee rates increased 
in UK after Andersen demise. 
9006 observations 
(1998-2003) 
UK 
(Ahmed and 
Goyal, 2005) 
The paper examines the main 
factors affect determination of 
audit fees in three emerging 
economies within South Asia. 
Client size, ownership structure and audit firm 
size are significant determinants of audit fees. 
However, client complexity and client financial 
condition do not significantly affect audit fees 
566 observations 
(1998) 
Pakistan 
India 
Banglades
h 
(Al-Harshani, 
2008) 
The study investigates the 
determinants of audit fees in 
Kuwait 
Client size, liquidity ratio and profitability ratio 
are significant determinants of audit fees in 
Kuwait. However, the size of audit firm and 
location do not significantly affect audit fees 
49 observations 
(2005) 
Kuwait 
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(Bandyopadhyay 
and Kao, 2004) 
The study examines the 
relationship between audit 
pricing and market structure 
The results of the study give empirical evidence 
of a positive relationship between auditor market 
concentration and non-Big N audit fees but is not 
related to Big N audit fees 
257 observations 
(1995) 
Canada 
(Beattie et al., 
2001) 
The study investigates audit 
pricing in charity/voluntary 
sector 
The results prove that, like private sector, 
determinants like client size, complexity, audit 
firm location and non-audit fees affect audit fees 
in charity sector. And also, charity activity and 
whether charity is grant making or fund raising 
are specific determinants of audit fees in charity 
sector. 
210 observations 
(1997) 
UK 
(Bedard and 
Johnstone, 2004) 
The paper explores auditors' 
planning and pricing decisions 
depending on the existence of 
earnings manipulation risk and 
corporate governance risk 
The paper found no main effect between 
corporate governance and pricing decisions. But 
only when both corporate governance risk and 
earnings manipulation exist, audit fees are 
affected. 
1000 observations 
(2000-2001) 
US 
(Behn et al., 2009) The study examines Korean audit 
market and how the 1999 
Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act 
affected audit pricing decisions 
The results of the study suggest high audit pricing 
competition and discount after the 1999 Omnibus 
Cartel Repeal Act 
1195 observations 
(1999-2004) 
Korea 
(Bell et al., 2008) The paper explores the 
relationship between business 
risk assessment for the auditee 
and audit labour usage and 
pricing 
The paper provides evidence that total audit fees 
and audit fees/hour increase with increased 
assessment of auditee business risk for first year 
auditees not for continuing auditees 
165 observations 
(2002) 
US 
267 
 
(Bell et al., 2001) The study analyses the relation 
between client's business risk and 
audit pricing 
The paper provides evidence that higher business 
risk is associated by higher audit fees due to the 
increase in number of audit hours not audit 
fee/hour 
422 observations 
(1989) 
US 
(Bryan and Mason, 
2016) 
The study tries to investigate 
whether CEO compensations 
reduction could affect auditor's 
assessment of risk and audit fees 
or not. 
The paper proved a significant positive 
association between audit fees and CEO pay cuts. 
8352 observations 
(2000-2011) 
US 
(Cahan and Sun, 
2015) 
The study examines the effect of 
audit experience on audit fees 
and audit quality 
Results indicate the existence of a positive 
relationship between audit experience and audit 
fees. While a negative relationship exists 
between audit experience and audit quality 
1917 observations 
(2007-2010) 
China 
(Cameran, 2005) The aim of the study is to find out 
the main determinants of audit 
fees in Italy. 
Client size, client complexity and client risk are 
the main determinants of audit fees in Italy. Large 
auditor premium is attributable only to KPMG. 
338 observations 
(1995-1999) 
Italy 
(Carcello et al., 
2002) 
The paper investigates the 
relationship between board of 
directors’ characteristics and 
audit pricing 
The paper gives empirical evidence of a 
significant positive relationship between board 
characteristics (independence, diligence and 
expertise) on audit pricing 
258 observations 
(1992/1993) 
US 
(Chaney et al., 
2004) 
The study examines the existence 
of big 8 premium in pricing of 
audit services for private firms in 
UK 
The study results show that private firms do not 
pay premium for Big 8 
15484 
observations 
(1994-1998) 
UK 
268 
 
(Chen et al., 2007) The paper makes a comparison 
between Big N practices in 
competitive statutory market and 
the less competitive 
supplementary market in China 
Results of the study indicates that Big N earn 
audit fee premium in less competitive audit 
market 
434 observations 
(2000-2003) 
China 
(Choi et al., 2008) The paper examines how 
country's legal environment 
could affect audit pricing 
decisions and audit fee charged 
big N and non-big N 
The paper provides evidence that the stronger the 
country regime, the more audit fee charged by the 
auditors. And Big N charge audit fee premium 
given a certain legal liability regime 
21559 
observations 
(1996-2002) 
15 
countries 
(Choi et al., 2009) The paper's main research 
question is to find out whether 
auditors charge higher audit fees 
for cross-listed firms especially 
those in strong legal regimes 
countries 
The paper provides empirical evidence that 
auditors charge higher audit fees for cross listed 
firms in countries with stronger legal 
environment 
17837 
observations 
(1996-2002) 
14 non-
US 
countries 
(Chung and 
Narasimhan, 2002) 
The study investigates variations 
in audit pricing across five 
industries in 12 countries 
The results of the study show that companies in 
developed countries pay higher audit fees than 
companies in developing countries. 
Manufacturing sector is charged with the highest 
audit fees than other sectors. And Big N charge a 
fee premium. 
6198 observations 
(1989-1993) 
12 
countries 
(Clatworthy and 
Peel, 2007) 
The paper examines the 
relationship between corporate 
failure and audit pricing 
The paper found that there is no evidence that 
insolvent companies that failed were charged 
higher audit fees on the year before the failure 
51429 
observations 
(2003) 
UK 
269 
 
(Audousset-
coulier, 2015) 
The paper studies the effect of 
joint audit setting on audit pricing 
Results show that if the joint auditors are big 4, 
no big 4 premiums are charged compared to the 
choice of one big 4 and a smaller auditor 
254 observations 
(2002-2003) 
France 
(Ding and Jia, 
2012) 
The paper aims to focus on the 
effect of PwC merger on audit 
fees and audit quality 
There was evidence that post-merger period, 
there is a significant increase in audit fees and 
audit quality 
5820 observations 
(1995-2001) 
UK 
(Ettredge et al., 
2007) 
The study explores the 
relationship between audit fees 
and auditor dismissals in the 
period post-SOX 
The study finds that clients paying higher audit 
fees are more likely to dismiss their auditors in 
expectation of lower fees from the succeeding 
auditor 
428 observations 
(2003) 
US 
(Evans Jr. and 
Schwartz, 2013) 
The goal of the paper is to 
estimate how new regulations 
and market concentration affect 
audit fees using panel data 
approach 
New regulations have increased audit fees, while 
market power and concentration do not highly 
affect audit fees 
43413 
observations 
(2000-2010) 
US 
(Felix JR. et al., 
2001) 
The study investigates the 
whether the internal audit 
contribution affects external 
audit pricing 
The study results show that internal audit is a 
significant negative determinant affecting pricing 
of audit fees 
  
(Ferguson and 
Stokes, 2002) 
The paper investigates the effect 
of brand name and auditor 
specialization on audit pricing 
No evidence of the presence of industry specialist 
premiums, and limited support for brand name 
premium 
Observations (per 
year): 1174 (1990), 
965 (1992), 1069 
(1994), 1084 
(1998) 
Australia 
270 
 
(Ferguson et al., 
2003) 
This study examines the effect of 
industry expertise on audit 
pricing 
The paper documented audit fees premium if the 
auditor is industry specialized in both city-level 
and national-level 
1046 observations 
(2002) 
Australia 
(Francis et al., 
2005) 
The purpose of this study is to 
examine how industry expertise 
based on joint national and city 
leadership would affect audit 
pricing 
There is a significant fee premium for auditors 
that are industry specialist jointly nationally and 
on city level 
3994 observations US 
(Fung et al., 2012) The paper examines the effects of 
auditor specialization and 
economies of scale on audit 
pricing 
The paper provides evidence of audit fees 
premium by specialist auditors and scale 
discounts 
17207 
observations 
(2000-2007) 
US 
(De George et al., 
2013) 
Examining how IFRS adoption 
affect audit fees 
There is a direct and significant increase in audit 
fees after IFRS adoption 
4535 observations 
(2002-2006) 
Australia 
(Ghosh and 
Lustgarten, 2006) 
The paper investigates whether 
auditors make discounts on initial 
engagements or not 
Initial engagements discounts exist for non-big N 
auditors than in Big N auditors 
2113 observations 
(2000-2003) 
US 
(Giroux and Jones, 
2007) 
The study is interested in 
investigating the audit fee 
structure of local authorities in 
England and Wales with 
particular focus on pricing 
decisions by Big 4 
The study provides evidence for a Big 4 discount 
for local authority audits 
409 observations 
(2000) 
UK 
271 
 
(Griffin and Lont, 
2011) 
The study analyses the effect of 
auditor change due to dismissals 
and resignations on audit fees 
The paper finds that dismissals is associated with 
lower audit fees, while resignations is associated 
with higher audit fees (before and after auditor 
change) 
12772 
observations 
(2001-2006) 
US 
(Hay and Knechel, 
2010) 
The paper examines the effect of 
advertising and solicitation on 
audit fees 
There was an evidence that advertising is 
associated with higher audit fees while 
solicitation is associated with lower audit fees 
3329 observations 
(1980-2001) 
New 
Zealand 
(Hogan and 
Wilkins, 2008) 
The study examines the response 
of auditors to internal control 
weakness 
Results indicate that companies disclosing higher 
internal control weakness pay higher audit fees. 
6735 observations 
(2003-2004) 
US 
(Huang et al., 
2009) 
The paper explores initial audit 
engagements pricing pre-and 
post-SOX 
The paper found that the big 4 become more 
conservative towards client accepting and pricing 
decisions after SOX, and Big 4 clients pay initial 
year audit fee premium post-SOX 
1691 observations 
(2001) and 1992 
observations 
(2006) 
US 
(Ittonen and Peni, 
2012) 
The paper examines the effect of 
auditor's gender on audit fees 
The paper found evidence that female audit 
engagements partners have significantly higher 
audit fees 
715 observations 
(2006-2006) 
Finland 
Denmark 
Sweden 
(Jeong et al., 2005) The paper investigates the 
relationship between audit fees, 
mandatory auditor assignment 
and the non-audit services 
The paper finds that under a mandatory auditor-
assignment system, auditors charge higher audit 
fees because of the increase in bargaining power. 
Also, non-audit fees are positively associated 
with audit fees. 
2025 observations 
(1999-2002) 
Korea 
272 
 
(Kim et al., 2012) The study examines the effect of 
IFRS adoption on audit fees 
Mandatory IFRS adoption has led to an increase 
in audit fees 
2860 observations 
(2004-2008) 
European 
Union 
Countries 
(Krishnan and Yu, 
2011) 
The study analyses the effect of 
non-audit services on audit fees 
determination 
There is a strong significant negative relationship 
between audit and non-audit fees 
11899 
observations 
(2000-2006) 
US 
(Kwon et al., 2014) The paper examines the effect of 
mandatory audit firm rotation 
regulation, that took place in 
South Korea from 2006-2010, on 
audit fees and audit quality 
Results show that audit fees increased post-
regulation period for mandatory firm rotation 
6710 observations 
(2000-2009) 
South 
Korea 
(Leventis et al., 
2013) 
The paper attempt to find 
evidence if there is a relationship 
between social norms and audit 
pricing 
The paper found evidence that audit firms charge 
higher audit fees to companies that deviate from 
prevailing social norms 
1600 observations 
(2003-2009) 
US 
(Lin and Liu, 
2013) 
The paper explores how 
managerial ownership could 
affect audit pricing in Hong Kong 
The study found that managerial ownership is 
negatively associated with audit pricing in case 
of low and high levels of managerial ownership, 
and positively associated in the intermediate 
level. 
2785 observations 
(1999-2007) 
Hong 
Kong 
(Lin and Yen, 
2016) 
The paper examines the effect of 
IFRS adoption on audit fees in 
China 
The paper found a significant positive 
relationship between IFRS adoption in China on 
audit fees  
4129 observations 
(2005-2008) 
China 
273 
 
(Liu and 
Subramaniam, 
2013) 
The study investigates the impact 
of government ownership on 
audit pricing based on data from 
China 
The study presents empirical evidence that 
enterprises owned by government incur lower 
fees than other enterprises 
8116 observations 
(2001-2008) 
China 
(Lowensohn et al., 
2007) 
The study aims to explore the 
effects of auditor specialization 
on audit fees and quality 
Auditor specialization does not have any effect 
on audit fees but has positive effect on audit 
quality 
241 survey 
response 
US 
(Lyon and Maher, 
2005) 
The paper focuses on the 
relationship between audit fees 
and business risk for bribery-
paying clients doing business in 
developing countries 
The paper provide evidence audit fees were 
higher for bribery-paying clients 
82 observations 
(1974) 
US 
(Matthews and 
Peel, 2003) 
The study tries to find out 
whether there is a difference in 
determinants of audit fees 
nowadays and in the 1900 
Client size, complexity, profitability were the 
main determinants of audit fees in 1900 in line 
with contemporary findings. But for Big N in 
1900 they did not charge fee premium as the 
present Big N appear to do. 
121 observations 
(1900) 
UK 
(McMeeking et al., 
2006) 
The study investigates whether 
big auditing firms are able to earn 
audit fee premium in UK 
The study concludes that audit fee premium 
exists especially in case of provision of non-audit 
services to audit clients 
3240 observations 
(1985-2002) 
UK 
(Mitra et al., 2007) The paper explores the 
relationship between ownership 
structure and audit fees 
The paper found evidence that there is positive 
relation between audit fees and diffused 
institutional stock ownership, while a positive 
relation exists between audit fees and managerial 
stock ownership and institutional block-holder 
358 observations 
(2000) 
US 
274 
 
ownership. No evidence that non-institutional 
block-holder ownership affect audit fees 
(Munsif et al., 
2011) 
The paper investigates the effect 
of remediation of internal control 
on audit fees 
The paper found that companies that remediate 
previously disclosed internal control weaknesses 
pay less audit fees than companies that continue 
reporting internal control weakness 
1610 observations 
(2004-2008) 
US 
(Niemi, 2005) The paper investigates the 
influence of various types of 
client ownership structure on 
audit fees and effort 
The paper provides evidence of lower audit fees 
and hours for management majority-owned 
companies, and higher audit fees and hours for 
foreign majority-owned companies. 
200 observations 
(1996) 
Finland 
(Owusu-Ansah et 
al., 2010) 
The objective of the study is to 
explore the main determinants of 
audit fees in Greece 
Client size, audit firm size, client financial 
condition and auditor change significantly affect 
audit fees in Greece 
145 observations 
(2000) 
Greece 
(Rainsbury et al., 
2009) 
The paper investigates the 
association between audit 
committee quality and audit fees 
in New Zealand 
The results show that audit committee quality has 
little effect on external audit pricing 
87 observations 
(2001) 
New 
Zealand 
(Scott and Gist, 
2013) 
The purpose of this paper is to 
examine the effect of auditor 
change and new auditor 
specialization on audit fees 
There is a positive relationship between audit 
fees and auditor specialization 
221 former 
Andersen audit 
clients who were 
absorbed by the 
remaining Big 4 
firms (2002) 
US 
275 
 
(Seetharaman et 
al., 2002) 
The paper examines whether 
audit fees reflect risk differences 
across liability regimes 
The paper find that auditors of UK firms cross 
listed in US charge higher fees as a risk premium 
for higher litigation risk in the US 
550 observations 
(1996) 
UK 
(Shan and 
Troshani, 2016) 
The purpose of the study is to 
evaluate XBRL and IFRS impact 
on audit fees in China 
The main results of the paper indicate the 
existence of a positive relationship of IFRS 
adoption and audit fees and a negative impact of 
XBRL on audit fees 
1798 observations 
(2000-2011) 
China 
(Shan et al., 2015) The study investigates 
differences between countries of 
the effect of XBRL on audit fees 
Results give empirical evidence of a negative 
relationship between XBRL use and audit fees 
17010 US 
observations 
(2005-2012) 
7067 Japanese 
observations 
(2004-2011) 
US & 
Japan 
(Singh et al., 2014) The paper examines that 
relationship between internal 
audit and external audit pricing 
Results of the paper indicates a significant 
positive relationship between internal audit and 
external audit pricing 
272 observations 
(2005) 
Australia 
(Srinidhi et al., 
2009) 
The paper examines the effects of 
institutions on audit fees and 
specialist premium 
The paper provides evidence that country-level 
institutional strength increases audit fees and 
reduces the demand for specialist auditor 
29840 
observations 
(2000-2004) 
Multi-
countries 
(Goodwin-stewart 
and Kent, 2006) 
The study investigates how the 
existence of audit committee and 
internal audit could affect 
external audit fees 
The study gives empirical evidence that the 
existence of internal audit and audit committee 
existence, more committee meetings are 
associated with higher audit fees. 
401 observations 
(2000) 
Australia 
276 
 
(Sundgren and 
Svanström, 2013) 
The paper investigates how audit 
quality and pricing vary with 
audit firm size 
Results of the study indicate that larger audit 
firms charge higher fees 
4062 observations 
(2005-2009) 
Sweden 
(Taylor and 
Simon, 1999) 
The paper aims to investigate 
macro determinants of audit fees 
Increase in litigation, disclosure requirements 
and regulations increase audit fees 
2300 observations 
(1991-1995) 
20 
countries 
(Villiers et al., 
2013) 
The paper explores the price 
behaviour of audit fees in 
response to changes in the 
variables that are considered as 
main determinants of audit fees 
Audit fees are sticky (do not immediately 
adjusted to changes in their determinants) 
30298 
observations 
(2000-2008) 
US 
(Wang and Zhou, 
2012) 
Investigate the impact of PCAOB 
Auditing Standard No.5 (AS5) on 
audit fees and audit quality 
Audit fees decrease upon the adoption of AS5, 
but audit quality was not affected. 
4928 observations 
(2006-2007) 
US 
(Wang et al., 2009) The paper examines the audit 
fees determining and focusing on 
auditor specialization in China 
market 
Brand name and audit specialization is associated 
by an audit fee premium 
213 observations 
(2005-2007) 
China 
(Whisenant et al., 
2003) 
The study investigates the joint 
determination of audit and non-
audit fees 
The results do not support that non-audit fees 
directly influence audit fees 
2666 observations 
(2000) 
US 
277 
 
(Yao et al., 2015) The paper explores the 
association between the 
revaluation of non-current assets 
and audit pricing 
The paper found that there is a significant 
positive relationship between audit fees and 
revaluation of non-current assets by fair value 
984 observations 
(2003-2007) 
Australia 
(Zerni, 2012) The purpose of the study is to 
examine the relationship between 
auditor specialization and audit 
pricing 
The results of the study give an evidence that 
appointment of a specialist audit partner is 
associated with higher audit fees 
862 observations 
(2003-2007) 
Sweden 
(Zhu and Sun, 
2012) 
The paper focuses on the reform 
of accounting standards in china 
impact on audit pricing 
Audit fees increased significantly after adopting 
the new standards of accounting in China 
802 non-financial 
firms (2007) 
China 
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Table I-2 Summary of main audit report lag literature 
Study Objectives Results Sample Country 
(Abbott et al., 
2012) 
The paper investigates how 
external audit delay is affected 
by the assistance of internal 
audit function 
The paper found that internal audit assistance 
is negatively associated with audit delay 
134 observations 
(2005) US 
(Afify, 2009) 
The paper purpose is to 
investigate the main 
determinants of audit report lag 
Company size, industry, profitability, BOD 
independence, CEO duality and existence of 
audit committee are the main significant 
determinants of audit report lag 
85 observations 
(2007) Egypt 
(Apadore and 
Noor, 2013) 
The paper analyses the 
relationship between audit 
report lag and corporate 
governance characteristics in 
Malaysia 
The results give empirical evidence of a 
significant effect of audit committee size, 
ownership concentration, client's size and 
profitability on audit report lag 
180 observations 
(2009-2010) Malaysia 
(Behn et al., 
2006) 
The paper reports the burdens 
that may prevent auditors from 
reducing report lag 
The study suggests that insufficient personal 
resources prevent auditors from timely 
reporting 
217 survey US 
(Blankley et 
al., 2014) 
The paper examines the 
relationship between future 
financial restatements and 
audit report lags 
Results give empirical evidence that audit 
report lag increase with increased probability 
of financial restatements 
2530 observations 
(2004-2007) US 
279 
 
(Chan et al., 
2016) 
The study seeks to explore the 
determinants of audit report 
lags in China and examine the 
consequences of long audit 
report lags in the subsequent 
years. 
The results indicate that auditor expertise, 
client risk and complexity significantly affect 
audit report timeliness. Clients with longer 
report lag tend to have non-standard audit 
opinion in subsequent years 
4025 observations 
(2004-2010) China 
(Chen et al., 
2014) 
The paper investigates how IT 
capability contributes to 
internal control and external 
audit fees and delays post SOX 
The paper gives evidence that IT capability 
mitigates audit fee increases, but not audit 
delay. 
6381 observations 
(2004-2007) US 
(Enofe et al., 
2013) 
The study investigates the 
relationship between audit firm 
rotation and audit report lag in 
Nigeria 
Results reveal that audit fees, busy season and 
auditor type positively affect audit report lag. 
While audit firm rotation and company size 
negatively affect audit report lag. 
50 observations 
(2011) Nigeria 
(Ettredge et al., 
2006) 
The paper analyses the effect 
of internal control quality on 
audit report lag after SOX 
implementation 
The study provides evidence that audit report 
lag became longer after the implementation of 
SOX. Also, higher internal control weakness 
is associated with longer delays 
4688 observations 
(2003-2004) 
US 
(Habib and 
Bhuiyan, 
2011) 
The paper investigates the 
relationship between auditor 
specialization and audit report 
lag 
Results demonstrate that audit report lag is 
shorter for companies audited by specialised 
auditors 
502 observations 
(2004-2008) New Zealand 
280 
 
(Habib, 2015) 
The paper examines the effect 
of the adoption of the new 
Chinese accounting standards 
on audit report lag 
The paper documents an increase in audit 
report lag after the adoption of Chinese 
accounting standards. 
9969 observations 
(2003-2011) China 
(Hassan, 2016) 
The study purpose is to identify 
the determinants of audit report 
timeliness in Palestine 
Client size, performance, complexity, audit 
committee existence, board size and 
ownership concentration are the main 
determinants of audit report lag in Palestine 
stock exchange. 
46 observations 
(2011) 
Palestine 
(Henderson 
and Kaplan, 
2000) 
The study explores the main 
determinants of audit report lag 
in banking sector 
Results indicate differences between cross-
sectional analysis and panel data, also higher 
explanatory power of panel data exceeds that 
of cross-sectional analysis. 
558 observations 
(1988-1993) 
U. S 
(Imam et al., 
2001) 
The paper examines how audit 
firm size could affect audit 
delay 
The study reveals that audit firms associated 
with international firms have longer report lag 
in Bangladesh 
115 observations 
(1998) 
Bangladesh 
(Johnson et al., 
2002) 
The study explores the effect of 
fiscal year end on audit delay 
and audit fees in the US local 
government sector 
Results indicate that December 31 as a fiscal 
year end showed higher audit fees and audit 
delay than June 30 fiscal year end 
302 observations 
(1998) US 
281 
 
(Khlif and 
Samaha, 2014) 
The paper main objective is to 
investigate the effect of 
internal control quality and 
ESA adoption on audit report 
lag 
ESA adoption and internal control quality 
have reduced audit report lag 
344 observations 
(2007-2010) Egypt 
(Knechel and 
Payne, 2001) 
The purpose of this paper is to 
examine how incremental audit 
effort, audit team allocation 
and the provision of non-audit 
services affect audit report lag. 
Higher audit effort, provision of tax services 
and allocation of less experienced audit team 
are positively correlated with audit report lag. 
226 observations 
(1991) 
Canada 
(Knechel and 
Sharma, 2012) 
The paper examines the effect 
of providing non-audit services 
on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the audit. 
Results reveal that higher non-audit fees are 
associated with shorter audit report lags-as an 
indicator of audit efficiency. 
11793 
observations 
(2000-2003) US 
(Lee et al., 
2009) 
The study examines whether 
auditor tenure and non-audit 
services affect audit report lag 
or not 
Results show that both auditor tenure and 
non-audit services negatively affect audit 
report lag 
18473 
observations 
(2000-2005) US 
(Leventis et 
al., 2005) 
The paper explores the main 
determinants of audit report lag 
for companies in Athens Stock 
Exchange 
Report lag is reduced if the auditor is Big N 
or in case of audit fee premium. While report 
lag increase if there is bad news concerning 
the company. 
171 observations 
(2000) 
Greece 
282 
 
(Mukhtaruddin 
et al., 2015) 
The paper tries to examine how 
client and auditor characteristic 
could affect audit report lag in 
Indonesia. 
The study proofed a positive significant 
relationship of client size and auditor opinion 
on audit report lag, and a non-significant 
effect of client complexity. 
325 observations 
(2008-2012) Indonesia 
(Munsif et al., 
2012) 
The paper examines the 
association between audit 
report lag and weakness in 
internal control 
The paper gives empirical evidence that 
clients with internal control weakness require 
additional audit effort and longer audit report 
lag even after remediation 
5678 observations 
(2008-2009) US 
(Payne and 
Jensen, 2002) 
The paper examines the effects 
of audit firm characteristics on 
municipal audit delay 
The study suggests that municipal size, busy 
season, auditor opinion significantly increase 
audit report lag. 
410 observations 
(1992) US 
(Pizzini et al., 
2015) 
The study explores the effect of 
SOX section 404 on audit 
report lag. 
The study documented a significant increase 
in audit report lag after the implementations 
of SOX section 404 
1356 observations 
(2003-2004) U. S 
(Shin et al., 
2016) 
The study examines how 
human resource investment in 
internal control could affect 
audit report timeliness 
The study reported that experienced 
personnel responsible for internal control 
exists help the auditor in completing the audit 
process more quickly and thus reduce report 
lag 
2702 observations 
(2006-2010) Korea 
283 
 
(Sultana et al., 
2015) 
The study investigates the 
effect of audit committee 
characteristics on audit report 
timeliness 
The study documented that audit report delay 
is shorter if the audit committee is 
characterised with independence and include 
a financial expert 
2470 observations 
(2004-2008) Australia 
(Whitworth 
and Lambert, 
2014) 
The paper examines how 
specific attributes of the audit 
firm could affect audit 
timeliness 
Results indicates that auditor specialization is 
negatively associated with audit report lags, 
while audit office size and client importance 
are positively associated with report delay 
14948 
observations 
(2003-2008) US 
(Yan, 2012) 
The study's purpose is to 
examine the characteristics of 
audit firm could affect audit 
report timeliness 
The paper provides evidence that neither 
audit frim size nor auditor specialization have 
significant effect on timeliness of audit report. 
4899 observations 
(2009-2011) China 
284 
 
Appendix II Variables Operationalisation 
 
Table II-1 Variables operationalisation in audit fees model  
Variable  Sign Source 
Log of total assets  + (Ahmed and Goyal, 2005; Al-Harshani, 2008; Behn et al., 2009; Bell et al., 2008; Bell 
et al., 2001; Cahan and Sun, 2015; Cameran, 2005; Carcello et al., 2002; Chaney et al., 
2004; Chen et al., 2007; Choi et al., 2008; Clatworthy and Peel, 2007; Audousset-
coulier, 2015; Ding and Jia, 2012; Ettredge et al., 2007; Evans Jr. and Schwartz, 2013; 
Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005; Fung et al., 2012; De George et al., 2013; 
Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006; Griffin and Lont, 2011; Hay and Knechel, 2010; Hogan 
and Wilkins, 2008; Huang et al., 2009; Ittonen and Peni, 2012; Jeong et al., 2005; Kim 
et al., 2012; Krishnan and Yu, 2011; Kwon et al., 2014; Leventis et al., 2013; Lin and 
Liu, 2013; Liu and Subramaniam, 2013; McMeeking et al., 2006; Mitra et al., 2007; 
Munsif et al., 2011; Niemi, 2005; Owusu-Ansah et al., 2010; Rainsbury et al., 2009; 
Scott and Gist, 2013; Seetharaman et al., 2002; Shan et al., 2015; Singh et al., 2014; 
Srinidhi et al., 2009; Goodwin-stewart and Kent, 2006; Taylor and Simon, 1999; 
Villiers et al., 2013; Wang and Zhou, 2012; Wang et al., 2009; Whisenant et al., 2003; 
Yao et al., 2015) 
No. of employees  + (Sundgren and Svanström, 2013; Zerni, 2012) 
Log of revenues  + (Clatworthy and Peel, 2007; Griffin and Lont, 2011) 
Sales  + (Chaney et al., 2004; Ettredge et al., 2007; Sundgren and Svanström, 2013) 
Foreign 
subsidiaries/sales/operations 
 + (Carcello et al., 2002; Chaney et al., 2004; Clatworthy and Peel, 2007; Audousset-
coulier, 2015; Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005; Fung et al., 2012; De George 
et al., 2013; Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006; Griffin and Lont, 2011; Hogan and Wilkins, 
2008; Huang et al., 2009; Ittonen and Peni, 2012; Krishnan and Yu, 2011; Leventis et 
al., 2013; Mitra and Hossain, 2007; Munsif et al., 2011; Owusu-Ansah et al., 2010; 
285 
 
Rainsbury et al., 2009; Scott and Gist, 2013; Seetharaman et al., 2002; Shan et al., 
2015; Singh et al., 2014; Srinidhi et al., 2009; Goodwin-stewart and Kent, 2006; 
Sundgren and Svanström, 2013; Villiers et al., 2013; Wang and Fan, 2014; Whisenant 
et al., 2003) 
No. of reportable segments  + (Behn et al., 2009; Cahan and Sun, 2015; Carcello et al., 2002; Clatworthy and Peel, 
2007; Ettredge et al., 2007; Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005; Fung et al., 2012; 
De George et al., 2013; Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006; Griffin and Lont, 2011; Hay and 
Knechel, 2010; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Huang et al., 2009; Krishnan and Yu, 2011; 
Kwon et al., 2014; Leventis et al., 2013; Lin and Liu, 2013; Mitra et al., 2007; Munsif 
et al., 2011; Rainsbury et al., 2009; Singh et al., 2014; Goodwin-stewart and Kent, 
2006; Taylor and Simon, 1999; Villiers et al., 2013; Wang and Zhou, 2012; Whisenant 
et al., 2003) 
Receivables and inventory 
ratio 
 + (Behn et al., 2009; Audousset-coulier, 2015; Ettredge et al., 2007; Hay and Knechel, 
2010; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Huang et al., 2009; Ittonen and Peni, 2012; Kwon et 
al., 2014; Lin and Liu, 2013; Niemi, 2005; Rainsbury et al., 2009; Srinidhi et al., 2009; 
Whisenant et al., 2003; Yao et al., 2015) 
Receivables ratio  + (Cahan and Sun, 2015; Carcello et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2007; Liu and Subramaniam, 
2013; Scott and Gist, 2013; Shan and Troshani, 2016) 
Inventory ratio  + (Mitra et al., 2007; Singh et al., 2014) 
  - (Cahan and Sun, 2015; Liu and Subramaniam, 2013; Shan et al., 2015) 
Leverage  + (Chaney et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2007; Choi et al., 2008; Clatworthy and Peel, 2007; 
Audousset-coulier, 2015; Ettredge et al., 2007; Evans Jr. and Schwartz, 2013; Francis 
et al., 2005; Hay and Knechel, 2010; Ittonen and Peni, 2012; Jeong et al., 2005; 
Krishnan and Yu, 2011; Leventis et al., 2013; Scott and Gist, 2013; Shan et al., 2015; 
Taylor and Simon, 1999; Villiers et al., 2013; Whisenant et al., 2003; Yao et al., 2015) 
  - (Al-Harshani, 2008; Ferguson et al., 2003; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008) 
Current ratio  + (Chaney et al., 2004; Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005; Fung et al., 2012; 
Krishnan and Yu, 2011; Villiers et al., 2013) 
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  - (Evans Jr. and Schwartz, 2013; Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006; Lin and Liu, 2013; Wang 
and Zhou, 2012; Yao et al., 2015; Zhu and Sun, 2012) 
Loss  + (Cahan and Sun, 2015; Chaney et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2007; Evans Jr. and Schwartz, 
2013; Fung et al., 2012; Hay and Knechel, 2010; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Huang et 
al., 2009; Ittonen and Peni, 2012; Krishnan and Yu, 2011; Kwon et al., 2014; Villiers 
et al., 2013; Wang and Zhou, 2012; Wang et al., 2009; Whisenant et al., 2003) 
Return on assets  + (Cahan and Sun, 2015; Villiers et al., 2013) 
  - (Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005; Fung et al., 2012; Hay and Knechel, 2010; 
Ittonen and Peni, 2012; Kwon et al., 2014; Srinidhi et al., 2009; Goodwin-stewart and 
Kent, 2006; Yao et al., 2015) 
Internal control weakness  + (Munsif et al., 2011; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Ettredge et al., 2007; Huang et al., 
2009; Wang and Zhou, 2012; Evans Jr. and Schwartz, 2013) 
Internal audit reliance  + (Singh et al., 2014; Goodwin-stewart and Kent, 2006) 
BOD independence  + (Singh et al., 2014; Mitra et al., 2007; Carcello et al., 2002; Goodwin-stewart and Kent, 
2006) 
CEO duality  + (Lin and Liu, 2013) 
Audit committee meetings  + (Singh et al., 2014) 
Audit committee 
independence 
 + (Mitra et al., 2007; Goodwin-stewart and Kent, 2006) 
Managerial majority 
ownership 
 - (Niemi, 2005; Mitra et al., 2007) 
Owned by a foreign 
multinational parent 
 + (Ahmed and Goyal, 2005; Niemi, 2005) 
Initial engagement  + (Huang et al., 2009) 
  - (Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Niemi, 2005; Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006; Jeong et al., 
2005; Krishnan and Yu, 2011; Whisenant et al., 2003; Behn et al., 2009; Evans Jr. and 
Schwartz, 2013) 
Audit firm size  + (Munsif et al., 2011; Ahmed and Goyal, 2005; Owusu-Ansah et al., 2010; Zhu and Sun, 
2012; Singh et al., 2014; Kwon et al., 2014; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Ettredge et al., 
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2007; Audousset-coulier, 2015; Yao et al., 2015; Lin and Liu, 2013; Chen et al., 2007; 
Cahan and Sun, 2015; Liu and Subramaniam, 2013; Shan et al., 2015; Goodwin-stewart 
and Kent, 2006; Wang et al., 2009; Leventis et al., 2013; De George et al., 2013; Choi 
et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2012; Choi et al., 2009; Taylor and Simon, 1999; Ghosh and 
Lustgarten, 2006; Jeong et al., 2005; Whisenant et al., 2003; Behn et al., 2009; 
Sundgren and Svanström, 2013; Ferguson et al., 2003; Wang and Zhou, 2012; Evans 
Jr. and Schwartz, 2013; Clatworthy and Peel, 2007; Cameran, 2005) 
Auditor specialization  + (Kwon et al., 2014; Srinidhi et al., 2009; Scott and Gist, 2013; Cahan and Sun, 2015; 
Zerni, 2012; Leventis et al., 2013; Fung et al., 2012; Francis et al., 2005; Ferguson et 
al., 2003) 
Provision of non-audit fees  + (Clatworthy and Peel, 2007; Audousset-coulier, 2015; Huang et al., 2009; Griffin and 
Lont, 2011; Zerni, 2012; De George et al., 2013; Jeong et al., 2005) 
  - (Ittonen and Peni, 2012; Krishnan and Yu, 2011) 
Busy season  + (Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Ettredge et al., 2007; Lin and Liu, 2013; Griffin and Lont, 
2011; Leventis et al., 2013; De George et al., 2013; McMeeking et al., 2006; Francis 
et al., 2005; Chaney et al., 2004; Evans Jr. and Schwartz, 2013; Clatworthy and Peel, 
2007) 
Non-standard auditor opinion  + (Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Ettredge et al., 2007; Huang et al., 2009; Cahan and Sun, 
2015; Liu and Subramaniam, 2013; Griffin and Lont, 2011; Leventis et al., 2013; 
Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006; Krishnan and Yu, 2011; Behn et al., 2009; Fung et al., 
2012; Francis et al., 2005; Wang and Zhou, 2012; Evans Jr. and Schwartz, 2013) 
  - (Chen et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2009) 
Cross-listed client  + (Audousset-coulier, 2015; Liu and Subramaniam, 2013; Seetharaman et al., 2002; De 
George et al., 2013) 
Restatement  + (Huang et al., 2009; Leventis et al., 2013; Jeong et al., 2005) 
Female auditor partner   (Ittonen and Peni, 2012) 
Auditor education and 
experience 
 + (Cahan and Sun, 2015) 
Auditor location  + (Clatworthy and Peel, 2007) 
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  - (Chen et al., 2007) 
XBRL adoption  - (Shan and Troshani, 2016; Shan et al., 2015) 
IFRS adoption  + (Zhu and Sun, 2012; De George et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2012) 
SOX implementation  + (Evans Jr. and Schwartz, 2013)(Griffin and Lont, 2011) 
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Table II-2 Variable operationalisation of audit report lag model  
Variable sign Source 
Log of total assets + (Leventis et al., 2005; Afify, 2009; Yan, 2012; Blankley et al., 2014) 
- (Ettredge et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2009; Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011; Abbott et al., 
2012; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Munsif et al., 2012; Apadore and Noor, 2013; 
Whitworth and Lambert, 2014; Habib, 2015; Shin et al., 2016) 
Foreign subsidiaries/sales + (Whitworth and Lambert, 2014) 
- (Blankley et al., 2014; Khlif and Samaha, 2014) 
No. of reportable segments + (Ettredge et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2009; Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011; Knechel and 
Sharma, 2012; Chan et al., 2016) 
Loss + (Ettredge et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2009; Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011; Abbott et al., 
2012; Munsif et al., 2012; Yan, 2012; Blankley et al., 2014; Whitworth and 
Lambert, 2014; Chan et al., 2016) 
ROA - (Afify, 2009; Apadore and Noor, 2013; Khlif and Samaha, 2014) 
Leverage + (Ettredge et al., 2006; Abbott et al., 2012; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Khlif and 
Samaha, 2014; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014; Shin et al., 2016) 
- (Chan et al., 2016) 
Extraordinary items + (Ettredge et al., 2006; Abbott et al., 2012) 
Financial industry + (Ettredge et al., 2006) 
 - (Afify, 2009) 
High tech industry - (Ettredge et al., 2006) 
BOD independence - (Afify, 2009) 
CEO duality + (Habib, 2015) 
- (Afify, 2009) 
Audit committee existence - (Afify, 2009) 
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Audit committee size - (Apadore and Noor, 2013) 
Internal control weakness + (Abbott et al., 2012; Munsif et al., 2012; Blankley et al., 2014) 
Internal audit - (Abbott et al., 2012) 
Ownership concentration + (Apadore and Noor, 2013) 
Audit firm size + (Shin et al., 2016) 
- (Leventis et al., 2005) 
Auditor specialization + (Blankley et al., 2014) 
- (Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014) 
Auditor tenure - (Lee et al., 2009; Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011; Knechel and Sharma, 2012) 
Auditor change + (Ettredge et al., 2006; Whitworth and Lambert, 2014; Chan et al., 2016) 
Non-audit services provision - (Lee et al., 2009; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Blankley et al., 2014) 
Busy season + (Lee et al., 2009; Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011; Abbott et al., 2012; Whitworth and 
Lambert, 2014) 
- (Blankley et al., 2014) 
Non-standard audit opinion + (Leventis et al., 2005; Ettredge et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2009; Knechel and Sharma, 
2012; Yan, 2012; Blankley et al., 2014; Habib, 2015; Chan et al., 2016; Shin et 
al., 2016) 
- (Munsif et al., 2012; Khlif and Samaha, 2014) 
Restatement + (Ettredge et al., 2006; Abbott et al., 2012; Knechel and Sharma, 2012; Blankley et 
al., 2014) 
IFRS adoption + (Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011) 
SOX implementation + (Ettredge et al., 2006; Mitra et al., 2015) 
 
 
